

THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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THE ANDOVER REVIEW.

PRESS NOTICES.

The April number of the ANDOVER REVIEW is very noteworthy for other matter besides the text of the "Teaching of the Apostles." President Porter, of Yale, contributes a paper on the Christian Ministry, so full of striking thoughts for students of divinity that we commend it earnestly to their attention. . . . Professor Egbert C. Smyth furnishes an abstract of Bryennios' extended and learned Introduction, and a critical estimate of the value of the document ["Teaching of the Twelve Apostles"]; and we have also copious notes by Professor Smyth, and by Dr. Starbuck, who translates the manuscript. The editorial matters that finish the number are very bright, critical, and fresh, discussing some of the recent stirring questions. Altogether the fourth number of the REVIEW is the ablest and liveliest of the series, and we are not surprised to learn that it is rapidly gaining in circulation. — *New York Observer*.

The ANDOVER REVIEW begins to have plenty of spirit in it. It is growing more and more to be a practical force in theological and religious circles, and is the mouthpiece of the best thought in the Congregationalist denomination. It is even more than this. It looks as if it might be the rallying centre of many of the best tendencies in the present religious life of the country. The number for April, quite as much as that for March, indicates the new line of thinking that has come to control not only Andover Seminary, but the minds of the men who are leading the thought of the day. . . . It is brimming full of honest work and honest thought, and has already become a necessity to scholarly and thoughtful people. — *Boston Advertiser*.

The February number of this REVIEW comes to us full of good things, even fuller than was the first number. Its leading paper is a profound treatise on the Christian Conception of Providence, by Lewis O. Brastow, D. D., though to us the most interesting articles are Dr. Newman Smyth's review of Harris's Philosophical Basis of Theism, President Buckham's very thoughtful and suggestive article on Lay Theology, and the first of two papers on the Theological Tendencies in Germany, by the Rev. J. H. W. Stuckenberg, of Berlin. Dr. Newman Smyth's review is valuable not only for the eminently clear and comprehensive exposition of the contents of one of the most important books issued in our country within recent years, but especially for the incidental lucid statement of the leading principles of that "progressive orthodoxy" which this REVIEW represents. . . . On the whole the number is so good that if succeeding ones will do no more than come up to it, the REVIEW will demand a place in the home of every one who would keep up with the thinking of the times. — *The Moravian*.

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VOL. I.—JUNE, 1884.—No. VI.

TRANSITION PERIODS IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

By transition periods in religious thought I mean those of change in its form or substance, spirit or methods. I say change, not progress. Movement is not necessarily progress, though it always attends on it, and is essential to it. It may be its necessary condition, yet not in the direct line of advance, and it may sometimes embarrass us to determine whether or not it is the adjutant or accompaniment of it. Like a river, it may be deflected into a lateral or reflux course, or be perturbed into eddy and meander, in flanking some headland lying directly across its main direction, which otherwise it could not pass; or it may have to climb by a zigzag path some height whose steep ascent it could not directly surmount.

Such as yet indeterminate movements often perplex us. They may or may not be auxiliary to true progress; and our perplexity may lead to false judgment and false treatment of them; may betray us into careless and disastrous confidence, or into unwarranted and mischievous hostility or alarm; and this very much according to the different prepossessions with which we approach them. There may be, also, varieties of opinion as to what is the direction of genuine progress, what are its tests, and what the true objective goal.

On all these accounts I avoid using the term "progress" in the statement of my theme, as my object in this paper is to inquire into the treatment of transition movements whose character and tendency may be regarded as yet indeterminate—an inquiry apparently of especial relevancy to the present time, as the dangers and difficulties of a transition period seem to many looming up before us and waiting around any mistaken judgment and action of ours in regard to it.

And first, one of the gravest dangers is that of supposing that such transition periods can be avoided, or are in their nature necessarily evil. Such periods, welcome or unwelcome, coveted or dreaded, are sure to come, coming on the world like a barometric storm, cyclonic at times in both suddenness and force, or like the slow and silent approach of spring, — or winter, if you will; still it is in the ordinance of nature and the order of life that they should come. It is a necessity of social progress by the very idea of the term, and is inwrought with its history and philosophy in all the past. Such changes are incorporate with the life of the world, synchronous with its life-pulses and the forces of its progressive building and uplift. "Behold I make all things new," is the divine declaration of the consummation of the coming of the kingdom of God. Mind, science, thought, feeling — the architects of that kingdom — must be in perpetual flux in all before God's throne in the eternal approach of the finite to the Infinite and Unapproachable One.

Movement is the law of all living things and of subsistence in the material universe. Especially is this true of intellectual and moral being. If mind lives, it will move. If thought lives, it will change with the changing standpoints and outlooks of man's eternal self-hood in the infinite universe. God is forever one and the same; but such is not man nor the aspects of the infinite being he is to traverse.

Certainly there must be transition periods of thought in all things to which human science attaches. Truth is eternally the same, but man's science of that truth is not so. His capacity, culture, experience, and mental position are mutable factors.

A conflict with this law of transition in thought were as hopeless as a conflict with that of the seasons or the roll of the world.

Nor were it desirable to arrest it if practicable or supposable. It were an attempt to antagonize a necessity of our own moral and intellectual life. It is true that change may be disaster, ruin, death. Still, for finite man, life and growth, transition and progress are indissolubly united. Change of truth in some regard, as of aspect or relation, form or essence; or of new analyses, syntheses, developments, — novelty, in some form, seems essential to its sustained life-force. God passes before us ever the same, yet eternally new as the ever-rolling skies. Agitation that waits on change may derange, dislocate, undermine, destroy; yet it shakes off, eliminates, and drives away dead things; it roots and anchors deeper and firmer the living growths, and makes proof of what

cannot be shaken and will remain. The waters of life are a river, no standing pool. Life flows ; stagnation is death.

When I speak of transitional periods, I do not imply that any periods are without transitional movement. The eternal flux of mind never stops. It were a syncope of the world's heart were it to do so. But in some periods the current of change flows with more rapidity, certainly with more visible rapidity and manifest force than at others. The tendency to revise, reform, amend, and rehabilitate, and the impulse to innovation or revolution, are more decidedly and boldly self-pronounced.

The life of the world goes on by pulse and paroxysm rather than by continuous uniform stress. The transition period is that of long hidden and silently working forces, suddenly coming to outburst or outflash, or, to change the figure, of floods long, and it may be slowly, accumulating, then suddenly breaking their barrier and rushing into rapids.

But, however occurring, it is of the gravest importance to be able to recognize their approach and to know how to treat them when they come. Not to be prevented or arrested or beaten back any more than the tides of the ocean, by mere awe of authority or by denunciation or anathema, still they may be moderated, moulded, guided, enlightened, and pervaded by a beneficent intelligence and purpose, under wise appliances.

Such movements, if they come with kindness, candor, logic, and argument, are certainly to be met with a kindred spirit of fairness, charity, and reason.

If they come with a different spirit and method, little is gained by imitating them in this respect. Truth can always afford to be patient, calm, kind, temperate, candid, liberal, charitable. Matters of grave logic and reason are not to be met by innuendo and fling, nor by crimination and suspicion, nor more, by beautiful enthusiasms or gush of pious pity and goodish platitudes, but by sober, serene, earnest, and severe reason and logic.

Transition periods are those of great opportunity as well as of great dangers ; they are pivotal and plastic for the issues of a vast future. They often determine the direction, quality, and consequence of religious thought for a cycle of centuries. The question of their treatment, therefore, becomes one of vast consequence. It often gives them their distinctive permanent strain and spirit. Often they are plastic and amenable to wise, kindly, candid reason, while they may be made passionate, malign, fanatic, and anarchical by mere invective. The movement may

often be enlightened, regulated, and rightly attuned, which cannot be beaten back or stopped. It is of vital importance, then, that we recognize such periods on approach and know how to deal with them wisely when present. For, as we do this or fail to do it, they will do us good or evil; or at least much of their possible good may be lost, and much of evitable evil may be incurred.

Ordinarily they are not difficult of recognition. Often we are conscious of their approach as of something abnormal and bodeful in the air, as the chill of the iceberg on the sea or the hot pulse of the cyclone on the atmosphere. There is a murmur in the deeps or on the heights as of the coming earthquake or tempest; something strange, if not out of nature, out of wontage, seems to be abroad and about us. New modes of thinking, feeling, speaking, manifest themselves as gradually coming on, significant of change now in process, or already accomplished and soon to be pronounced, — a change which, whether called reform or revolution, is destined to shape the present to new issues, and leave much of the past behind it.

The old forms of thought are not usually reasoned down or voted out, or formally repudiated. They usually pass silently into disuse, as no longer representing existing phases of feeling or belief in the public mind. They have lost their working power. In their place, in like manner, without formal election or decree, new forms that better meet the existing condition of mind and of working force will gradually and silently be installed. The change may be wise or unwise, permanent or transient; may be passionate and spurious, or legitimate and rational; may be for the furtherance or the hindrance of the truth. That is not the present question. We are now simply inquiring of the signs of the approach, independently of the character of the change. Changes necessary as requisite steps in the advance of all progressive science and culture may be reasonably expected; yet even these may be intemperate, violent, and inordinate, and require prudential forecast and judicious treatment.

Of course every outcry of arraignment or exultation from the camp of unbelievers is not to be regarded as heralding the advance of a transition period. Indictments of Christianity and prophecies of its downfall are always rife with those offended with its ethics or its creed and alien from its spirit. With such the wish is father to the crimination and prediction.

Nor is the actual coming of such periods in such cases any assurance of their reasonableness, righteousness, or beneficence.

There has ever been, and ever will be, until there is a spiritual renovation of the race, frequent defection and revolt from Christianity because of hostility to its very essence and spirit. Society is ever full of volatile, uneasy, restless spirits, to whom unrest is chronic, and indeed is their only repose. It is useless to fashion things for their relief: quiet to them were torture. But there may be voices that are truly cries from the deeps, as of "spirits in prison," of souls restless, troubled, anxious, earnest, truthful, sincere, that long unspeakably for light, clearness, and rest, amid the problems and enigmas of the universe, as it seems to them, unsolved by formulated theologic thought, in which, perplexed, they recognize ghost-like forms that were living oracles in past eras, but are dumb or Delphic now. There are such minds, against whom the charges of irreverence or insincerity were most unjust, and by whom they would be repudiated and resented as false, bigoted, and cruel. Unquestionably, the character and destiny of such persons will be largely affected by the treatment which transition movements in theologic thought may receive. For the sake of such persons, and for the sake of truth itself, it were wise and well we should study rightly to recognize and deal with transition epochs.

Whenever, therefore, a chasm seems gradually growing between faith and culture, and between Creed and Belief, and formularies current and ancient seem gradually losing their hold and power with the public mind, — with the mind of the thinking and scholarly, the scientist and philosopher, and with the common sense and feeling of the million as well, — there is a suggestion that we pause and interrogate these phenomena: what is their cause, significance, and monition? What has severed things naturally so allied? and what remedy is practicable for healing that unnatural and disastrous schism?

And first, why is this severance? Is it because the formulated creed is no longer in accord with the Christian consciousness of the age, — a consciousness instructed by more careful study of Scripture and by the spirit and utterances and life of Christ, as well as by general culture and intelligence increasing with the years, and so dogma and reason and conscience are at variance? or is it because the spirit of the age is wild, wanton, worldly, idly conceited, infidel? and if so, how came it so? How came the public mind into this morbid, corrupt, and portentous condition?

In either case the situation demands grave heed, and will furnish matter for important inquiry and instruction. If it is caused

by a seeming conflict between revelation on the one hand, and natural science and our moral consciousness on the other, it will be well to inquire into the cause of this apparent conflict; whether possibly something defective or fallacious in our theories of revelation, inspiration, interpretation, or canonicity, or of the validity and authority of ecclesiastical precedent and tradition, or something at fault in our philosophical method or logic in the application of those theories, may be in any degree responsible for it. If the difficulty has originated from a false conception of Revelation as the disclosure of a perfect moral system, requiring or admitting no suggestion of hypothesis in relief against seeming defect or hardship, it is well we should be recalled to the obvious and necessary fact that the Scriptures could present to us only fragments, not the entirety of a moral system; isolated peaks, not a complete landscape; special glimpses, not a synopsis of chainwork whose interstitial links are lost from sight; and it may behoove us to inquire whether the attempted welding of these isolated fragments into one continuous, compact, adamant system, precluding all relief against its immediate stringency by hypotheses of interstitial links not yet brought to light, has not put an unnecessary strain on the faith that accepts such a system; and also whether that strain has not been intensified by false views of the validity of authority of ecclesiastical precedent and tradition, forgetting that mere time is far from being an infallible warrant for truth and authority in a world where next oldest to the kingdom of heaven is the kingdom of hell. Questions of this order, especially relevant and exigent in transition eras, require to be treated with the candor and calmness of an unimpassioned logic, free but reverent, animated simply and supremely with the love of truth and of Christ.

Animated with such a spirit, and feeling the transition pulses — whether of health or fever — from all the past — from Judaism and Paganism to Christianity; from the patristic to the mediæval church, and on through the periods of the Lutheran reform, the philosophic revolt and religious eclipse of the 17th and 18th centuries, and the crimson saturnalia and catastrophe of the French revolution to the reaction to Christianity, evangelistic or rationalistic, of our times, — standing in memory and continued appulse of all these movements, coming oft in most “questionable shapes,” and “bringing with them airs from heaven or blasts from hell,” the Church may still look with the courage of hope on the agitation of the present, confident that the Burning Wheels are out on the

floods, and this very tumult of the waves may be part of the coming of the Lord. And the thought seems pressing on the hour whether a theology to a greater degree embracing Christ as its living centre, regarding Him as the personal, consummate revelation of God, subordinating Lawgiver, Prophet, Psalmist, and Apostle, — himself *the truth* and the supreme and ultimate test and interpreter of all revelation, — would not do much to harmonize seeming discrepancies attaching to inchoate stages of a progressive theologic development, by the final expression of himself by God in the Christ of the New Testament.

But the Church cannot well ignore extensive, persistent, and pronounced tendencies to transition movements, from whatever causes arising. If morbid, capricious, irrational, they point to diseases it may be vital to recognize and, if practicable, remedy. But not uncommonly they indicate some real grave cause imbedded in its theology, some incongruity or conflict with the living reason and moral consciousness of the world: an incongruity and conflict which must be relieved, or it will peril the faith of men; at first, it may be, of the thinkers, but, subsequently, of the million. History points to such incongruities and conflicts in the past, and emphasizes the need of giving them timely heed. Some dogmas once consecrated in the belief of the church, and championed by the greatest intellects and its noblest and saintliest men, and bound fast by adamant logic in its creed, if now pushed on the world, would drive it into infidelity. The monstrous dogma of the eternal perdition of young infants, and of others who from *mere defect of baptism* were doomed to wander forever without the Gates of Light, — a dogma numbering among those accepting it such names as Augustine among the Fathers, and as Dante among the grandest minds of the Middle Ages, — would, if now persisted in, wreck the faith of the age. Terrible is the strain brought upon men's loyalty to Christianity by a theology claiming to be its exponent, which seems to them, as in the case above, to place the God of the Scriptures in conflict with the eternal sentiments of right and mercy and love which He has planted in the human soul. Something must give way in such a case, something must move, either this gloomy theology or the throne of God. Their faith in the God of Revelation as disclosed in the creed or that in the ineffaceable instincts of their moral nature must yield. In such cases, adhesion to the creed is the destruction of belief.

Such a strain has been laid on Christian faith in past ages. It is not impossible it should be so again. Tendencies to any such

result should engage our inquiries, on indications of the approach of transition periods. True, the dogma above noted is of exceptional atrocity. But the fact that it could exist and command the championship of such men as defended it makes it not incredible that something similar, if less monstrous, should linger, even in ages that have learned to abhor that dogma.

Whenever the current and time-honored creeds cease to command the beliefs or emotions of men, and seem no longer congruous with the moral instincts and intuitions of the million or the culture of the learned; when old formularies are disappearing from the pulpit and from literature, whether addressed to the savans or the masses; — whether it be that those formularies have lost position in the belief of preachers and writers themselves, or are ignored from a consciousness of their repugnancy to the convictions of the multitude, and their incompetency to serve longer as instruments for the conversion of men, — then, whatever may be the cause, it is time to hang out storm signals.

It is certain that the mind of society will not long remain quiet in this incongruity between a nominally accepted creed and the actual utterance. Something must soon change. In what direction shall the change be, and how best met, becomes an urgent rational inquiry. Either the approaching movement must be resisted, stopped, and turned back, or such modification of the old creeds must be yielded to it as shall put them more in harmony with the mind of the age and the living beliefs of men, and such as shall tend to imbue the transition movement with a kind, sober, and temperate spirit and bring it under wise and beneficent control.

The first impulse will naturally be to suppress, because of those tendencies inherent in society which always antagonize change. These are termed conservative, and, kept within wise degree, they are truly so; but beyond that, becoming absolute and dominant, they are the deadliest of destructives, and kill even what they would conserve.

This instinctive antagonism to change is constituted of elements that may be beneficent or maleficent in kind or degree. There are vested interests of position, reputation, influence, or of wealth, place, power, representing a constant inertia and a disposition to hold things as they are. Society has adjusted itself, its thinking, feeling, acting, to the existing status, and has learned to find repose in it. Transition disturbs and annoys it, offends its self-complacency and sense of security, and provokes its resentments by alarming its fears. So it shrinks within its bristling prejudices,

like a porcupine within its quills, ready to wound any touch that would incite movement.

To many, moreover, because of their special idiosyncrasy, change is ever distasteful and fearful. They start back with natural terror from the perspective of advance. To leave present intrenchments and venture beyond the range of present ideas seems like a plunge into chaos. This feeling drives multitudes, often of the most estimable and worthy, the philanthropic and the timid, the sincere lovers of church and society and of order and truth, as well as the indolent, the selfish, and the placeman, into the ranks of conservatism and opposition to the new movement. An opposition which, with its various elements, it were most unjust to denounce as characteristically selfish or bigoted, for it will naturally have some of the noblest and purest elements blending with it, whose antagonism to hasty, rash, capricious, or ambitious change is an instinct in society for its self-preservation. But conservatism is a check, not a motor, and its function as a check is to regulate and moderate, not to stop transition. Change is growth and life.

But the danger is lest, on the appearance of the signs of change I have indicated, in the first alarm the impulse should be toward immediate, arbitrary, stringent repression. No chapters in human history are more opprobrious than those which record such attempts; none more disastrous and ultimately more hopeless. No resentments are more passionate or cruel than those evoked on both sides at such time by the policy of absolute, unreasoning repression, whether by physical or moral force, — resentments usually the more vehement and bitter in proportion to the consciousness of incompetency of logic, and especially so in realms of religious thought. Here, change, displacement, or modification of that which, with time and custom, has come to be regarded as a divinely established order, becomes audacious sacrilege; and the sense of assault on ourselves becomes intensified, in our eyes, to that of an outrage on God and his truth, and an impious recreancy to Christ and his church. Then partisan or selfish passions consecrate themselves as vindicators of the insulted honor of Christ and the violated majesty of Heaven, and as the executors of divine wrath against dissidents and gainsayers.

But like begets like, and by a natural reaction against felt injustice, the repressed reformer becomes embittered into the fanatic and anarchist, and poses in his own thought, and soon in the eyes of the multitude, as a confessor and a martyr, a champion of Christ and his truth against stupid bigotry or hypocrisy or spirit-

ual despotism, that by human tradition and arrogant philosophy would drag down Christianity into dishonor and unbelief. Meantime, conservatism, alarmed, rushes on the incipient movement to stamp it out as one would a flame kindling on our dwellings, and often only to scatter into a conflagration what it would extinguish.

If the movement lies deep in reason and Christian consciousness, the attempted repression will, at the most, only effect a surface arrest or reflux, as futile ultimately as the storm surge against the profound tides of the ocean. Repression, failing, tends to a stronger and more serious outbreak. The dammed-up river accumulates a mass for a mightier overflow. The peaceful stream breaks into rapids or a devastating inundation. Repression without removal of cause were impossible, and, could it succeed, most disastrous. It would only make wider the divergence between theology and the living reason and conscience of men, relegating it to incredulity and impotency or oblivion.

Happy will it be for the Church if, instructed by the scandals and disasters of past theological controversies, she shall have learned a more excellent way, and recognizing the inevitableness of transitions as the method of progress, she shall see to it that they be wrought and imbued with a spirit of truth and love; and that when one, foretokened widely by signs such as above noted, and numbering among those to a degree favoring it many whom the Christian public has learned to love and trust as candid, devout, and wise Christian men, should come forward reverently and temperately, with suggestions of change, presented in a spirit of ingenuousness, sober reason, and love, it shall meet with a kindred spirit of candor and logic and a charity not prejudging it as unchristian because it suggests change, or charging against it all the excesses or crudities liable to attach to the initial period and the extreme left of all reforms. When this shall be the attitude of the Church toward such movements, and when those engaged in them shall hold fast patience of faith and hope and love, with sobriety and humbleness of mind alike under suspicion or flattery, denunciation or panegyric, with trust in Christ and truth, moving calmly on, discarding of the past only what, having served its purpose, can, being retained, only obstruct the growth to which it had ministered, — even as the tree kindly drops in autumn the leaves once beautiful and ministrant, but now withered and dead, — and admitting such changes only as shall prove themselves legitimate offshoots of the one original life-germ, THE ETERNAL CHRIST, — when such a phase of a transition period shall appear, then indeed

will the Captain of our salvation lead his Church by living fountains of waters, and her day-star of progress, emerging from the murky, storm-vexed, sometime crimson past, shall shine higher and higher to the perfect day.

But some may urge, "Such a spectacle has never been seen in the history of the world; its appearance will only open the Millennium." True, and until something like it becomes fact there will be little approach to a Millennium; but it still is an ideal to which all ought to aspire, and one for attaining which we all ought to strive and pray perpetually, and we can accomplish much by individually so doing, though its full realization may be in the distant future. Transition movements are sure to come, and they will surely do us much good or much evil, according as we treat them. Even those which are not genuine nor of beneficent impulse can seldom fail to disclose to us some truth, some danger or defect, or some opportunity it much behooves us to know. And certainly he must be blind who does not recognize grave aspects of change on the present hour, and he can have little sympathy with the cause of Christian truth in the world, or but slight appreciation of the vast issues that are opening, who does not regard the aspect of the times with gravest interest, whether of hope or solicitude, and feel impelled in no partisan interest, but for the love of Christ and his truth, to urge at this time the vital importance of caution, calmness, candor, and charity.

It is of vital consequence that we be prepared to meet these issues with minds so instructed and armed that we be not driven from our steadfastness or our charity. Let us beware of the delusion into which past ages have been so prone to fall, of imagining that, with us or our times, theology has become a finished science, fixed, complete, and changeless in substance and form, all innovation upon which is laying presumptuous hands on a divinely perfect temple, and that consequently all change or modification suggested is profane and mischievous. Let us not forget that theology must be a progressive science while it is a study of the Infinite by the finite, and while, though one of the factors is immutable, the other is perpetually changing, in stand-point, faculty, and competency. We can now clearly see that without transitions in the past, that were deprecated and anathematized in their time, Christian faith would have been shipwrecked. Let us beware lest, in disregard of past experience and of the philosophy of progress, we exasperate, and make malign and disastrous, movements we are impotent to suppress, but might by kind and candid treatment guide to beneficent issues.

Let us, on the other hand, beware of imagining that we of the present time are called, as new creators into a virgin field, into the science of theology, with a new revelation and an abjuration of the past, embarking church and society on a chartless and unknown sea of wild and anarchical speculation. Let us remember the methods of true progress are not destruction, but development; not divulsion, but engrafting. Nor let us ignore Christ's promise of his perpetual presence with his Church, and of the ever-abiding gift and guidance of the Holy Spirit who should keep the things of Christ in perpetual suggestion and remembrance;—a promise which, if it has accomplished nothing true and permanent in theologic science in the eighteen and a half centuries past, can give but little assurance of ever doing so.

Let us not forget the process of past progress, that it has been gradual, disciplinary, educational, from the simple and elementary to the deeper and higher knowledge of the things of God; that it has been by holding fast certain great central and primordial facts and organic and germinal truths (or, perhaps I should say one person around whom these truths and facts gather, and in whom they inhere),—facts and truths clearly revealed, but for the most part separate from their systemic or philosophical relations,—that it has been by holding fast these facts and truths in their gradual unfolding under the Divine Spirit, to the gradually enlarging culture and competency of the Church, that whatever has been accomplished of genuine theologic progress in the past has been achieved.

Let us not, therefore, look at transition as of course ill-boding or malevolent. Change is not necessarily hostility, nor modification of form a destruction of substance; on the contrary, it is often the conservation of the principle and the necessity of the life. The amputation or excision is the saving from death. Reform vitalizes and guards order; it enables truth to protect itself. Removing appanages unlimbers the ordnance; it disengages the sword-arm. Retrenchment of accessories is often casting away the mail that with the progress of time only cumbers and fetters. It is the abandonment of a redoubt whose indefensibleness exposes the whole line. Modification may come not to destroy, but to fulfill, and the abandonment of the old form may be the advance beyond the need of it. The type is embodied in life. The grain has developed to fruitage because it has died.

Persons may shrink from any modification of any article or element in a system, lest it should sweep away or subvert the entire

structure in which it inheres, and this often with reason. With some minds and with some doctrines there is this danger, of which it is well to beware. On the other hand, persons may repel a modification not because it is not logical or scriptural, but it seems to them to remove or impoverish the motives which in their view are essential to give power to Christian truth over the minds of men.

To this latter order of thought and feeling it may be said, in the first place, that such treatment of the question of a religious truth is neither rational, philosophical, nor reverent. For, in the first place, truth can be permanently built on no falsehood, and if any system of truth is made to rest on such a foundation, it is in perpetual danger. The sooner the illusive support is removed and one real placed under it, the better and safer for truth itself and the world. And, in the second place, in the question, What is truth? the supreme inquiry is not concerned with the motive forces resulting, in our view, from a certain belief, or with its consequences in other directions, but with the truth itself, — what are the positive, intrinsic, or scriptural evidences of it? Our first great quest is truth; the consequences we leave to the God of truth.

But, indeed, how to create or sustain motives best adapted to save a soul or a world is a question which we are often little competent to determine. I learn this from the history of the world. I believe firmly in a God of Reason and Love, and Almighty, and that his reason and love run through all the history of the world and adopt the measures and methods most potent to restore it. But how the world's history has wrought towards this result is a problem too high, too vast, too complicated for me. The scheme I see actually at work seems little like one I should have devised to create motive forces requisite to regenerate it; I see that Almighty Reason and Love go forward in the scheme of saving the race on a plan beyond my power of thorough understanding in the historic and natural realm. It must certainly be so in the moral realm; and I am as little entitled to sit in judgment on the form and method of motive forces in the one case as the other. It certainly then behooves me, in the interpretation of Scripture given by divine inspiration, to accept the natural construction of language God has chosen to employ, and not to force upon it an import in accordance with my ideas of what He should have said in order to the highest incitement to repentance and salvation. The latter is clearly presumption and irreverence. In this question of motive forces to the best result in the exegesis of Scripture, I find I am a learner (a *disciple*), not a master; that it is mine to listen, not to

dictate — to simply interpret, not prescribe the mind of the Revelator.

Again, nothing is more deceptive than our reasoning to doctrines from motives probably resulting from them. As God is truth, we believe truth is in the end the mightiest of things, and on it wait the strongest forces, stimulant or suasive; and if a statement claims to be sustained by Scripture and our rational consciousness, it is to be tried by them, and it is illogical and irreverent to decide on reception or rejection of it on the ground of supposed consequence to motives, though the fear of evil from a false judgment may well bring the mind into the white light of perfect candor in forming its decision.

Nor can we tell what degree of stringency from immediateness, absoluteness, or certainty of consequences may give motives their most beneficent influence on character and action. For example, it were most illogical to postulate the exegesis of 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20, on the ground of the supposed effect of a certain interpretation of it on the motives to the immediate repentance of the individual, or to the enterprise of missions to the heathen world. We might suppose that if it were clearly written by revelation over this world, "Here and now only is probation and salvation possible. To those unsaved here is reserved in the world beyond only the blackness of darkness forever," it would be the strongest motive to bring men to Christ. Or we might suppose if the term of human life were definitely fixed and made known to men, like that of a man under sentence of death from the courts, it would conduce most mightily to securing his effort for personal salvation against the known day of his death; or that if in every case with the offer of salvation the preacher were authorized to announce absolutely that that offer was single and final, and that with its acceptance or rejection would be settled irrevocably the everlasting doom of the hearer, it would be the strongest measure to induce immediate acceptance of the gospel. We might so think and so reason. But it has not so pleased God to deal with man. He has not placed him under the stress of such absolute, immediately certain, and irrevocable results. He deals with him in long-suffering, telling him the crucial and final crisis is sure to come, — to come he knows not when, — and that it may be now; and leaves him with that play of motives under certainty of law and ultimate issue, but under uncertainty of time, which seems thus, in Divine thought, to be best adapted, in the long run, to secure the salvation of man.

We may certainly believe God's long-suffering is wiser and stronger than man's instantaneousness and absoluteness of limitation. Nor need we fear that if in some cases the possibility of an offer of salvation through Christ beyond this life to those for whom He died, but who never heard of Him in this, may be suggested conjecturally by the revealed fact that once Christ "went and preached to the spirits in prison," — we need not fear, if through the natural exegesis of this passage a chink of light is allowed to open in possible cases into the fearful mystery of the world beyond the grave, that thereby is operated a jail-delivery of the Abyss, or that the doctrine of a future retribution is swept away; or that its unspeakable terrors are obliterated or minimized, while stands at last over it the final doom, with the blazon on it of Christ's own words of "eternal punishment," prefigured by the awful symbol of "eternal fire." Even could the tremendous time measures or the imagery used by Christ be conceived of as reducible below their seemingly obvious and natural meaning by theories of etymological import or figurative enhancement, retaining the lowest significance any sane interpretation could bear, still they would be fearful past thought. A fall from Sirius, could astronomy demonstrate it as sunk less deeply in the heavens than the Pleiades, would not cease to be an unspeakable horror.

But while transition is to be regarded as in itself neither hostility nor disaster, yet we are not to forget such is the contexture of our thoughts, wrought through time and custom, that change in any single article in the scheme of old and time-honored beliefs not unfrequently imperils a whole system of correlated and associated truths. He is indeed a rash man who contemplates such change without grave solicitude, and he incurs a fearful responsibility who abets it without solemn deliberation and under the force of weightiest reasons. No one can tell how far such change may reach in some minds, or what disturbance it may work in the field of religious thought; or how many beliefs may stand behind that one which you propose to displace or modify; or to what extent a slight disarrangement may endanger the whole structure of creed and character, as in the case of Prince Rupert's drops, where a fracture of some minute filament causes the entire crystallized globule to crumble instantly to a mass of vitreous dust.

No one can tell what discomfort and distress, what impairment of reverence and faith, what deterioration of sentiment and life may be behind some seemingly slight displacement among things long regarded as determinate and sacred in the realms of relig-

ious thought. There is danger, often, of slaughtering many truths in killing one falsehood, of uprooting much wheat in extirpating one tare. There is hardly any false belief but becomes in time organically inwrought with many true ones. Many truths are often in some minds partially based on fallacies which being removed, the superstructural truth is undermined and is liable to carry with it many others, linked with it by association, in its fall.

Now, these considerations should not lead us to shield falsehood, or to defend truth on false grounds, doing which is sure in the end to expose truth itself to disaster and defeat. But they should admonish those who are aspiring to accomplish what they believe to be beneficent reforms in the domain of religious belief that they deal with minds which have received valuable truths, though on an insufficient basis, in a spirit of gentleness, tenderness, and considerate caution, and to replace the false, as fast and as far as it is removed, with the true, lest faith and falsehood perish together. In some cases they may find it necessary, in order to save the wheat, to let the tares grow with it until the harvest; that is, to let the fallacies and the truths grow together until their results differentiate and separate them. Nothing, however, forbids meanwhile to smother the tares by a richer culture of the wheat.

These considerations warn against rash, premature, violent, or ambitious innovation; not to resist all transition, which, being borne on by the life-forces of society, is sure to come, but to proceed positively, rather than negatively; to supplant falsehood by the fostering of truth, rather than beginning with denunciation of errors and prejudices; and in the patience and love of Christ to remember his significant aphorism, "No man having drunk old wine desireth new, for he saith, The old is good."

But it may be asked, By what criterion shall we know that transition is true progress? How distinguish, amid multitudinous and perpetually new-coming movements, the genuine from the spurious? First, true progress will be an outgrowth, not a divulsion, from the past. If nineteen centuries have failed to discover and develop the primordial germinal truths of Christianity, we can hardly expect nineteen centuries more will find them. Progress must be outgrowth or none. Change of form, hue, envelope may be, and a fall of dead branches and withered leaf and petal, but still it will be the same tree.

The past has not been mere empiricism and mistake. The

process has been by development and fulfilling, not by destruction and substitution. The new will be recognized as an off-shoot, springing genetically from the old.

You will also recognize the genuine movement by its spirit. Does it breathe the gentleness, the candor, the temperance, the tenderness, the patience, the charity of Christ?

You will know it by its trend; that will be Christward. Its system of truth and life will be Christo-centric. Out on the drifting deeps our anchorage, cynosure, and goal will be the eternal Christ; the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; forever the same, yet ever new, with everlasting unfoldings of nature and relations, and, with new revealings into the infinite, ministering in the eternal unveilings of his beauty the endless novelty that attracts and quickens to endless progress.

The lifted-up Christ alone will draw us securely on through storm-vexed transitional eras. His is the name above every name which is named in this world and also in that which is to come. He is the Revelator of revelators, the Revelation of the revelations of God, the direct outshining of his glory and the express image of his person. Above Prophet, Apostle, Psalmist, and Lawgiver, He is the ultimate exponent, interpreter, and summary of all.

To Him alone the Spirit is given without measure. He alone is the image of the invisible God, the First-born of the whole creation. In Him alone dwells all the fullness of the God-head bodily. In his face alone is seen the glory of the Father. He alone of the sons of Adam may say, "None cometh to the Father but by me," "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," hath seen the true face of God toward fallen man. Christ is the fulfillment and consummation of all Scripture and its final supreme interpretation. He is **THE TRUTH**; He is the norm to which genuine revelation must conform; He is the test and gauge of inspiration, of its genuineness and degree. Variance from Him marks imperfect inspiration. He overrules in all Scripture; conformity, accommodation must harmonize all other utterances to Him, not his to them. He is the unchangeable model of the divine to man.

Christ is above and before Christianity. He proves it, but is himself self-proved; He upholds the entire system, is not upholden of it. The centre of all true theology, like the sun, He coördinates, illumines, and sways all. Relevancy to Him gives comparative rank and value to all doctrines. In Him are the supreme forces of the gospel, — forces which draw, not coerce. He is

the ideal to which all churches and all souls aspire, the upbuilder and uplifter of the world and of the kingdom of God.

The beauty of God revealed in Him will be the eternal drawing force — a force that will last with the moral nature of man and the moral universe, a beauty which can never be eclipsed nor tarnished, more than a star, and which shall never go down in the depths of time. Over the remotest ages of the world and over the City of Light it will shine, the sun that never sets.

The transition that lifts up Christ and sets the face of the Church toward Him, that enthrones Him in the centre of its theology system, and makes Him the supreme and ultimate self-expression of God to the world, overruling all others, and conforming them to itself, and testing by itself the genuineness and degree of all inspiration, — such a transition movement, we feel, could not bear very widely from the truth, nor, while thus centralizing, need it be regarded greatly with alarm.

Should it swerve, a mightier force than that which binds the Pleiades or Orion would call it back.

T. M. Post.

THE ENGLISH PRE-RAPHAELITE AND POETICAL SCHOOL OF PAINTERS.

IN studying any individual or school whose work is characterized by a vigorous departure from accepted methods, we long for some abstract standard of values by which to judge the new comer, out of hearing of the clamor which contemporary prejudice is sure to arouse. Let us try to find such a standard by considering the two great phases in which the artistic impulse manifests itself.

The instinct that impels men to artistic work is, primarily, the instinct for creation. Man, made in the image of the Creator, yearns, like Him, to create, to embody truth; exercising thus, in his small measure, the divinest of functions.

Creation is of two kinds. One form of it is *imitative*, using the word in a very high sense.

This seeks first the material aspects of things. Fascinated by the glories of nature and the picturesqueness of life, it renders the varying phases of these without inquiring too narrowly into their meaning. We may say of this form of creation that it begins with facts, and attacks all subjects from the outside.

The other form of creation is *constructive*.

This seizes upon the principles and sources of power which underlie material facts, and wielding these with the divine energy of the imagination, it produces new forms and combinations with which to delight and elevate us. We may say of this form of creation that it begins with ideas, and attacks all subjects from the inside.

In these two distinctions we recognize the old battle-cries Realist and Idealist; two parties whose opposition has kept human thinking fresh and vital for hundreds of years. Each of these parties tries to put down the other, but, in fact, they are as mutually dependent as the magnetic poles. Neither could exist without the other. All vital truth results from a combination of the two. They are so interwoven, in the very nature of things, that if we can distinguish between two men, or two schools, as Realist and Idealist, as a tree may divide into two trunks from its root, yet on the trunk named Idealist we shall find, as on a tree, further ramifications and subdivisions, which will give us Idealists with realistic sub-tendencies; and on the trunk named Realist we shall find branches whose prevailing realism has yet an ideal quality.

All this renders the task of classification very difficult. If we could set the sheep on one side and the goats on the other, without any lingering preference for the sheep, the task of the impartial critic would be an easy one; but when we find an unmistakable goat comfortably wrapped in woolly fleece, or a sheep masquerading with a pair of goat's horns, we are tempted to abandon the whole subject as a hopeless confusion. Our best help is a firm grasp of the broad distinction between Realists, those who approach nature from the material and visible side, and Idealists, those who seek first the unseen forces and spiritual truths of which material facts are the symbols; but we must not expect to find the greatest men in the extreme wing of either party.

The terms Realist and Idealist are far from satisfactory, but they are the best we have. If we can hold fast to them, and yet keep our heads clear in the presence of a Realist with an ideal method like Corot, or an Idealist with a realistic method like Holman Hunt, making allowance at the same time for the effect of individual, national, and reactionary tendencies, we shall start on our journey with a fair equipment.

The first great division among artists as Realists and Idealists should be made the ground of *choice of subject*, since this is

what most reveals the inner man. All artists must come, with more or less distinctness, into one or the other of these great divisions. If Realists, they choose their subject chiefly for its fitness to display the movement of contemporary life, or the beautiful forms, striking contrasts of light and shade, and delicious combinations of color, which appeal to them as fragments of the divine harmonies of creation. If Idealists, they are moved by some abstract and poetical conception, and seek for material forms chiefly as the means of embodying it pictorially. This last, when carried to an extreme, has been stigmatized as "literary art," and it is doubtless true that there are some pictures by this Idealist school which would be equally, perhaps more, successful as poems or narratives. The stigma that has been applied to the Realists, on the other hand, is that their works lack elevation and moral dignity.

The first broad division having been made on the ground of choice of subject, we next look at the *treatment* or presentation of that subject as practiced by different artists. Here we leave the pair of simple and easily distinguished tree trunks, and get among the branches. We shall often find the ideal bias of a painter prevailing throughout his work, and so with the realistic bias, but we shall quite as often find the contrary to be true. We shall see an Idealist like Holman Hunt, for instance, evolving from Jewish tradition a subject called the "Scapegoat," and then taking a long and wearisome journey to the shores of the Dead Sea (Ruskin applauding meanwhile), in order to paint locality and accessories with a literal fidelity to fact which must certainly be called realistic.

On the other hand, we find a man like Corot, who was a Realist, because manifestly inspired by the charm of external nature in its tenderest, freshest phases. Yet, in treatment, he was, above all, an Idealist; painting from memory or sketching only for a brief hour at dawn, in order to filter out from his impressions everything that did not express and enhance the delicate freshness, and subtle, poetic charm which appealed to him in nature above all else. Such treatment as his sacrifices facts to impressions about facts, which are their ideal aspects. Thus we have an Idealist with a realistic treatment, and a Realist with an ideal treatment.

This question of treatment is one of great importance, pictorially speaking. Modern Realists reverse our whole point of view by declaring that the first and most essential equipment and test of an artist is his ability to render the aspects of nature in a

broad, simple, fluent manner, which shall be at once true and picturesque. They declare that if this be wanting no amount of poetical conception or appropriate imagery is of the slightest value in a picture, considered as a picture; but that such a conception should be thrust out of its gilded frame, and shut between the covers of a book, whence it can no longer make any appeal to the vision, except through the medium of the imagination. There is a deep truth here, for if we would discriminate between the sister arts, we must certainly call Poetry the Idealist, and Painting the Realist of the pair. Painting must appeal to the senses first, and through them to the imagination, but it should have a care not to stop half way, as sometimes happens when the Realists do not aim higher than the realm of the senses. The Idealists in painting often err in an opposite direction, by giving us allegorical and symbolic works, whose meaning challenges our curiosity, but which have little charm to hold our senses in thrall.

But to return to the question of treatment. When brought face to face with any object or scene to be transferred to canvas, artists fall into two divisions, according to their tendency to see things in masses or in details. All artists love truth, but with some it is truth of *fact*, with others it is truth of *relation* that attracts. The conscientiousness of some leads them to such devout and minute rendering of one detail after another that the general effect is sacrificed. These we may call *Realists in treatment*, like many of the English school. Others feel that no detail is worth emphasizing for a moment if it detracts from the general effect. They will sacrifice any small matters of fact rather than lose the retiring planes of distance, or the broad sweep of light, out of their pictures. These are *Idealists in treatment*, like most of the French school. The facts directly under their eyes do not appeal to them so strongly as the larger and more general truths, whose very largeness prevents their being easily grasped.

The highest success in art, as in all else, comes, of course, from striking a just balance between special and general truth, since neither can be ignored; but this is the prerogative of those giants of art who have both wings of the soul so strongly feathered that they are at once Realists and Idealists and incline only in a small degree either to one side or the other, according to temperament and circumstances. As our two trunks proceed from one root, and are the same in essence, so a complete human being, if we could find him, would combine in himself the utmost of both possibilities.

If we were to sketch for ourselves the ideal spiritual equipment of the perfect artist, we should have the following: The two forces (which, for want of better names, we have called Real and Ideal) will both be potent in him, and strive for mastery, mutually restraining and reacting on each other. A special love of things that can be seen must be his charter as a painter, rather than a poet. For subjects he must dream dreams and see visions with the inner eye of the imagination, while the figures in these dreams and the scenery of these visions must rise up panoplied with all the splendor of light and shade, form and color, of which his soul has drunk deep at nature's fountain since his boyhood. Thought and expression will be one with him, because his brain children are born full grown and full clad, and he loses neither time nor force in nursing them and weaving for them appropriate garments. His treatment must be the result, first, of a thorough study of nature's separate facts in their individual dignity. Then, these facts must be distilled in the alembic of his imagination, and transmuted into fluent pictorial speech, clear, balanced, rhythmic, and expressive. Are we not describing Tintoretto? and Michael Angelo, too, except that he was of sterner mould, and cared less for beauty than for thought and power; and Titian, who loved beauty supremely, and yet gave to his figures an ideal propriety of expression. Raphael was more of an Idealist. Velasquez, Veronese, and Rubens, on the other hand, leaned towards Realism. Velasquez impresses us as a great narrator of all that he saw about him. In looking at the works of Veronese and Rubens we feel that it was only custom which led them to paint religious and allegorical subjects. What they really loved was human life: Veronese the stately gorgeousness of Venetian life, with its slow water ways and abundant sunny leisure; Rubens the rollicking, robust life of a more northern clime, which inspired him to paint scenes of joyous festivity, or to deluge canvases with cataracts of superbly painted flesh and drapery; the amount of flesh being, as a general thing, largely in excess of the amount of drapery.

Coming down to modern times, we find the French school to be unquestionably realistic. It arose as a revolt from the tedious classicism of David and others, which had nothing to say to the modern mind, because its subjects were remote, and in its treatment there was nothing that recalled the freshness and beauty of nature. It was an Idealism gone to seed. Seeking truth and liberty, the modern French painters have returned to nature, and, by worshipping external beauty above all other, have proclaimed

themselves Realists. At the same time their intellectual grasp, delicate discrimination of values, and superb *technique* require us to call them Idealists in treatment.

French art is important in this connection, because it is the one most accepted in this country; the one by whose standards we unconsciously measure all new work. Nothing could seem a greater contrast to the work of the French school than the pictures by the Englishmen Rossetti and Burne Jones, photographs of which have found their way to us of late, and aroused deep interest. These pictures seem surcharged with meaning, but what that meaning may be, it is not easy to tell at a glance. They certainly do not resemble nature, and therefore we pronounce them the work of Idealists, as they assuredly are.

Strange as it may seem, however, it is probable that they are the outcome of the same *Zeitgeist* which brought about the realistic movement in France. Both came from the quenchless thirst for truth, purer truth, higher truth, truer truth, than man had had before. Prosper Mérimée makes the remark that the revolt in France was against the literary spirit, while in England it was animated by the literary spirit. It would perhaps be truer to say that in both cases the revolt was against dead conventionality, but that the French painters were men of revolutionary tendencies and inclined to deify natural instincts; while the pre-Raphaelite movement had for its leader Rossetti, a born mystic, deeply versed in mediæval lore, and one in whom the poet was as great as, if not greater than, the artist. It was not to be expected that the *Zeitgeist* should speak with precisely the same voice through two such different mediums.

So we have French Realists protesting on one side of the Channel, and English Idealists protesting on the other; both against the same evil, but without mutual sympathy. Both declared that they sought truth and a return to nature, but the French Realists grasped at the impression produced by nature, which is its ideal form; while the English Idealists, protesting against conventionality in subject, sought in matters of treatment a realistic copying of facts, one by one. In this Ruskin encouraged them by telling the younger painters to go to nature, "rejecting nothing, selecting nothing, scorning nothing,"—excellent advice, if he had but added "digesting everything."

Thus we have the curious spectacle of Holman Hunt working up in the East every detail of the Syrian tools to be painted in his picture called the Shadow of the Cross, and elaborating every

muscle in the form of the Saviour, with sincere intent thereby to honor the truth, yet producing, by the very strenuousness of his effort, an effect so unlike life and truth as to be positively repulsive. Across the Channel we have the French Impressionists, pushing their theories to the point of caricature, and the "*plein air*" school, the vanguard of the Realists, who insist that all out-door subjects shall be painted literally out of doors. These also place themselves in the precise conditions necessary for observation, though what they seek to observe is an effect rather than the facts which compose it. They sacrifice everything to the rendering of some hitherto unrecorded phase of nature's glitter and high light, and startle us with pictures about as far from our habitual thought of nature as the Shadow of the Cross itself. One thing is certain, the two schools can never be made to agree, or admit for an instant the rightness of one another's point of view; and yet are they not animated by the same love of truth, the same desire to paint things as they really are?

Frequent reference has been made in this paper to the works of Holman Hunt because he is a marked example of that Realism in treatment which so prostrates itself before the facts of nature that it ends by losing sight of the larger truths, and so produces an unnatural effect, and defeats its own object.

Millais has something of the same quality. These two men, with Dante Gabriel Rossetti, are the three best known painters in that group of seven men who associated themselves together under the name of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood nearly forty years ago. The other four were Thomas Woolner, a sculptor and poet, James Collinson and Frederic George Stephens, both painters, but better known, the first as critic and the last as poet, and William M. Rossetti (brother of Dante Gabriel), who is both poet and critic.

Other names might be included in the school, but these alone formed the Brotherhood. The leader of the movement, a man of most magnetic and inspiring personality, was Dante Gabriel Rossetti. He was at this time about twenty years old, full of passionate earnestness and deep conviction. It was he who gave the name Pre-Raphaelite to the Brotherhood. This name was chosen partly "to flutter and exasperate the artistic big-wigs of the day," but seriously, because the young protesters hoped to get rid of the tiresome fetters of conventionality in art by a return to its infancy, before any rules had been laid down for its behavior.

Seeking the artistic atmosphere of the painters before Raphael,

it is not surprising that they caught also something of their manner and flavor of asceticism. This is very obvious in the earlier pictures by Rossetti, in none more than in his earliest, the *Girlhood of Mary Virgin*, which is one of his best. Later, he emerged from this phase into a broader and more splendid development of his powers, and became less a pre-Raphaelite than a poetical painter.

With regard to this merging of the Pre-Raphaelite idea in the poetic, these words of Professor Sidney Colvin are in point: "The pre-Raphaelites felt that they could express their love of beauty more freely, if they could bring back their art to the childish attitude of the earlier poets, and create an unscientific and uncritical No-Man's-Land of beauty and enchantment, where all the figures of all the world's history and all the offspring of the world's imagination might be free to roam together among flowery groves, and greet one another in joy or sorrow, wearing whatsoever apparel they pleased, and conversing with one another in whatsoever guise they would." He adds that in an unsimple and affected age the effort to be simple and natural at first involves quaintness, awkwardness, and even the appearance of a special affectation; and that the progress of the school has consisted in getting rid of this appearance, and proving that "despite archaic expression," its ideas are at once modern and classical, in fact, "perennially lovely for all generations."

That the poetical creed was a development of the pre-Raphaelite, and not an abandonment of it, will be manifest if we remember exactly what the pre-Raphaelite creed was. One of their number puts it briefly, as follows: "The three things on which they laid great stress, in *descending* ratio of importance, were (a) serious and thoughtful selection of subject-matter; (b) sincere invention of incident and detail germane to the subject; (c) anxious care in realizing all details according to the visible facts of nature." In other words, they begin with the idea, and evolve their subjects from the inner world of the imagination. Having done this, they strive to express their idea by appropriate symbols; then execute every detail with an "anxious care," which, as we have seen, is not always successful in making things look like nature.

Here two contradictions appear, and such curious ones that we cannot afford to pass them by. The school, and Rossetti as representing the school, revolted against conventionality in one form only to fall deep into it in another. They would have no more

conventional subjects and time-worn accessories, rightly regarding such as mere husks from which the seed, with its life and germinating power, had departed; but they adopted in treatment a symbolism, which was in the highest degree conventional.

Rossetti invented strikingly original subjects, and original renderings of them, but he expressed his thought by a symbolism, both of form and color, into which so much more meaning was packed than could be understood without profound study, that his pictures have as little to say to the ordinary beholder as the most vapid of the works which moved his scorn. It is practically almost as bad for a picture to mean too much as to mean too little. All symbols are but conventions, and the effective use of them consists in catching them at the point where they are most fully irradiated by the truths which they summarize. The danger of a symbolism like Rossetti's lies in its being, if not arbitrary, at least so remote from the knowledge of most persons that the intellectual effort required to understand his pictures threatens to defeat their charm.

The second contradiction of which we have spoken lies in the fact that while the intellectual is so predominant in most of Rossetti's works that it is difficult to understand them without profound study, nevertheless he and his school have suggested to contemporary criticism such unpleasant adjectives as "fleshly" and "sensuous."

That Rossetti had a most passionate soul is evident. That his intellectual faculties were well balanced by his sensuous faculties is proved by his extraordinary power as a colorist; but both these faculties in him were spiritual above all; and if he and those whom he influenced have painted pictures and written verses to which the epithet "fleshly" can be applied, is it not, perhaps, because both thought and passion in them work on the high plane of the spirit, and things seem to them pure and safe which to lower natures are fraught with dangerous suggestion? Rossetti sometimes wrote with a frankness as startling as that of William Blake, of whom he was a great admirer, but no one has dared to tax Blake with impurity, because it is so evident that, seer-like, his vision pierced through and cast aside all material symbols to grasp the spiritual truths beyond. No one was more surprised and hurt than Rossetti by the storm of unfavorable comment which assailed some of his pictures and poems, more especially the latter.

It is doubtless true that a certain disinclination to the sacri-

fice of leaving things vague, which we notice in his pictures, led him to print a few lines which had better have been withheld, and which he afterwards suppressed. It is only fair to mention, however, in justice to the whole effect of Rossetti's life-work, that long after the public controversy on this point had subsided, Mr. Robert Buchanan, whose article in the "Contemporary Review" had started the discussion, said, in a private letter from which we quote verbatim: "I was unjust, most unjust, when I impugned the purity, and misconceived the passion of writings, too hurriedly read, and reviewed *currente calamo*."

We must not expect to find in Rossetti a moral teacher or an inspirer to noble deeds, for he was neither. His work, both in poem and picture, was given to proclaiming the supremacy and eternal sanctions of beauty. In beauty he believed, with fervent faith, and he made no attempt to square that faith with the grave problems of life and duty which confront men in all ages. That he recognized the difficulty of such squaring is shown in his picture of the Sphinx, where Youth is seen dying of the mystery which has saddened his being. A moral may be drawn from such pictures as *Found and Hesterna Rosa*, and such a poem as "Jenny," in all of which Rossetti depicts the degradation, breakage, and pain which come from preferring low loves to high ones. But Rossetti never exhorts; he only paints two forms of beauty, seeming to be spell-bound by each in turn. In his *Lilith* we have that beauty of sense which ends in self and bondage, and in his *Sybilla Palmifera* that ideal beauty whose service is perfect freedom. In their contrasted sentiment these two pictures remind us of Da Vinci's *Profane and Sacred Love*, and of Blake's stanzas:—

"Love seeketh only self to please,
To bind another to its delight,
Joys in another's loss of ease,
And builds a Hell in Heaven's despite."

"Love seeketh not itself to please,
Nor for itself hath any care,
But for another gives its ease,
And builds a Heaven in Hell's despair."

Lilith is a modern rendering of the mythical bride of Adam, who is said to have held sway over him before the creation of Eve. She is more forcibly portrayed in Rossetti's poem called "Eden Bower." The *Sybilla Palmifera* is one of Rossetti's most impressive pictures. The Sybil looks at us with eyes absolute in knowledge and power. As Rossetti himself wrote:—

"Hers are the eyes which, over and beneath
 The sky and sea bend on thee, which can draw,
 By sea, or sky, or woman, to one law,
 The allotted bondman of her palm and wreath."

That the "one law" is the law of God, whose first canon is righteousness, Rossetti does not tell us. He only tells us that the law is compelling. His poet's faith overleaps the centuries of renunciation and sacrifice, through which man must struggle before he can receive his great inheritance of beauty and power with stainless hands and an undoubting heart. Rossetti's work may stand as a purple line of prophecy side by side with that crystal utterance of Wordsworth, which is so clear that a child may read:

"Serene will be our days, and bright
 And happy will our nature be,
 When love's an unerring light,
 And joy its own security."

Rossetti was in a way the source of the æsthetic revival which to-day finds so many ardent disciples and calls forth so many jeremiads. He is said to have started the craze for blue china, ecclesiastical brasses, antique cabinets, incense burners, etc., by hunting such things out of remote corners of London to adorn his house at Chelsea. In his picture of Mary Magdalene at the House of Simon the Pharisee is seen the first use of the sunflower as a gorgeous decorative object. We may trace back to him the increased color and beauty of our homes, and thank him for introducing to us a very genuine source of enjoyment.

The three noted painters among the original pre-Raphaelites were, as has been said, Rossetti, Millais, and Holman Hunt. As they were men of marked individuality, the differences between them soon became manifest, and they should therefore be considered separately.

The three were curiously near each other in age, Hunt being born in 1827, Rossetti in 1828, and Millais in 1829.

Of Holman Hunt enough has already been said to indicate the uncompromising realism and attention to detail which he has brought to his work. Judged by a purely artistic standard he cannot rank high; but his moral earnestness, candor, and conviction command our reverence and impress us through his works. The faces he paints are never vapid, but rather over-intense in expression, and there is great beauty of detail in his pictures, though these details often refuse to fall into the ranks of orderly subordination. He is said to have studied patiently the current

artistic creeds and conventions of his day, but to have rejected them at last because they seemed to him flimsy and artificial. His taste for subjects with a direct moral or spiritual bearing, and the assiduous pursuit of facts which his extraordinary physique enabled him to undertake, encouraged many persons, especially among the English clergy, to hope that he was to found a new school of religious art. In this they were disappointed. They failed to see, as many still fail to see, that truth is too large and gracious a goddess to be hunted down in detail and captured like an entomological specimen. She will be worshiped in the spirit, and if we try to corner her with a microscope she slips away with a laugh, and we find only dry dust in our hands.

Holman Hunt studied Jewish feet in Jewry, only to have a lady of that race remark, on seeing his picture of Christ in the Temple, that he had introduced the pedal peculiarities of the wrong tribe.

John Everett Millais is the only one of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood who has become a popular painter. In his earlier pictures, such as *St. Agnes Eve*, and *Satan Sowing Tares*, we find a weird poetic feeling, together with a realistic and unselecting treatment. It was this last quality which allied him to the other members of the Brotherhood, their moralizing and symbolism adhered to him only superficially, and were soon thrown off. He surpassed them all in mastery of technique, and when he was about twenty-three he made a great concession to the insatiable British appetite for anecdotal pictures by painting the well-known *Huguenot Lovers*. The public who, despite their animadversions against the Brotherhood, had regarded its shibboleths with a secret awe, were as much delighted as if a god had stepped down from the home of the Immortals to entertain them with a picture-book. Millais became extremely popular, and has continued so ever since, though his work is very uneven in quality. He is a prolific painter of portraits, especially of children.

Rossetti is much the most interesting man of the three. His individuality was very marked to begin with, and some circumstances in his life tended to develop it in an exceptional manner. One of these circumstances was the seclusion in which he lived. Finding the general public quite incapable of understanding what was so real and so dear to him, he ceased to exhibit his pictures, and withdrew into a small circle of friends, in whom he inspired a profound devotion. Shutting himself up in his house at Chelsea, he seldom quitted it except to drive at night, or to take exercise in his walled garden. This being the case, it is not surprising that

his pictures lack the freshness of the out-door atmosphere and become introspective, and in a few cases morbid and even unwholesome, despite his brilliant imagination and great originality. The nature which he painted was brought in to him from without, both literally and in an ideal sense too. He excelled in the rendering of cut flowers, and of wondrously wrought draperies, rather than of leafy glades and murmuring streams. He lived and thought in a strange atmosphere, mediæval, mystical, and weird. If his ideality in treatment were equal to his ideality in subject, he would persuade us to lend faith to this atmosphere and breathe it with him, when we look at his works; but, unfortunately, a lack of simplicity and unity in much that he did, leaves the spectator in a cool and critical mood, even before some of his most impassioned pictures.

Why this lack of simplicity and unity, which haunts all the pre-Raphaelite school, should be the concomitant of an aim as lofty and ideal as was theirs, it is hard to understand. It probably comes from the fact that they have not dared to trust nature as the voice of God, yet at the same time hold man's soul superior as being God's highest utterance and the crown of all his works.

The best and most ideal of the French Realists, like Millet and Corot, less troubled by moral and spiritual doubts, and with stronger instincts for classification, accept nature as the "what" to paint. For the "how" they trust their own highest instincts, and prefer to work chiefly from memory, and to dwell on the larger and more permanent qualities in nature. They group natural facts in masses in order that these masses may, by their carefully discriminated relative values, utter broad, coherent statements of truth. The Englishmen, on the contrary, weighted by their sturdy moral ancestry, pass over the "what" and the "how" to grasp at the "why," and with deep purpose to find the sources of things, become Idealists, and call in nature only as a means of expression. Their hearts tell them that nature and beauty are divine, yet, finding a conflict between beauty and duty, which they are too serious minded to ignore, they study nature in a half-slavish, faithless way, as if she were a despot to be feared rather than a mistress whose spirit they might catch, and so mould the details of her service to higher forms in accordance with the divine norm which lies at the basis of each man's individuality.

Rossetti's power of putting expression into the faces he painted was very great. He handled colors with extraordinary ability, but he used them, either consciously or unconsciously, in a symbolic

way. In some of his most pregnant pictures he seems to have made prominent dark tints instead of light, blues and greens instead of yellows and reds: a reversal of the ordinary scheme of color which reminds us of two lines in a poem by his sister, Christina Rossetti, about one who has gone out of this visible life, and which hint at the strange antitheses which we meet as soon as we penetrate beyond the material world.

"Darkness more bright than noonday holdeth her,
Silence more musical than any song."

These pictures are profoundly introspective. They make us feel as if we were looking into the shadow rather than into the light; into the depths of the soul rather than into the outer world. They tell us of a mysterious, intense, palpitating life, which to us is darkness, but which throbs so near us that we sometimes catch its pulses even in this open daylight world where the fluid forces of the spirit are petrified into material shapes.

In many of Rossetti's later pictures he abandoned models, and painted the same ideal type of face. This he insisted on beginning with ultramarine and white, thinking that by working over such a basis, he could best express his mysterious conceptions. The effect was livid. In form, too, the type became exaggerated. The dark hair was massed like a thunder-cloud above the mournful, penetrating eyes. The mouth was too ample and sinuous, and the fingers too long and twining to be agreeable.

Sometimes Rossetti came out into the sunshine, and was content to bring his unsurpassed power as a colorist to the rendering of the features of an ordinary mortal in the golden light of day. *Lilith* and *The Beloved* belong to this class of pictures. They are wonderful achievements. Never did painter of any age or school invent more marvelous harmonies of clear, pure tints, so combined that they enhance or modify each other almost without the use of gray. Rossetti seems to have seen things always in the near foreground, and his pictures frequently remind us of mosaics, with the added brilliancy of stained glass. Perspective and the gradations of distance had no charm for him. His conceptions were always highly original. The *Venuses* he painted were draped wholly, or in part, and in arrangement were the very antipodes of the conventional.

A curious proof of the fact that he was, on the whole, more in his element as a poet than as a painter, is found in two pictures from his enchanting poem called the "*Blessed Damosel*." One is a sketch in colored chalks, reddish-brown, gray, and green. Only

the Damosel's head and shoulders are seen as she leans over the golden bar, with the lilies "lying asleep, along her bended arm." Back of her head is clear space, and one leafy branch overshadows her. We feel that she is in a realm high up, pure, spacious, and full of light, and that the picture interprets and helps the poem. In the oil painting of the same subject, the Damosel is robed heavily in blue, with pale pink stars in her hair. Three angels fill the space below the golden bar. Beneath them the lover is seen lying in his loneliness near a stream in a dark wood. Above the Damosel, in the thick groves of Paradise, couples of reunited lovers, about the size of birds, in dark blue robes, are seen embracing among the greenery with an amusing fervor. The whole coloring is dark and rich. Every inch of space is filled, and great bunches of roses are massed along the parapet, lest there should be a gap. The whole effect is stuffy and like an opera-box, and we feel as if we must rush out somewhere to breathe.

Abstract and unearthly subjects demand a very light medium for their expression, — a medium which retires even as it reveals them. They cannot be solidified into material forms without verging on the absurd, unless the artist have power to combine his symbols in such harmony and contrast that they shall address our sense of beauty in a rhythmic, modulated language of their own, quite apart from their symbolic meaning. That this double triumph can be achieved is shown in much of the work of Burne Jones.

Many of Rossetti's pictures can be studied through photographs, and they all require study. How they Met Themselves is a good example of the weird quality of his genius. A design for Tennyson's "Palace of Art" is in the extreme pre-Raphaelite manner. Dante's Dream is one of the largest and most celebrated of his works. The only picture he painted of an incident in contemporary life is called Found. This is intensely dramatic, and shows us the crouching form of a poor, lost girl, who has been found in London, in the early morning, by a countryman, the lover of her purer days. She shrinks from the recognition which sets her wretched life before her with unutterable poignancy. The scene is on a bridge, and the nearness of the dark river current, where so many like her have sought oblivion, is a fine imaginative touch.

The poetical school into which the pre-Raphaelite school developed takes in other men whose work is of great importance.

Passing mention may be made of two who are known in this country by photographs from their pictures. These are Simeon Solomon and Albert Moore. The pictures which have come to us from Solomon are chiefly groups of ideal heads of an impassioned and mysterious beauty, though somewhat sentimental and lacking in force. They have a subtle flavor of renunciation and pain. When he gives us two heads in a remote spiritual atmosphere, one a man's head and one a woman's, side by side, yet not looking at each other, with the title "Until the day break, and the shadows flee away," he makes us feel that these are two lovers, whom death, or fate, has separated till the eternal morning. The poignancy of the contrast between love and death, and the unearthly and sacramental quality imparted to love by death's separating and reuniting power, are favorite themes with many of the poetical school of painters.

If these profound thoughts tire, one cannot better refresh one's self than by turning to the pictures by Albert Moore. He renders to perfection the beauty and pure pagan joyousness of natural life, untroubled by a doubt. His charming goddesses in thin classic drapery are always sporting in groves by the sea, or gracefully handling fruits and flowers. We recall the works of the Frenchman Hamon in looking at them. The poetic No-Man's-Land in which they dwell, if different from that of Rossetti and Burne Jones, is at least equally remote from our work-day world.

G. F. Watts is a man of rare power. In some of his pictures he reminds us of the great men of the past. He is an Idealist through and through. The broad reach of his thought and his capacity for seeing the relations of things kept him apart from the pre-Raphaelite movement, which was, after all, a very partial one, but he is a poetical painter in the truest sense. Some of his works are elemental in their depth and grandeur. Mr. Beavington Atkinson says of them that "they seem to typify acts in creation, and eras in the history of the human race." Watts's love of the "grand style" in art has made him seek for grand spaces in which to work out his conceptions. He has executed many frescoes, and even offered to decorate the great hall of the Euston Square Railway Station in London for the cost of the scaffolding and colors; so desirous was he to raise English taste to an appreciation of the higher possibilities of art. The English climate, however, has proved so disastrous to fresco that Mr. Watts has turned his attention to mosaic as a more permanent medium of expression, and he has prepared many fine designs to be executed in that material.

When he takes up such a subject as "The people which sat in darkness saw great light," he troubles himself as little about accessories or situation as did Michael Angelo in painting his Creation of Adam. He gives us an ideal conception of an awakening to life and hope such as might take place anywhere in time or eternity. The figures in this wonderful picture are those of two men, an old woman, and two children. They are almost without drapery, and are as grand as the Theseus of the Parthenon. They are grouped on a mountain top, perhaps; at any rate no local quality obtrudes itself. One of the men is turning his face calmly and strongly to the light, while the other, with his back to it, sits bowed in darkness. The old woman lifts her veil and looks with longing wonder, half afraid to believe in the great heritage to which the sleeping babe in her bosom will soon awaken. The other child, a boy of five or six years, rejoices in the new glory with open-mouthed delight.

A picture by Watts called Love and Death has been photographed, and is known here. Poor Love, rainbow-winged, flutters and drops in hopeless agony before the stern advance of the great gray-clad figure of Death. A dove on the door-step mourns the loss of its playmate.

Edward Burne Jones, born in 1833, is of Welsh descent. As so often happens with artists he had to find his vocation. At Oxford he met William Morris, the poet, a man only six months younger than he, and they formed an intimate friendship. Midway in his college course he saw Rossetti's picture of Dante painting an Angel, and it was like a revelation to him. He sought the friendship and help of Rossetti, who was six years his senior. Rossetti gave him the truest sympathy and encouragement, and persuaded him to give up his intention of entering the church, and to become a painter. A likeness of Burne Jones at about this time may be found in Rossetti's picture of Mary Magdalene at the House of Simon, in which he served as a model for the head of Christ.

He paints, as did Rossetti, both in oil and water-color. The management of the latter by both these painters is very exceptional. They do not seem to prize it for its special qualities, such as simplicity and transparency, but by using a great deal of body color, and working elaborately with rich, dark tints, they produce an effect hardly to be distinguished from oil. One cannot quite understand the grounds of their preference when they employ it.

Burne Jones is an Idealist in choice of subject and in treatment. He draws his themes from the world of the imagination, and embodies them in symbols which he handles with an ideal grasp. Like Rossetti, he does not give us the sweep and freshness of the out-door air, but rather bids us hold our breath, as in the atmosphere of a dream. His color is either so rich and glowing that it reminds one of Giorgione, or else he handles it in a merely conventional way, painting some pictures wholly in shades of bronze green, or in gray and dull gold, as in his *Golden Stairs* and *Wheel of Fortune*. His reason for this singular treatment is doubtless his desire to subordinate the color to the thought, and let it be quietly and agreeably decorative without calling any special attention to itself.

Burne Jones succeeds in making us believe for the time being in the *No Man's Land* to which he seeks to transport us. This is owing to his grasp of the essences of things, but still more to his instinct for seizing upon, and making the most of, the decorative and picturesque possibilities of whatever he paints. The result is a coherence and unity of expression which is the most ideal of qualities in treatment. He arranges his chosen symbols according to an ideal pattern of beauty in his own mind, and that pattern is so fair and so convincing that we accept it with joy. Burne Jones's world is not the natural world, as all must agree, perhaps it is not even a possible world, but it is such a beautiful world that we are glad to enter it and have our senses charmed by the graceful forms and melodious colors that greet us there. In his picture of *Hope*, how agreeable to the eye, without regard to their meaning, are the bright branch of almond blossoms and the dark bars of the prison which shut her in. Her hand within the veil appeals chiefly to our intellectual faculties, it must be confessed.

The beautiful *Golden Stairs*, the profound and mysterious head of the figure of *Fortune*, and two series, called respectively *Orpheus* and *Eurydice* and the *Days of Creation*, have all been photographed.

In the first of the six paintings which represent the *Days of Creation*, the color is very grave and simple, but as each succeeding day brings a new angel, holding mirrored in a globe her fresh miracle of creation, the color, like the design, grows richer and more complex, till, in the sixth, it swells to its full diapason, and the angel of the seventh is seen preluding on a stringed instrument the great harmony that rose to heaven when God saw that his work was good.

The Orpheus and Eurydice series was painted to decorate a pianoforte. The designs are all charming. Everything in them is slightly conventionalized, as good decoration must be. This is seen in the stiffness of Eurydice's weeping maidens, in the flat, conventional forms of the trees and plants, and in the sinuous arrangement of lines throughout, which keeps in mind the serpent whose bite was the source of so much woe.

In another picture by Burne Jones we see two lovers in a sunshiny garden, half hidden in roses and sung to by birds, forgetful of everything but their present happiness. The thread of their life floats round them in a golden coil, ascending at last to a solemn arch, under which, mantled in heavy falling drapery, sit the three Fates, who, holding the end of the golden thread, are about to sever it.

Love which binds and death which severs, infinite passion and infinite pain, — between these lies the whole gamut of the poet.¹

Helen Bigelow Merriman.

FREDERICK MAURICE IN PRESENT THOUGHT.

THE "Life of Frederick Denison Maurice"² is a singularly compact and unique biography. The story has almost the character of an autobiography. It reflects, like a photograph, the strong and peculiar features which belonged to Maurice's intellectual and religious life. His books are always self-revealing, and his letters are only shorter and often more varied expositions of the opinions which find expression in his formal writings. To some the biography will be wearisome from its steady thoughtfulness and prevailing monotone; but to others its vivid portraiture of Maurice's inward and thoughtful life will be its irresistible charm. Colonel Maurice has been true and just to his father's memory, hiding nothing that ought to be revealed, but is at times too reticent on points concerning which the general public is not adequately informed. The views of his contemporaries as to Maurice's work and influence would

¹ A collection of photographs from the pictures of Rossetti and Burne Jones, including most of those mentioned in this paper, may be seen during the summer of 1884 at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.

² *The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice.* Chiefly told in his own letters. Edited by his Son, Frederick Maurice. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo, pp. 566, 726.

have seasoned the biography, and presented a more complete picture of the man in relation to his times. He is set forth too entirely by himself to be seen to the best advantage. Colonel Maurice is not the same kind of a biographer that Dean Stanley was in the case of Dr. Arnold. He has no historical perspective. He is too close to his subject. But, with these drawbacks, he has given us a singularly faithful account of what his father said and did, without the flagrant sins of partiality and undue glorification which are peculiar to family memoirs. He understood his father and has presented him, from his birth on August 29, 1805, to his death on April 1, 1872, as he actually lived and thought. In the following article the biography will be used less to set forth the details of his life, which were few, than to show how he grew to be the intellectual and influential man he was, and how in the two lines of social advance and spiritual direction he became the great leader of his time and in some sense the teacher for the future. He was the foremost man in England in a great religious movement which has been felt hardly less in Germany than in New England, and may almost be described to-day as a New Reformation.

"My Puritan temperament" — a phrase which he employed in many letters — indicates that Frederick Maurice understood what forces had gone into his blood, and it is in the study of these forces that you find the keynote to the life of the man. To an unusual degree he was the child of his ancestors. He came from the Puritan stock that had stood by Cromwell in the Civil Wars. The elder Maurice had deflected to Unitarianism of the type of Priestley and Belsham during his own education, but still retained the Puritan tone and temper in everything but the doctrines, and even these he returned to with some vehemence in middle life. The Puritan temperament was in young Maurice's blood, and the Unitarian education was in his heart. Each member of his family went his individual way. The household represented as many different faiths as it had persons. His home had strictness, without severity of discipline. From fictions of all kinds, modern or romantic, he was carefully excluded. Nothing took hold of him, no objects in nature, whether beautiful or useful, like social or political subjects. He took great interest in a heavy and somewhat narrow book, "Neal's History of the Puritans," and owed much to the direction which it gave to his thoughts. His father made a companion of him in all his practical schemes for social improvement, whether connected with general problems of national

education or those of parochial organization or of large public interest. Much even of the forms of his belief when he became a Churchman came from his study of the "History of the Puritans," and all his early life had a theological complexion. As early as his ninth year he used to listen to long discussions about the Bible, the divinity of Christ, and kindred topics, and even when younger he was often found concealed behind the gooseberry bushes, reading the Bible. He also read largely in the best works in English literature before leaving home for the University of Cambridge. The divided religious interests of his family influenced him powerfully. Those years were to him years of moral confusion and contradiction. He had no boyhood. There was never a time when he was not thinking. He had not passed his fifteenth year when he had begun to block out his ideas for the future. The great wish of the boy's heart was to reconcile the various earnest faiths which the household presented. In one of his autobiographic fragments, he says: "The desire for Unity has haunted me all my life through; I have never been able to substitute any desire for that, or to accept any of the different schemes for satisfying it, which men have devised." Again, in the same fragment he says: "I not only believe in the Trinity in Unity, but I find in it the centre of all my beliefs; the rest of my spirit when I contemplate myself or mankind. But, strange as it may be seem, I owe the depth of this belief, in a great measure, to my training in my home. The very name that was used to describe the denial of this doctrine is the one which most expresses to me the end that I have been compelled, even in spite of myself, to seek." In 1840, in a letter to a friend, he says: "I believe some of the earliest impressions I received in my life, which most people would think, and I myself often thought, were of the wrong kind, requiring to be especially counteracted by other thoughts, have yet, on the whole, exercised a most beneficial influence over me, and have determined more than any other the tenor of my life, so far as it has been consistent or right. Doctrines about liberty of conscience, the unity of God, and such like, which I may feel to have been most crude and wrong, have yet had such a strong, determining influence over my mind and character, that all feelings and truths which have come since may be said to have adapted themselves to them, and made them more efficient, even while it counteracted them." The strife of opinions amid which he lived is thus seen to have been operative in shaping as well as suggesting the thoughts of his mature life. Before he went up to Cambridge he had gone

through enough convulsions to make any ordinary mortal's life tragic, and it was out of these struggles and conflicts that he finally reached definite and settled views. Two writers had much to do with the adjustment of points in his faith, and in placing him on the right track, Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, who afterwards became his attached friend, and Alexander Knox, the Irish lay theologian, who gave John Keble the first suggestion of the Oxford movement of 1833.

When he went up to Cambridge in 1823 he came in contact with Julius Hare, and a set of men among the undergraduates, over whom he had a remarkable influence, and by whom the reticent youth was powerfully affected in turn. Before he left the University he found himself the acknowledged leader of the most remarkable body of men within it, though it was a leadership which others were much more anxious to concede to him than he to assume. John Sterling used to say in those days that he spent his time "in picking up pebbles beside the ocean of Maurice's genius." The testimony of young Arthur Henry Hallam, then in his nineteenth year, in a note to Mr. Gladstone, reads thus: "I do not myself know Maurice, but I know well many whom he has known and whom he has moulded like a second nature, and these, too, men eminent for intellectual powers, to whom the presence of a commanding spirit would in all cases be a signal rather for rivalry than reverential acknowledgment. The effect which he has produced on the minds of many at Cambridge, by the single creation of that Society of the Apostles (for the spirit, though not the form, was created by him), is far greater than I can dare to calculate, and will be felt, both directly and indirectly, in the age that is upon us." The man that influenced Maurice most at Cambridge was Julius Hare, in later years his brother-in-law. Maurice attributed to him the setting before his pupils of an ideal, not for a few "religious" people, but for all mankind, which can lift men out of the sin which "assumes selfishness as the basis of all actions and life," and secondly, the teaching them that "there is a way out of party opinions, which is not a compromise between them, but which is implied in both, and of which each is bearing witness." Hare made his pupils feel this, and thus put a new spirit into them. There was one point in Maurice's Cambridge career which illustrates his moral character in a remarkable way. He was obliged to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles in the English Church in order to hold his scholarships, and, to use his own words, refused to "hang a bribe round his

neck to lead his conscience." His father wrote to a friend in the spring of 1827: "Fred has left Cambridge, and has preserved his principles at the sacrifice of his interests. With this I am more satisfied than if he had taken a degree and had been immediately presented with a fellowship. He was willing to state that he was a full believer in Christianity, and would conform to all the rules of the gospel; but subscribe he must if he would retain his scholarships, for they had presented him with two. This he could not do, and therefore was not permitted to take his degree, though he had passed all his examinations with credit." In 1830 he was induced to spend some months at Oxford as an undergraduate, during which time his opinions in regard to subscription changed. Then he came into contact with Newman and Keble, and found himself in sympathy with the views which were shortly after embodied in the Oxford movement. It was the seething time in the mind and heart of one of the sincerest of men. He could not say, as Newman has, that "at that hour, in that field," he was taught this or taught that; his thoughts and character did not express themselves in that way; but "as each new thread of thought was caught by the shuttle of his ever-working mind, it was dashed in and out through the warp and woof of what had been laid on before, and one sees it disappearing and reappearing, continually affecting all else, having its color modified by successive juxtapositions, and taking its own place in the ever-growing pattern." In 1833 his mother explained Maurice's position in a letter to a Unitarian friend, who was naturally indignant that he was about to take orders in the Church of England. She says: "It was not until he had received the most solemn impression on his mind that he could best serve the Lord by becoming a Christian minister, that he ever ventured to entertain the thought of entering that church. I need not, my dear sir, tell him to pause. He has long been, and with much prayer, deeply considering the awful subject, and believes himself truly called to preach the words of life to perishing sinners. There never was a human being more free from inconsideration, either as it respects acting hastily or from inattention to the feelings of others; for, in this respect, those who know him best know him to be only too sensitive. If ever anybody acted from pure motives, I am sure it is he; for a more disinterested and noble disposition does not exist."

The residence at Oxford not only resulted in his decision to take orders, but enabled him to gauge the characteristic life of

the time at the two Universities. When he left Cambridge he was not ready to declare himself a *bond fide* member of the Church of England, but when he entered his name at Oxford, it was what he had deliberately done. He explained himself thus, — “that the Cambridge demand was much more distinctly and formally exclusive than the Oxford, inasmuch as it involved a direct renunciation of Nonconformity,” and “that the subscription to Articles on entering Oxford was not intended as a test, but as a declaration of the terms on which the University proposed to teach its pupils, upon which terms they must agree to learn.” His pamphlet on “Subscription no Bondage,” written at this time, embodied this distinction and gave him the good-will of the leaders of the new movement at Oxford, who began to regard him as a powerful advocate of their opinions. In an autobiographic letter he says of this pamphlet and its connections: “I had a tolerably clear instinct when I wrote it that I could never be acceptable to any schools in the Church; that if I maintained what seemed to me to be the true position of a Churchman, I must be in hostility more or less marked with each of them. The newest form of parties was then only beginning to develop itself. I did not personally know either Mr. Newman or Dr. Pusey. The first I regarded as an eminent Aristotelian divine and popular tutor who had been in great sympathy with Dr. Whately, and who was then following Mr. Keble in his reverence for Charles I. and in devotion to Anglican Episcopacy. The latter I only knew of as a Hebrew and German scholar, who had answered a book of Mr. Hugh Rose on the subject of German Rationalism. Both were at this time strongly opposed to any relaxation of subscription; both appeared to take the Thirty-nine Articles, even more than I did, as representing the belief of the English Church. To both my pamphlet was shown — not at my request — in proof; both, I was told, accepted it as one contribution to the cause which they were advocating; both, I have no doubt, disliked the tone of it. In a short time Mr. Newman was the declared antagonist of Luther, the defender of the English Church only as it presented itself in writers like Bishop Bull, who had resisted the reformers’ doctrine — that simple belief in Christ is the deliverance from evil and the root of good. That doctrine was still more undermined, as I thought, by Dr. Pusey’s tract on Baptism, published a short time after; a tract that drove me more vehemently back on what I took to be the teaching of our catechism — that by baptism we claim the position that Christ has claimed for all mankind. At the same time this

conviction put me in direct opposition to the Evangelicals. They were at this time passing through a new phase. . . . They had adopted the maxim of Dr. Chalmers—that, as men are fallen creatures, religion must be distasteful to them; that there will be no natural demand for it, therefore that it must be recommended by all external aids and influences. No doctrine could be so much in harmony with a theology which was built upon the acknowledgment of sin; no doctrine could be so at variance with the notion that it is a gospel which men have need of, and in their inmost hearts are craving for. Men who had the reverence which I felt for the old Evangelical movement were obliged to choose between those two conflicting ideas, which were now practically presenting themselves to every young divine. More and more I was led to ask myself what a gospel to mankind must be; whether it must not have some other ground than the fall of Adam and the sinful nature of man. I had been helped much in finding an answer to this question by your dear old friend Mr. Erskine's books—I did not then know him personally—and by the sermons of Mr. Campbell. The English Church, I thought, was the witness for that universal redemption which the Scotch Presbyterians had declared to be incompatible with their confessions. But this position was strictly a theological one. Every hope I had for human culture, for the reconciliation of opposing schools, for blessings to mankind, was based on theology." This was written in 1870. Maurice acknowledged his mistake about the subscription list. The Liberals were right, he finally saw, in opposing it because it meant to most the renunciation of the right to think, and involved dishonesty. He thus accepted the humiliation. He said: "I give the Liberals the triumph which they deserve. But they feel and I feel that we are not a step nearer to each other in 1870 than we were in 1835. They have acquired a new name. They are called Broad Churchmen now, and delight to be called so. But their breadth seems to me to be narrowness. They include all kinds of opinions. But what message have they for the people who do not live upon opinions or care for opinions. Are they children of God or must they now and forever be children of the devil? The Broad Churchman gives no answer. To me life is a burden unless I can find one. All these parties I knew, when I wrote 'Subscription no Bondage,' and I know much more fully now, contain men at whose feet I am not worthy to sit. I have longed for sympathy with them all. But God has ordered it otherwise." The son adds a word as to his position at this time to the father's ex-

planation. It was on a visit to London that he took a walk to Clapham to attend one of the meetings of the "Clapham sect." "He often spoke," says the son, "of his having taken Dr. Pusey's tract with him on a walk of this kind, and how, as he went along, it became more and more clear to him that it represented to him everything that he did not think and did not believe, till at last he sat down on a gate, in what were then the open fields of Clapham, and made up his mind that it represented the parting point between him and the Oxford school. He always spoke of it with a kind of shudder, as it were of an escape from a charmed dungeon. 'They have never allowed any one who has once come within their meshes to escape,' was often his last sentence on the subject." In 1835 he wrote to Richard (now Archbishop) Trench: "Oh that our High Churchmen would but be Catholics! At present they seem to me three parts Papist and one part Protestant; but the *tertium quid*, the glorious product of each element so different from both, I cannot discern even in the best of them. Pusey has just written a tract on Baptism of which I fear this is true." The separation from Dr. Pusey was abundantly reciprocated. During the controversy with Mansel, he is reported to have said that he and Maurice believed in two different Gods. In 1867 Maurice wrote: "The substitution of dogma for God, which is the characteristic tendency of Pusey and his school as much as of Auguste Comte and his school, is surely leading to a fearful atheism or to a devil-worship." In 1836 he wrote a note to Julius Hare concerning the appointment of Dr. Hampden to the divinity chair at Oxford, in which he measures the breadth of Cardinal Newman: "That Newman will prove him a heretic I do not doubt; the fear I should have is that he may convict himself by the same process, for this seems generally the hard fate of men who attack a one-sided notion, that they give currency to the other half of it, which in the end proves equally mischievous." About this time Maurice wrote the letters to a Quaker, the Rev. Samuel Clark, soon after published under the title of "The Kingdom of Christ," which concerned English Churchmen more than Quakers, and in the second letter commented on Dr. Pusey's theory of baptism. He afterwards said of it: "Nothing I have written had so important an effect on my life. It set me in direct antagonism with his school, to which I had many attractions." When, in 1845, Cardinal Newman published his essay on "The Development of Christian Doctrine," by which his speculative intellect hewed a passage to the Church of Rome, Maurice and Mozley were the two champions

of the Church of England who exposed its weak points, and set forth, each in his own way, the reasons why the English Church was a vital and integral part of Catholic Christendom. With great charity for the struggle through which Cardinal Newman was then passing, Maurice, in the following paragraph, which is found at the end of his "Review of Mr. Newman's Theory of Development," strikes at the root of the difficulty of the school to which Newman and Pusey belonged: "Chronology in the history of mental conflicts is most uncertain: to-day there may be sensations of vehement disgust for that which was once very dear, to-morrow a return of first love. If the decision is ultimately an honest one, we have no right to assume a cognizance of the previous struggles and revulsions of feeling, which are really known only to the Judge of all. I think we shall miss the lesson, the humbling and therefore the useful lesson, which Mr. Newman may teach us if we busy ourselves in seeking excuses for condemning him. He finds the barriers which he thought would preserve us from Rationalism insufficient. Is he not right? are they not insufficient? Will a mere belief in the Fathers, or in succession, avail to answer the question, 'Is God really among us or no?' Will sacraments avail, if we look at them apart from Him, if they do not testify of his presence?" All through life friendly relations existed between Newman and Maurice, though there was no intimacy, but when Maurice had exposed the Procrustean character of Dr. Pusey's tract on Baptism, the Oxford divine was exceedingly angry, and the whole party saw that they had mistaken their man. To Dr. Pusey, who united the saint and the dogmatist in one life in rare proportions, Maurice was "self-deceived," his humility a sham, his earnestness of speech an impertinence.

Maurice, even in youth, was a self-centred person. His intellectual life was self-active, and he had an ever-growing conviction that words were to be said through him that he could refrain from speaking only at his peril, whether Dr. Pusey or all the doctors in the world opposed them. His humility was great and genuine, but he had as much personal religion as knowledge of spiritual truth. One who knew him in 1836 said: "He is a man of much prayer; his sisters told me that when he was with them they frequently found that he had not been in bed all night, having spent the whole night in prayer." His out-look at this time was broad and high. Sir Edward Strachey, then his pupil, wrote to a friend: "Maurice says all sects are fast breaking up and preparing to vanish away, that we may again have one Church throughout

Christendom—a Church, the parts of which will be nationally and universally united under their true Head, instead of being confounded under a pope or separated into sects. Thus the child will be the father.” The point which he raised in “The Kingdom of Christ” in 1838 was sharply antagonistic to Dr. Pusey’s theory of baptism. It was whether the Church is exclusive or inclusive, whether its great privilege is that it confers certain selfish advantages on its members, or that it is the representative of what is true for all mankind. The book, as a whole, is a vindication of the position of the Catholic Church as the “spiritual constitution” designed to maintain both human and divine relationships. Maurice had the rare and remarkable characteristic of all great thinkers, that he carried particular ideas constantly into their wholes or universals. He saw things in their integrity as well as in their relations. Reviewing his life, in 1871, he said in rather a sad tone one day to his son: “I have laid a great many addled eggs in my time, but I think I see a connection through the whole of my life that I have only lately begun to realize; the desire for Unity and the search after Unity both in the Nation and the Church has haunted me all my days.” In 1843, in a letter describing Carlyle’s function to be, to show clergymen their ignorance and sin, and the deep wants of the age with which they profess to deal, he says: “I tremble to think what a crushing of all systems, religious and political, there must be before we do really feel our gathering together in Christ to be the hope of the universe; before we acknowledge that the manifestation of the actual centre of society, not the creation of some circle for ourselves, or the indefinite enlargement of the circumference of our thoughts and notions, is what we are looking for.” Just as the coöperative movement was beginning in 1849, he took up the same line of march in the following words: “The strong sense of a vocation,—I may say, for you will not misunderstand me and set down the words to mere vanity,—of a vocation to be a church reformer, has struggled in my own mind with great natural indolence and despondency, and, in my social intercourse, with the incapacity of joining those who seek reformation, but who give a meaning to the word which seems to me frivolous and false. I cannot enter into a party for the sake of compassing an end which involves the destruction of party. I have, therefore, been more delighted than most other persons would have been at the opportunity of meeting earnest people as friends, and not as allies, who must assuredly be agents, perhaps the main agents, in bringing about

whatever changes, good or evil, take place during the next ten years. I am most thankful to connect church reformation with social reformation — to have all one's thoughts tested by their application to actual work and by their power of meeting the wants of suffering, discontented, resolute men. Whatever will not stand that trial is not good for much." To him "the great elements of Christianity as the revelation to mankind and the universe" are "the truths of God's absolute, fatherly love, of the Incarnation, of the Sacrifice for all." Church reformation in its highest sense he conceived to "involve theologically the reassertion of these truths in their fullness apart from their Calvinistical and Tractarian limitations or dilutions; *socially*, the assertion on the ground of these truths of an actual living community under Christ in which no man has a right to call anything his own, but in which there is spiritual fellowship and practical coöperation; *nationally*, the assertion of a union, grounded, not on alliances and compromises, but on the constitution of things, between this Universal Community and the state, of which the principle is Personal Distinction and the symbol Property." As early as 1844, he writes to Daniel Macmillan: "The one thought which possesses me most at this time, and, I may say, has always possessed me, is that we have been dosing our people with religion when what they want is not this, but the Living God." In a letter to the Rev. Charles Kingsley, dated the same year, he says: "If once the teachers in our theological schools would have the courage to proclaim theology to be the knowledge of God and not the teaching of a religion, I am satisfied that the scientific character of the Bible would be brought out as conspicuously as its practical character, one being seen to be involved in the other. Then it would not be necessary to assert for theology its place as the *scientia scientiarum*, or to bid others fall into their places in connection with it and in subordination to it; far less would it be necessary to be perpetually proclaiming church authority in favor of such and such doctrines. The truths concerning God would be felt so essential to the elucidation of those concerning men and nature, the relation of the one to the other would be so evident, there would be such a life infused into the portions of human knowledge, and such a beautiful order and unity in the whole of it, that the opposition to them would be recognized as proceeding just as much from prejudice and ignorance, sure to disappear when these came with moral causes to sustain them, as the opposition to gravitation or any of the most acknowledged physical or mathematical

principles." There is no outreach in all the letters of Maurice — letters in the variety and richness of their spiritual meaning that have never been paralleled — which is higher than the following passage from a note to Miss Hare, the sister of Julius Hare, and afterwards Maurice's second wife: "I do find the love of God is the only power in the universe to accomplish *any* result. All must be the Devil's, if *it* were not at work. Shall it not in some way or other vindicate all to itself? I wish to think awfully on the question, confessing with trembling that there is an unspeakable power of resistance in our wills to God's love — a resistance quite beyond my understanding or any understanding to explain — and not denying that this resistance may be final, but still feeling myself obliged, when I trust God thoroughly, to think that there is a depth in his love below all other depths; a bottomless pit of charity deeper than the bottomless pit of evil. And I answer that to lead people to feel that this is a ground for them to stand upon is the great way of teaching them to stand. They are not made to hang poised in the air, which is the position, I fear, of a good many religious people, in a perpetual land of mist and cloud, never seeing the serene heaven, nor feeling the solid earth. 'God is in the midst of us; therefore we cannot be moved.' What might there is in these words!"

From 1849 to his election in 1866 to the professorship of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, his life was very largely that of a social and educational reformer. The theologian was not swallowed up in the socialist. Maurice was quite as much at home with the proletariat as with the aristocrat. He organized the Christian socialist movement in 1848, which, as Chartism, created a revolution in Paris, and threatened one in London. He made Christian socialism respected; nay, he made the Church of England roomy enough to take it in. This cost him his professorship of Theology at King's College; it drew upon him volley after volley of the poisoned arrows of the religious press; but the way soon opened for the Workingmen's College, of which he was the president, for the organization of "Queen's College for Women," in which he was a constant worker, for the organization of Bible classes, in which he was successful to an extraordinary degree, and for many other plans and movements in which the Church, as the living minister of Christ, goes forth to do its work among the people. In this field Maurice did a work which makes him the model clergyman of modern times to the English-speaking world. His method with his Bible classes was typical of his work in many

other directions. He says of it: "I was known to a few friends who frequented a Bible class at my house. Our intercourse was of the frankest kind, but this was the foundation of it. They found that I was far less accomplished in general science and literature than numbers of my order, but that I regarded the knowledge of God as the key to all other knowledge,—as that which connected knowledge with life. They found that I accepted the Bible as the interpretation of the history of mankind. They found, as they might have expected, that I did not demand that they should bring that conviction with them. They might, if they pleased, bring just the opposite conviction. They might think that the Bible was no better than any other book, or that it was a worn-out book. The truth, it seemed to me, would establish itself. I at least was not afraid to subject that belief which had possession of me to any test. I thought that it would only be proved and spread if it was brought to the severest test." This method made his numerous Bible classes successful, and in their turn the knowledge which Maurice thus gained of what the average man was thinking about was of the greatest service to him as a teacher, and changed both the form and character of all his later writings. By playing the part of the Devil's Advocate he drew out the thoughts of others, and in this way acquired such a knowledge of the actual difficulties, doubts, and objections of the more thoughtful laymen of his time as few clergymen either have or attempt to have. His son says of these classes that indirectly they had other effects: "When books appeared in which he met the objections which men of earnest thought were putting forward in all lay societies, those of the clergy and those dissenting ministers with whom it had become a habit to imagine that they could stifle inquiry by snubbing thought were aghast at the frank statement of objections, to which he did full justice before he answered them. These men believed that he was inventing arguments which they had never heard, because they had carefully closed their ears. On the other hand, from all parts of the country, clergy and laity, who had become aware that one man at least believed that the faith in Christ was strong enough to face fairly its adversaries, and need not bury its head in the sand in order to avoid them, poured in letters upon him. In this way, therefore, he acquired an acquaintance yet more extended with the thought of his age." There is no better place than, as a sequel to the statement of the constructive growth of Maurice's social and religious beliefs, to quote the words in regard to his life-work

which his son thinks would have pleased him most, — the words spoken by Dr. Montagu Butler in 1872, when the turf had just been placed upon his grave: "Whenever rich and poor are brought closer together, whenever men learn to think more worthily of God in Christ, the great work that he has labored at for nearly fifty years shall be spoken of for a memorial of him." His own words, almost his last, were: "I am not going to death; I am going into life."

It remains to show the relation of Maurice's beliefs to present religious thought. His hereditary convictions, not less than the growing beliefs on which he stood, were based not more upon an accurate knowledge of the thought of his own time than upon the affirmations of our spiritual nature which lie beyond the limits of experience, and exist in the essential truth of things. What he found in Coleridge — "the power of perceiving that by the very law of the reason the knowledge of God must be *given* to it" — seemed to him "a most precious preparation for the inquiry which belongs more strictly to our age, but still is only a preparation." What Coleridge was to one generation Maurice was to the one that followed. He valued Coleridge because he delivered him from certain philosophical phrases and generalizations, which had become the conventional way of stating religious truth, but really obscured its meaning. Maurice is valued to-day because he brought theology back to its true centre in the being of God, in the revelation of God, in the unfolding of the relations of God to man. More and better than any other man of his time he understood himself and the world of thinking beings in which he lived. The Anglican clergy have some understanding of Catholic truth because they are taught theology upon the basis of the historical creeds, as distinguished from modern schemes of salvation, but they are too often ignorant of what men are thinking about in the age in which they live. Maurice, by temperament, by education, by growing convictions, by large experience, apprehended early and held constantly the integrity of the ethical facts in theology and life. As a religious teacher, he escaped from the trammels of party, and looked at principles in their essence. He saw truth as a whole, as a relation of God to humanity; his error was that he rejected too often what he mentioned as the fault in the teaching of Alexander Knox, "his all-individualizing spirituality," which he felt "was not after the mind of Christ." And this leads to an explanation of the secret of Maurice's influence that is generally overlooked. His writings

are chiefly occasional efforts; they were put forth to meet a crisis, or grew out of a controversy; they are concerned with the thought of the day; it was not in him to compose a treatise as Hooker drew up the "Ecclesiastical Polity;" his thought took the form of a letter or a sermon; he was what Lord Macaulay has been aptly called, a pamphleteer, with his subject-matter not in politics and history, but in the more recondite realm of theology; his substantial and unique merit — and in this he is Coleridge's true successor — is that he always carries his point from the region of particulars to that of universals, from the personalities of men to God in the Christ. He could not be a party theologian in the Church of England. He could not follow Dr. Pusey's teaching, neither could he indorse that of Dr. Jowett; for the Evangelicals he had the pity that borders on contempt; but for the essential truth that each held, for that truth in its corporate form, for that truth as it is set forth in human society through the organized "republic of God," of which Christ is the Supreme Head as known to men, for that feeling out into the unknown for things certain which is the characteristic of religious genius and is granted to the sympathetic spiritual consciousness, he had that regard and reverence and devotion and instinct which have been vouchsafed to few men in any age of the world. The strength of his writing is not in its form, but in its method, in its spiritual insight, in its grasp of spiritual truth, in its penetration to the essential and final fact. Systems have no value in his eyes; the "scheme of redemption" is a misnomer; but in the chamber where Socrates and Plato sit down to inquire into the truth of things the new-comer, the kindred spirit, after the lapse of centuries, is Frederick Maurice. He has their sympathy with the essential, the universal. He is as close to God in his day as they were in theirs. He brings God, as they do, close to the thought of living men, in and through the Christ. His quality is that of the seer, the prophet, the man who "sees the vision of the Almighty." Not strictly logical, he is always true to the higher reason. Like the old prophets, he is always talking about Israel, but his words reach out to that larger truth that finds its fulfillment in humanity and in the Christ that is to be. This quality of the seer explains his influence. It is not as a system-maker, but as a teacher of truth, that he appeals to men. He founded no school; this was not in his mind; but he was instrumental in changing the order of religious thought, and in restoring the teaching of the kingdom of God to its original and true order in the processes of history. He made men see that

theology begins with the knowledge of God, not in the sinfulness of man. He introduced nothing new, but he restored the method which had been lost sight of amid the vagaries of Protestant speculations about theology. His work was infinitely grander than the founding of a school, because it quickened the life of God in men, in which all schools find their justification. He felt himself that he was here to say things that came to him, as if they were revealed to his mind through the life of the Spirit. Writing to his young friend, now Sir Edward Strachey, in 1838, he said: "I believe, so far as I am able to keep my end in sight of reconciling the facts of Christianity with its principles, and of showing how both are required to satisfy the wants of men now and explain those which history makes known to us, and how they can only co-exist and coöperate in a church, I shall do some good to persons in a certain state of mind. The sphere of my influence will be limited, I know from experience; for many whom I had expected at least to understand me I find have not the slightest dream of my purpose, but I do not aspire to do more than act upon a very few, who may act upon others."

While Maurice's great gift was the power of interpreting the thought of his time in the light of eternal truth, of relating the circumference of men's thoughts to their true centre, a power which he noted as the chief defect of John Stuart Mill's work, and the lack of which in Thomas Carlyle he deeply deplored, though he had the greatest reverence for his spiritual insight, he had another quality which cannot be too much insisted on. He had strong convictions about the order and constitution of the Universal Church, and it was the conviction that the English Church had this order and constitution which probably determined him to exercise his ministry within its fold. He had Richard Hooker's strong sense of order, of organization. He dreaded individuality, whether in society or religion. He had the constructive way of looking upon Christianity. It was Christ's method of regenerating humanity; it was also his method. His father had taught him the importance of social action, and when he wrote "The Kingdom of God," his first considerable work, its distinct outcome was that humanity in the concrete is to be reached through the constructive agencies employed in the Church of Christ. In earlier ages, Anglo-Saxon, cathedral-building, convent-founding, the Church of England made itself felt as a national institution. It organized society upon the basis of the Christian religion. The late J. S. Brewer, in his "History of Henry VIII.," calls it "the

church of the middle classes," and affirms that from these it derives its strength. It represents a social as distinguished from an individual or party religion, and Mr. Brewer rightly calls its book of social prayer "the most wonderful achievement of any age,—the greatest, next to the Bible, of any human production." In his view, "so long as the middle classes remain the governing and main power in the nation, so long will the Church of England remain as the representative of their religious peculiarities and convictions, their plain good sense of duty, their love of order, their intense loyalty, their indifference to ideal excellence, their dislike of novelty, their suspicion of all departures from the common and familiar types of human honesty and goodness." Maurice had Mr. Brewer's view of the Church of England, both in a national and a spiritual sense, as the church of the middle classes, but went still farther. He believed that the duty of the church is to regenerate the great working class that has grown up outside its walls and is somewhat fiercely prejudiced against it. Into this work he threw himself with passionate zeal and large-minded devotion in the middle of his career, and remained its most conspicuous leader to the end. His object in this social direction was to bring the sympathies of the Church of England as an ecclesiastical organization into closer and living contact with the thought, the movement, the energy, and the conflicts of the present day. The work he did to this end, like Norman McLeod's in Scotland, did something to change the activity of the Church of Christ in Great Britain. He applied the latent forces of organized Christianity to the neglected classes in English life, and did much to place the Christian religion in a broader and truer relation to modern society. The difficulty with work intended for the redemption of man as a social being since the Reformation and in Protestant circles is that it has been individual and unorganized and ephemeral. Maurice went back to the ancient church in principle, and taught men afresh how to make the Church of Christ a great, renewing, and humanizing force in present society. He anticipated the work that has specially fallen to our own time, and pointed out the methods by which it could best be done. He was an exponent of Christian democracy. Here again he was as truly a prophet of social forces as he was a teacher who had "the vision of the Almighty."

In these two positions of insight into truth and life, Maurice is quite as much alive to-day as when men felt his personal influence, and read his kindness of heart in his sympathetic and penetrating glance. Such men never die. On his death-bed, Maurice said,

"I am going into life;" but in another sense he is in life now. He is closely related to our present religious thought. First, he has done something to increase the religious toleration of the Church of England. He had close affiliations with the Broad Church party of which the late Dean Stanley was the head, but his influence has practically broadened that party out of existence by removing the narrowness of thought on which a party is always based. He never aimed his work beyond the English Church, but the English Nonconformists, at least those who are not Unitarians, are in their present religious temper as much the result of his influence as the changes are which are now modifying religious thought in the National Church. The change among the Nonconformists is in drawing them along historical lines to the affirmations of the Christian creeds, regardless of what modern schemes of salvation have taught. It is the strengthening of our affirmations of common truth. It should not be said that Maurice has been the only teacher of the return to historical theology of the more spiritual sort. Schleiermacher initiated the same movement in Germany before Maurice initiated it in England, but for the English-speaking people there is something far off in the operations of German thought. Maurice had the right of it, in contrasting English thought with German, when he said, "We must always be, to a considerable extent, unintelligible to each other, because we start from exactly opposite points; we, naturally, from that which is above us and speaks to us; they, naturally, from that which is within them, and which *seeks* for some object above itself." He further said, as was characteristic, "I most eagerly assert the worth of our English position to prove that the truth must look down upon us if we would look up to it; that Truth must be a person seeking us if we are to seek him." Maurice will never have a school in England any more than Coleridge had, but wherever men are feeling their way to the great affirmations about God, the Christ, and the Spirit, he will be recognized as a true prophet of the soul.

In this country his influence has been perhaps more general than in England. In the Episcopal Church the transformation of parties into schools of thought would have come about in the natural order of things, but there can be no doubt that the influence of Maurice upon men like Dr. Washburn and Dr. John Cotton Smith, both endowed with the gifts of spiritual insight in the sense that Maurice was, greatly hastened the development of a higher and better order of thinking. His name has stood for a better statement of theological truth, for a more concrete preaching, for a

more general application of Christian principles to the problems of society. The best representative of Maurice in America, the man who has been most enriched by his method and spirit but whose strongly philosophical mind has not become the slave of Maurice's thought, is Dr. Elisha Mulford. His "Republic of God" is saturated through and through with the teachings of Maurice and Hegel, and has carried the thought of both far and wide among American scholars and preachers,—a seed-book that will effectually regenerate any man's life who thoroughly masters it, and has probably done more to quicken the atmospheric change in American religious thinking than any book that has appeared since "Ecce Homo" presented the thought of Maurice in a fresh conception of the Christ in modern society. Partly through the reading of the "Republic of God," partly by the general circulation of different volumes of Maurice's writings, partly as an indirect influence of the study of German theology, partly as the increment of mutual contact and discussion about the essential interests of man which characterize modern life, there is a great change in all the representative religious bodies in America. It is most seen in the children of the Puritans, but the disciples of Roger Williams, the spiritual descendants of John Knox, and even the followers of Wesley, to say nothing of those who reverence the name of Channing, are in the same general movement; and a close analysis reveals the fact that the great truths of revelation which Maurice lived to set forth anew and apart from the barnacles that had fastened themselves upon them are the truths which are bringing all these children of God together upon the plane of a higher spiritual life, and upon the basis of an organic relation of the Christian Church to the life of the world. It is not what Maurice would have cared for, that people should call themselves by his name, and those who follow his thought and work upon his plan need to remember that behind all his thought on its spiritual side was his large and strong belief in the organized church, in an order and constitution of things that makes the individual a part of the whole, and causes him to influence society as a soldier in the army of the living God. Men seem to be reaching in these days along all the lines of our broken Christianity, as has been admirably said by Julia Wedgewood, "to a stronger belief in the present life,—the life that belongs to the seen and the outward, the life that satisfies, the life that quenches the thirst for God," and in this realization of the presence of God in our daily life, of the control of things that are against us as well as for us, of the movement of the Spirit of

God over the face of modern society as He is once said to have moved over "the face of the waters," the life-work of Frederick Maurice finds its true expression and consummation.

Julius H. Ward.

MECHANICAL EVOLUTION.

I believe in man, therefore I believe in God. This is the fundamental article of natural religion. Whatever our theory of the origin and ancestry of man may be, natural theism requires the belief that he *is*, and that he is a self-determining power.

There is a phase of thought bearing the name "evolution" which cannot by any possibility be reconciled with religion. It is subversive not only of theology, but equally of every high belief. In it the world is conceived of as having behind it not an intelligent will, but only a mindless energy. All things are what they are by necessity. Each term in the vast series of existences has been forced into being by those that have preceded it. Nothing that has taken place could have been in the slightest degree different from what it has been or is. Man, the most highly-evolved product, has become possessed of reflective intelligence; but this, his distinguishing characteristic, is the source of illusions which make him not the wisest thing, but only the most deceived thing that has existed. He is the most deceived not only in that he has inadequate ideas of the world that surrounds him, but essentially deceived in that, by the necessity that governs all things, he thinks of himself as the reverse, the absolute contradiction of what he is. He cannot help believing in himself as a cause, a responsible cause. He is, in fact, only a result that has come to pass by the impact of atoms acting and reacting upon each other through untold ages, without purpose and without intelligence.

I will not try to prove the position that this view of the universe is subversive of every high belief. If the statement does not carry conviction with it, there is some quality in the mental processes of the reader that no amount of argumentation is likely to influence. Mr. Herbert Spencer has recently given us his notion of the religion of the future, the motive power of which is to be the thought that we are "ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy." This to some minds may stand for a high belief, and if so, it would probably be labor thrown away to try to prove that it is

not high. The task which I have set before myself is, I hope, a more practicable one: namely, to demonstrate the unscientific character of Mr. Spencer's evolution. This, let me hasten to say, will not carry us into a refutation of his metaphysical "first principles," for the simple reason that these have and can have no vital connection with the *real* basis of his system.

A philosophy that destroys the reality of mind, by recognizing no permanent element in it, cannot indulge itself in metaphysics. If it is an "illusion" to suppose that "at each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, that then exists,"¹ anything like a trustworthy intuition or ultimate datum of consciousness is an impossibility. Such a supposed intuition is also an illusion. In saying this, I am not ruling out Mr. Spencer's agnosticism; for this, instead of being, as some of his admirers have claimed, an unessential part of his philosophy, is the necessary outcome of it. Spencerism is, in substance, the philosophy of Hume, illustrated and enforced by certain abstractions from modern science; and, as certainly as that philosophy, it leads to universal skepticism. What I do object to receiving, in such a connection, is that "datum of consciousness" which makes an "Incomprehensible Power," the "Absolute," a necessary object of thought. And with this must be excluded also all that metaphysical machinery, borrowed from Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel, to regulate and limit the too potent spirit which this datum of consciousness has called up. All this part of Mr. Spencer's system may be detached as easily as the dress of a masquerader. I therefore take the liberty of removing it and referring it for an answer to the many discussions, past, present, and future, of the views of the above mentioned writers.

What, then, is the real basis of Mr. Spencer's system? It is the doctrine of the persistence of force combined with an abstraction which he calls evolution. In his own words, "The phenomena of evolution have to be deduced from the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down; and on this a rational synthesis must build up."² A fuller expression of the same idea is as follows: "Given the persistence of force, and given the various derivative laws of force, and there has to be shown not only how the actual existences of the inorganic world necessarily exhibit the traits they do, but how there necessarily result the more numerous and involved traits exhibited by organic and super-organic exist-

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, p. 500.

² *First Principles*, p. 398.

ences — how an organism is evolved? what is the genesis of human intelligence? whence social progress arises?"¹

If a reader of the "Synthetic Philosophy" will continually bear in mind this position, it will very much reduce the seriousness of the dilemmas to which he finds himself shut up. Thus Mr. Spencer says, "Psychical changes either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this work, in common with all other works on the subject, is sheer nonsense: no science of psychology is possible. If they do conform to law there cannot be any such thing as free will."² Now, as persistence of force is Mr. Spencer's ultimate law, what he really means is this: Psychical changes either conform to *mechanical* law or they do not; if they do not, this work is sheer nonsense. Mr. Spencer has assumed that the formulated laws of the lower and less complicated domain are sufficient for the explanation of the phenomena of the higher. His philosophy is an application of this assumption. But in making it he labors, not as we might have supposed he would, to show that his theory of evolution as applied to mind is justified by the facts of human consciousness, but, on the contrary, to show us what these facts ought to be in order to fit his construction of evolution. Practically, therefore, it is an attempt to educate men to disbelieve that which they naturally — we may say constitutionally — believe.

This radical revolution in our fundamental ideas is entered upon with a light heart by Mr. Spencer because he feels confident of his ability so to replace that which has been taken away that the thinking world will not object to the change, but will, on the contrary, be only too thankful to accept at his hands its old conceptions transfigured and inverted. It must be confessed that in this expectation he has not altogether miscalculated; for notwithstanding its lack of a philosophic or truly scientific basis, the "Synthetic Philosophy" has been elaborated with great skill. The parts are fitted with such adroitness that one seems to grow out of another as naturally as a branch grows from a tree. The course of thought is so diversified with abounding illustration, and so enriched with scientific detail and subordinate truths, that the reader who surrenders himself to its surface current may be carried along, as in a pleasantly moving dream, to conclusions that are at variance with his deepest convictions. There is a fascination in the seeming completeness and sufficiency of this scheme. It smooths away difficulties, explains the origin of things that had hitherto seemed mysterious; and, without any very well defined reason for so doing,

¹ *First Principles*, p. 555.

² *Principles of Psychology*, p. 503.

preserves throughout an air of hopefulness and good cheer for the future.

To a large class of readers, therefore, the "Synthetic Philosophy" has come as a timely and helpful straightening out of things that were crooked. Much of this sense of completeness must be conceded to the personal persuasiveness of the writer, but much also must be accorded to the underlying conception which pervades the whole. It is the evolutionary idea that binds one part to another and holds the reader as with a spell. Mr. Spencer seems to have rescued this idea from the loose, indeterminate forms in which it appears in connection with different classes of phenomena, and to have reduced it to laws as well defined as those of mechanics. By the universal application of these laws, all questions as to the origin of ideas, whether of things in heaven or things on earth, may be solved; and our notions of the nature of phenomena, hitherto conflicting and uncertain, may be rectified and fixed forever. It has been claimed by ardent adherents of Mr. Spencer, that in the realms of mental science and sociology he has done a work which is as great as that of Sir Isaac Newton in astronomy. Now, it may be asked, does not the fact that this form of evolution explains so much, that it seems to make a straight road where there used to be only a crooked path, constitute a strong presumption for its truth? I answer, it does not; because the facts which it does *not* explain, but which it traverses without compunction, are many and important.

It is Mr. Spencer who has laid down the law that "there is no mode of establishing the validity of any belief, except that of showing its entire congruity with all other beliefs."¹ It would be hard to hold the constructor of a system to a literal interpretation of this rule. But we are certainly interpreting according to the spirit and not according to the letter when we insist that a philosophy which reduces to "illusions" ideas that have hitherto been regarded as the unimpeachable data of consciousness shall give some better reason for its authority than that, having explained *many* facts, it is to be assumed that *all* facts are subject to it.

We are brought, therefore, to the critical examination of Mr. Spencer's idea of evolution; and I shall endeavor to show that scientific evolution is not responsible for this evolutionary idea; but that this latter is a purely fanciful thing, conceived by a speculative mind, eager to reduce to fixed and easily applied laws a theory which is, and which must be, for a long time to come, in

¹ *First Principles*, p. 138.

the early stages of formation. As Professor Samuel Harris has well remarked, "Even if the theory of evolution is a grand insight of genius, it is not surprising, especially considering how recently it was announced, that it remains neither adequately formulated nor proved; and that only fragments which may ultimately find place in a comprehensive theory seem to be assuming the definiteness and certainty of scientific facts."

It is unnecessary to multiply expressions of opinion with regard to that which speaks so clearly for itself. All the way along the course of evolution we have to recognize at intervals the introduction of new, active elements which complicate the problem, and make it impossible to formulate, except in a very imperfect way, the laws by which its ends are accomplished.

When we pass from the evolution of things without life to that of living forms in the vegetable world, we encounter the new and utterly mysterious factor of organic growth. As we rise in the scale we come to a further complication in the hitherto non-existing factor of sentience; farther on we come to consciousness and intelligence, and still farther on we come to self-conscious intelligence, and self-determining will in man. In our present state of knowledge each one of these new factors appears to be, in many respects, antagonistic to those before existing. They modify, and to some extent neutralize, the laws which it was possible to formulate for the explanation of the more simple and less evolved existences. An immense amount of patient scientific inquiry, therefore, into the particular problems of evolution as they exist in these widely separate, though related, realms of nature must be gone through with before any general, comprehensive law of evolution can be reached. "It is not," says Dr. Maudsley, "sound science to apply the known laws of the phenomena of the lower domain to an entire explanation of the phenomena of the higher domain; still less to beguile one's self into the belief of an explanation by the vague misapplication of the special terms of the former, which have definite meanings in their proper use and place, to the more complex phenomena of the latter, where they not only do not cover and fit the facts, but have their own exact significations blurred and defaced by the misuse."¹ In rejecting Mr. Spencer's conception, therefore, we are not rejecting the doctrine of evolution. We are only rejecting a fanciful and unscientific form of it, in order to prepare the way for a truer construction which shall be at the same time scientific and theistic.

¹ *Body and Will*, p. 189.

The first position which I would assume as the basis of such a construction is, that a scientific application of evolution to mind can be made only by taking into account all the *facts* of mind which present themselves to us as ultimate data of consciousness. We must recognize at the outset two distinct departments of research, in each of which we come upon ultimate facts which can in no wise be invalidated. There is a subjective as well as an objective induction to be made. By the one we ascertain the facts of physical nature through sense-perception. By the other we ascertain the facts of mind-nature through self-consciousness. Deductions made from facts in the one realm cannot be used to override facts observed in the other. It is continually claimed by the representatives of natural science that they concern themselves only with facts that admit of verification. The claim is not well founded. In so far as they confine themselves simply to observing and recording that which exists and takes place in nature, their facts admit of verification. But they do much more than this. They reason about conceptions abstracted from these facts. Certain characteristics common to a group of facts are used to generalize from, and in this way they arrive at what are called "laws of nature." But these laws are abstractions which do not admit of verification. They may be proximately proved by convergence of evidence. But so long as the facts to which they are referred exhibit a side which is not only not included in the generalization, but which contradicts it, they must be regarded as imaginative conceptions, based upon one aspect of a many-sided reality. They are speculations without a reasonable foundation, because derived from a partial induction.¹

I have said we must recognize *two* distinct departments of research, in each of which we come upon ultimate facts belonging to a different order. Taken by itself, this would be a crude and insufficient statement. As a fact, the universe of created things presents itself to us not as divided into compartments, separated from each other by hard and fast lines, but rather as a series or scale of modes of existence. These modes have each their own specific class of relations, which must be expressed in terms which

¹ Some of the most widely received generalizations of modern science, often referred to as "established laws of nature," are of this character. The atomomechanical theory, for instance, has been shown to be at variance with the fundamental laws of special sciences, — with those of chemistry, physics, and astronomy. For an able exposition of this fact, by one who writes purely in the interest of science, see "The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics," by J. B. Stallo, International Scientific Series, vol. 38.

have their special application, and which cannot be transferred to express relations of a different order. But it is at the same time true that all these modes of existence are linked together, so that each is seen to be closely related to that which is next higher and to that which is next lower. When we speak of two departments, therefore, we are simply contemplating the whole series from the opposite standpoints of its extreme limits,—on the one hand, from the extreme of inorganic nature, and on the other, from that of self-conscious mind. We do not have to travel all the way from inorganic existences to mind before we reach a point where mechanical laws are manifestly inadequate to express the relations of phenomena. As soon as we pass from the contemplation of the inorganic world to that of organized, living structures, facts are encountered which refuse to yield their secret to the key of a mechanical explanation. While there is an appearance of mechanism of a distinctive kind, there is also a very important something more.

In every living organism there is an appearance of autonomy. There is an initiative and determinative power which seems to proceed from the structural unit itself. A single nucleated cell, under certain favorable conditions, sets to work to organize and elaborate itself. It does not simply multiply itself, but it exhibits a constructive ability which causes it to take certain forms having the most diverse characteristics and adapted to a great variety of functions. Now, in the contemplation of such phenomena our minds unconsciously reach about, not only for some words by which to designate the observed process, but also for a conception, borrowed from some other department of knowledge, which shall stand for a partial explanation of it. Every thinking man is perpetually striving after a unification of his knowledge; and what he calls an explanation is often little more than the noting of similarities between existences and processes, by which he is able to class the less known to some extent with the better known. Thus, when we seek for an explanation of the movements of the simplest forms of organized life, we have open to us two fields in which to search for similarities; for as these phenomena occupy an intermediate position between the extremes of mind and inorganic matter, we may reasonably expect to find analogies in both realms. We *ought* to search for them in both. But this is not what has most frequently happened. The acquisition of a two-sided conception does not satisfy that craving for a simplification of knowledge which is one of the most imperative wants of

the human mind. We have therefore seen the thinking world divide itself into two opposed parties, each of which is inclined to look with obstinate preoccupation on one side of the shield.

Those who approach it from the side of the inorganic find abundant evidences of what looks like purely mechanical action, and advance to the position that mechanical law reigns supreme. Whatever is at variance with this conclusion they feel justified in neglecting on the ground that it constitutes only an *apparent* exception, which will ultimately be proved, as science advances, to be no exception. But those who approach the same phenomena from the side of the more highly organized find equally conclusive reasons for classing the simplest phenomena of organized life with the action of an intelligent mind. Having their thoughts fixed upon those activities which originate in the human mind, they demand a *cause* for that which they observe, which shall be something more than a sequence of phenomena, — a cause which can be expressed in terms of intelligence and will. These opposite tendencies flower, on the one hand, into systems like that of Mr. Spencer, and, on the other, into conceptions which are based upon the assumption of mind as the more or less immediate cause of every movement in nature. On the one hand, it is dogmatically affirmed that life is only transformed physical and chemical force; and, on the other, with better reason, that physical and chemical force are only *transformed* life or mind.

By the former party it is argued that the whole course of creation is a process proceeding from lower to higher forms, — from the inorganic to the organic; that the theory of evolution obliges us to look at the whole series of existences as pushed into being, each one by that next lower in the scale; that mind itself is a result of this process; and that the idea of originating cause which we connect with it must therefore be an illusion. Man, in common with the brute, the plant, and the stone, is the product of inexorable forces, of the nature of which he can have no knowledge, and over which he has no real, but only an imaginary control. On the other hand, those who refer all power to intelligent will have on their side the incontestable fact that mind is the sole originating cause of which we have any knowledge, and that in our experience of real causation the process is uniformly not from matter to mind, but from mind to matter. Those who assume cause to lie in the direction of the inorganic, and effect in the direction of the organic, have simply borrowed the idea of causation, which has originated in self-conscious mind, inverted it, and

given it a purely imaginative application. It can also be said with truth that those who reduce everything to terms of mechanical force can never quite get away from the conception of intelligent causation. Their talk of molecules and atoms is meaningless without the accompanying conception that these have a certain individuality, and act as individuals act; and the admission of an "inscrutable power," an "incomprehensible cause," is in reality a reluctant concession to the idea of an intelligent, originating agent.

Now, while theism must hold to the truth of that interpretation of nature which takes its departure from the side of mind, it is not from a point of view so generalized and abstract that we can hope to ascertain the bearing of the doctrine of evolution on the phenomena of mind. Scientific evolution did not originate in a study of intuitions, any more than it did in the study of inorganic life. It was suggested by the observation of the processes of organic life. The successive stages of growth in the individual were seen to be, to some extent, expressive of the successive stages in organized life regarded as a whole. This afforded the clew from which the theory was formulated, and then reformulated, as the study of biology in all its branches threw additional light upon the problem. In making an application of evolution to the phenomena of mind, therefore, it is necessary for us to come back to the starting point from whence all the speculative applications of the doctrine have been derived. We must draw our analogies directly from those phenomena which characterize the evolution of the individual organism. In other words, if there is such a thing as the evolution of a human mind, we must try to understand it by scrutinizing carefully that which takes place in the evolution of a human body.

The first fact to which I would ask attention is this, that the whole process of evolution in the individual is marked by two very distinct stages. In the first stage, which takes place in the egg, and which in the case of a chicken occupies from twenty to twenty-one days, there is an exceedingly *rapid* evolution or differentiation. This process is not the expansion of a minute organism into a larger one. It is the construction of an organism by the multiplication of cells. The original nucleated cell takes the initiative and transmutes the matter which surrounds it. During the whole of this period the immediate environment is the same. Changes in the more remote environment of the egg may arrest growth. But, as Dr. Maudsley observes, "its successive variations do not owe much apparently to natural selection; rather would

they appear to make their own election. . . . The very remarkable evolution of the microscopic germ is not due to its environment, but to occult qualities in itself, to its intrinsic essence."¹ Instead of appearing as an adjustment of internal relations to external relations, therefore, it appears rather as an exceedingly rapid and revolutionary adaptation of external relations to internal relations, in the course of which the immediate external relations are made to disappear. The minute active cell has gathered to itself the whole little world of the egg and transformed it into a complete organism having the most wonderfully diverse parts, capable of the most varied and complicated functions. When this stage is finished, the second phase of existence begins. In this, the organism is no longer surrounded by an unchanging environment on which (without opposition) it makes constant aggression. It finds itself, on the contrary, in the midst of a variable and aggressive environment; and, from this time on, its evolution is a conflict. It is in this second stage that the principle of natural selection comes most manifestly into view. And it is during this stage alone that we are able to make those observations which result in the various theories of the cause of evolution. Let us notice, again, that in this second stage evolution has ceased to be a marvelously rapid process of variation by which non-existing organs are successively formed. It has become a comparatively slow process in which no new organs are formed. The structure and nature of the individual was completed and fixed in that utterly mysterious phase of existence which antedated its appearance on the stage of this world's activities and conflicts. But from this time forth we may observe, tabulate, and partially explain by environment the gradual changes which take place in it.

Passing now from the individual to the species, we enter upon a wider problem of evolution; and in applying analogically the facts just passed in review we ought to look for two distinct stages in the genesis of species corresponding to those observed in the history of the individual. The first of these should be a period of more or less rapid and radical differentiation, at the close of which the type should have become fixed. Do we find such a correspondence between the individual and the species? No one is able to testify from having been present as an observer during the whole process of the birth of a species. But we have a record of what has taken place in geology, and the testimony of this is directly to the point. In the words of Dr. Le Conte, "As a question of history there is

¹ *Body and Will*, p. 144.

no witness upon the stand except geology. . . . Her evidence and hers alone must eventually settle this question. Now, the evidence of geology to-day is that species seem to come in suddenly and in full perfection, remain substantially unchanged during the term of their existence, and pass away in full perfection."¹ So far as this record is concerned, therefore, whenever a new species is formed, its type seems to be reached by a comparatively rapid and, for the most part, inexplicable process of differentiation. Then ensues the history of the species corresponding to the life of the individual as a completed organism. By the study of this history we are able to account for many modifications of and variations from the original type by the influence of environment, heredity, and natural selection. But throughout the whole range of our observation the type remains essentially the same. The species has its distinctive structure and nature, its possibilities which it does not transcend. It is characterized by faculties and powers which may be strengthened or the reverse; but, so far as our knowledge extends, there is no passing into a type radically different, except as the result of a sharply defined crisis, — a period of rapid differentiation.

This argument is further strengthened from the necessities of the principle of natural selection. Even a useful variation must be developed with a considerable degree of suddenness, or it cannot survive. In the case of man the difficulty of accounting, on the theory of slow variation, for the characteristics which separate him so widely from the most highly developed brutes, has led even so staunch an advocate of natural selection as Mr. Wallace to attribute *his* origin to an exceptional working of the differentiating power. He declares it to be utterly inconceivable that the higher faculties of man could have been produced through the action of a law which looks only, and can look only, to the immediate material welfare of the individual or the race.² It is unnecessary to dwell upon this point; for it has been amply set forth by a multitude of writers, and emphasized not only by the opponents, but also by some of the most strenuous advocates of evolution.

From the above considerations I would deduce, first, the conclusion that *it is in accord with science as well as philosophy to regard the deliverances of self-consciousness as reliable data from which to determine the meaning of the word evolution as applied to mind.* We may assume the position that the essential features

¹ *Religion and Science*, p. 22.

² *Natural Selection*, p. 359.

of the human mind have always been what they are to-day. This is not to deny the working of evolution in the sphere of mind, but to affirm that, reasoning analogically from what we know of evolution in other departments, we may not expect to analyze the process of its becoming beyond a certain point. It is to affirm that the transition from the brute to the human mind must not be conceived of as an imperceptible and long drawn out gradation from lower to higher forms, but as a critical epoch in history. We must conceive of the birth of the human species as the result of a period of rapid variation like that which goes on in the egg before the birth of the individual. And as the organizing process which goes on in the egg is utterly mysterious, so the differentiating process by which the brute mind became human is mysterious and beyond analysis. We have to take up the study of mind, therefore, at a point where it must be regarded as an organism that has already reached a well defined stage of development. Its nature, its faculties, its possible relations to the world of thought and knowledge are essentially what they will always be, so long as man continues to be man. At the same time the analogies of evolution teach us, further, that we must conceive of the faculties and ideas of the human mind at this early stage as standing in the same relation to those of civilized man that the physical organs and activities of a new-born child bear to those of the age of maturity.

It may be useful here to remind the reader that I am not resting the validity of our ultimate beliefs upon these views of evolution. I have only tried to show that the analogies of scientific evolution, as now understood, are not inconsistent with the demands of philosophy and common sense; and I would further call attention to the fact that the opposite theory of evolution (that of slow variation) presents no contradiction to this view of mind as a well defined and separate entity, though it makes the conception of it more difficult. From the present drift of scientific discovery there is every reason to anticipate that a further knowledge of nature will afford analogies which will reduce the difficulty of harmonizing the facts of self-consciousness with the facts of sense-perception. But it is not impossible that new discoveries may produce a counter-current that will, for a time, increase the difficulty of obtaining a clear conception of mind as evolved from the lower orders of creation, and yet as having an essentially permanent and distinct nature. But these difficulties cannot shake the fact of its reality and its reliableness: they can only cast a doubt upon

the correctness of our notion of evolution. Having premised this, I will further call attention to the consideration that our observation of men as they exist to-day, in the least evolved societies, corroborates the view presented by the foregoing analogies.

It is manifestly an unwarranted assumption to regard the lowest existing savage as the complete equivalent of primitive man; for there is reason to believe that man, in the course of his moral evolution, has varied in a downward as well as in an upward direction. But, waiving this consideration, what do we find as to capacity for mental and moral improvement among the most degraded savages? Notwithstanding the accumulation of inherited tendencies, we find among them minds that are capable of being developed, sometimes in a single generation, to a stage which is both morally and intellectually in advance of that reached by great classes of the most civilized races. This fact, taken in connection with the cerebral development of the savage, so impresses Mr. Wallace that he does not hesitate to declare the human brain to be an example of structure in anticipation of function. Speaking of the lowest known human being, he says: "They possess a mental organ beyond their needs. Natural selection could only have endowed savage man with a brain little superior to that of an ape, whereas he actually possesses one very little inferior to that of a philosopher."¹ The testimony of missionaries, as the result of intercourse with uncultivated tribes in the most widely separated countries, is unanimous to the effect that men, the world over, are essentially the same. Facts collated by anthropologists like Sir John Lubbock and Mr. E. B. Tylor afford the strongest confirmation of the same view. Even Mr. Darwin, with his mind intent on observing the resemblances between men and animals, says: "The Fuegians rank among the lowest barbarians; but I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three natives on board H. M. S. Beagle, who had lived some years in England, and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition and in most of our mental faculties."²

In the light of these facts and analogies, the radical defect of Mr. Spencer's theory of the evolution of ideas, a defect that vitiates his main conclusions, is manifest. In his ambition to analyze and exhibit the whole process of the creation of mind, and thus supply proofs of its evolution by the mechanical action of environment, he has inverted the order of its phenomena. He has given us the evolutionary tree upside down,—the stem as the re-

¹ *Natural Selection*, p. 356.

² *The Descent of Man*, vol. i. p. 33.

sult of the branches. He does what is equivalent to making organs appear as the product of their activities, faculties as the outcome of their functions. Conceptions which we might almost call congenital are, with him, only incidents in the adaptation of the human organism to environment.

This will be seen with greater clearness if we follow Mr. Spencer in the account which he gives of the evolution of one of our fundamental conceptions, that of causation. So long as we retain the conviction that the will of man is, within a limited sphere, an originating and self-determining power, we are not at a loss to account for the belief (one of the most persistent of all our beliefs), that *every event must have a cause*. As Dr. Newman has truly observed, "The assent which we give to the proposition, as a first principle, that nothing happens without a cause, is derived in the first instance from what we know of ourselves; and we argue analogically from what is within us to what is external to us."¹ Unless the human will is, within certain limits, an originating cause, we can nowhere point to the existence of such a thing. The idea stands utterly without credentials. It has somehow got a foothold in the human mind, but it cannot show its right. The mind is very tenacious of it, but everything tends to the belief that it ought not to be there. Physical science shows us that no such thing is to be found throughout the length and breadth of its wide fields of investigation.

Now what does Mr. Spencer give us to build our idea of causation upon? The idea of causation, he tells us, is one of the latest fruits of evolution. It has come to us not full formed and complete; it is not a simple idea that has arisen in connection with the causative power which we ourselves exercise, — a conception, therefore, that has sprung up with our earliest self-knowledge, and has expanded as a faculty expands. On the contrary, it is one which has been arrived at, as yet, only by the leaders of thought, one which is only partially evolved in the minds of many scientific men. "Intellectual progress," he tells us, "is by no one trait so adequately characterized as by development of the idea of causation, since development of this idea involves development of so many other ideas. . . . Even the simplest notion of cause, as we understand it, can be reached only after many like instances have been grouped into a simple generalization; and through all ascending steps, higher notions of causation imply wider notions of generality."² Farther on in the same chapter he tells us that

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 63.

² *Data of Ethics*, p. 47.

causation is least recognized by men "in respect of those classes of phenomena amid which, in consequence of their complexity, causation is most difficult to trace,—the psychical, the social, the moral." "On studying the various ethical theories," he says, "I am struck with the fact that they are all characterized either by entire absence of the idea of causation or by inadequate presence of it."

It must be manifest to the reader that what Mr. Spencer here calls the "idea of causation" is the idea of second causes, or mediate causation. But what we call second causes are not, strictly speaking, causes at all. We have a chain of events which follow each other with regularity, and our experience of this regularity leads us to associate each one of these events with those that precede and those that follow it. We advance from this to the belief that these events will continue to follow in the same order. But how do we come at the idea of cause? Why is it that our minds instinctively travel back over the series, reducing on the way each supposed cause to an effect, in search of an efficient or *real* cause, altogether different in its nature from those that flow from it? This question is not a difficult one to answer on the basis of our old-fashioned consciousness.

But Mr. Spencer, in trying to arrive at the idea of causation by generalization, is pursuing something which he can never overtake, simply because it lies in the opposite direction; and the more he generalizes the more he gets befogged. When men become exclusively absorbed in the contemplation of, and search for, second causes, the idea of real or efficient cause becomes obscured, till a conception of it is arrived at which is hazy in the extreme; so hazy, indeed, that it is no wonder that only a select few of the world's educated minds have been able to attain to it. Mr. Spencer himself can only think he grasps it in moments of exceptional evolutionary exaltation. When, in calmer mood, he is laying the foundations of his philosophy, he speaks to us of an "incomprehensible cause;" and of this he says, though it "cannot in any manner or degree be known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness; that so long as consciousness continues, we cannot for an instant rid it of this datum; and that thus the belief which this datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any other whatever." But Mr. Spencer does not arrive at this idea of cause by generalization; and the passage is only a glaring illustration of the contradictions which abound in the "Synthetic Philosophy." As we

have before seen, his application of a mechanical theory of evolution to mind has destroyed its reality. He has left himself nothing in which to find a necessary datum of consciousness. He is perfectly right on the basis of his psychology in saying that "the 'Absolute' cannot in any manner or degree be known;" but all the rest of the sentence is, in the light of his philosophy, "unthinkable," "sheer nonsense."¹

What, then, is the true account of the origin and development of our idea of causation. Mr. Spencer recognizes the fact that it is impossible to know much about the traits of prehistoric man, except as we are content to fill out the general idea which evolution gives us, by the study of existing races of savages.² As regards the early appearance among savages of a desire to investigate causes, I can find room for only one quotation; but that shall be from a high authority. Mr. E. B. Tylor says: "Man's craving to know the causes at work in each event he witnesses, the reasons why each state of things he surveys is such as it is, and no other, is no product of high civilization, but a characteristic of his race down to its lowest stage. Among rude savages it is already an intellectual appetite whose satisfaction claims many of the moments not engrossed by war or sport, food or sleep." I have quoted this only as bearing upon the question of the early or late development of the desire to *enlarge* the original and simple idea of cause,—an idea which antedates the development of such a desire, and for the existence of which we have certain proof. Mr. Spencer's volume on Sociology gives us a vast collection of facts bearing upon this question, all of which go to prove that the idea of efficient cause is full formed in the mind of the savage from the time he begins to be conscious of himself.

Let us follow out one of his illustrations. In connection with the passage already quoted from the "Data of Ethics," Mr. Spencer says: "We hear with surprise of the savage, who, falling down a precipice, ascribes the failure of his foothold to a malicious demon." Are we surprised? On the supposition that the savage's mind is constituted like that of a civilized man, I say, most naturally reasoned! It is supposed, of course, that the fall has taken place under such circumstances as to seem to require an outside agency for the explanation of it. And such being the case, the inference is a natural deduction from his experience, and proves him to have a very clear, though narrow idea of cause. The will of an intelligent being is the only cause which he knows

¹ *First Principles*, p. 98.

² *Principles of Psychology*, p. 43.

much about; therefore if his own will did not cause the event, he naturally jumps to the conclusion that some other will did. And because, from the undeveloped state of his mind, he has little idea of process, and is unable to view the event except in relation to his personal injury, he infers an invisible malicious agent, acting in close contact with himself. Stripped of its accessories, the kernel of the conclusion, namely, that everything that takes place in the world must be traced to an intelligent will, is the truth. The simplest essential idea of cause, therefore, is fully evolved, though as compared with the wider idea of an educated man, it is what the hand of a baby, poor, weak, untaught thing, is to the hand of the adult, full of strength, and trained to a thousand skillful activities.

In the early stages of human development, the idea of process has but a small place in the conception of phenomena. The efficient cause and the result are brought close together. When the anthropoid animal became man by acquiring the power of sustained self-consciousness, the conception of process, we may assume, was at zero. The knowledge of himself as an actor, on the contrary, was a prominent element in that initial revelation by which he became known to himself. And as his causative power must have been exerted almost wholly in direct and simple acts, so his conception of cause would for a time continue to be that of a simple and direct exertion of his personal energy. But the progress of man in material civilization has ever been achieved by the invention of processes which become continually more and more extended. The use of fire, of water, of various implements, the construction of permanent abodes, and the elaboration of language familiarized primitive man with the use of processes in his own life; and by this the materials for the idea of mediate causation were accumulated. The idea itself could be grasped only when the power of abstract thought had become sufficiently developed for its recognition. As soon as it is grasped, and an effort is made to extend its application, there is a fermentation in the mind. For although when considered in relation to short and simple processes there is no confusion and no antagonism between the ideas of primary and instrumental causation, an antagonism ensues as soon as the problem is enlarged to take in a series of complex phenomena. A man thinks and speaks of himself as the cause of everything which he brings to pass by simple processes. Though he may, by accommodation, say that the fire cooks his food, he never thinks of calling the fire the cook. But

as soon as he turns to the consideration of results which have required longer processes, his mind is easily diverted from the thought of a real cause by his preoccupation with second causes.

When, for instance, attention is turned to the cause of a skein of home-spun yarn, the housewife who sat at the spinning-wheel is thought of. But in the case of a similar skein, produced by more elaborate machinery driven by steam, it is the steam-driven machinery that is thought of. Although perfectly well aware that the one as much as the other is the product of an intelligent human will, yet it is only by a slight compulsion of the mind that this is clearly recognized. So when man begins to project his idea of cause from the realm of human agency to the great world of natural phenomena, there ensues a conflict. The discovery of a mediate or instrumental cause where he has hitherto conceived an immediate one requires a reconstruction of his notion which it is not easy to make.

Scientific investigators are unconsciously led astray by an imperfect application of the analogy with which they start. Mr. Spencer's volume on sociology, as I have said, profusely illustrates and emphasizes the fact that the uneducated mind always demands an intelligent will to explain causation. Now, when the knowledge of process intervenes, the originating will is naturally sought for by tracing back, step by step, the series of second causes. Thus a detective, beginning with a slight clew, may work patiently for years at a problem of human causation, unearthing one link after another of a buried chain, till at length his patience is rewarded by coming upon an originating cause. It is the feeling that an originating cause ought to be discoverable in the same way by nature's detectives, when they unveil and trace back her hitherto hidden processes, that results in unbelief, when the chain seems to extend into infinity. A more careful application of the analogy would lead to the discovery of an intelligent will in the one case as certainly as in the other. Whenever causation is traced to a man, other than one's self, it is traced not to a physical organization, which is apparent to the senses, but to a mind which is never cognizable by the senses. A real causative power is believed to exist in connection with a human body, not our own, solely because we cannot help drawing an inference from our own self-consciousness. Reasoning in the same way, we must postulate a real cause of a similar kind as the source of the phenomena of the universe, though we cannot associate it with a physical form. But for those who are to be satisfied only by the discovery of a

physically embodied first cause, the only logical conclusion must be that the whole idea of efficient cause is an hallucination, and that the human will, like everything else, is only a link in the great chain of second causes.

But scientific explorers are not the only ones who find difficulty in extending the idea of mediate causation from its simpler manifestations to the problem of the universe. Those who cling through everything to the idea of origination by intelligent will are tossed upon a sea of conflict when they try to rationalize their conception of God. When the idea of many invisible agents, acting in close connection with phenomena, has given place to the idea of one will at the centre of the universe, there arises on the one hand the conception of an infinitely extended process with a God infinitely removed from connection with human beings; and on the other hand there arises the conception of a God in close connection with events, and sustaining to his works a relation similar to that which the mind of man bears to his body and to the activities which he manifests through it. The first is intolerable, and renders human intercourse with God inconceivable. The second savors of pantheism, and is rescued from it only by retaining a firm hold on the fact of human personality. Thus, from the never-ceasing stimulus of conflicting ideas, progress — evolution — results. By the interaction of destructive and reconstructive forces, of criticism and thought-building, the idea of causation, as applied to the universe, progressively works itself clear of misconception, while it ever assumes, in the mind of the theist, a more definite and rational shape. In other words, the evolution of this idea is the progress of the human mind on *one* of the great lines by which, in the realization of a pre-ordained plan, it seeks after God if haply it might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us.

If this account of the genesis of our idea of a Great First Cause as an intelligent self-determining Personality is true, we are in possession of principles which may be applied in other departments of mind. The evolution of the complex conscience of a Christian civilization may be deduced from the simplest ideas of ought and ought not, given in consciousness through a similar conflict of thought and experience; and in this evolution we may recognize another of those great lines of progress on which we advance to ever higher and purer conceptions of the *character* of God.

F. H. Johnson.

EDITORIAL.

INDISPOSITION TO FACE RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

MANY years ago, one of the pupils of a then well-known instructor in biblical literature gave us an amusing account of the professor's method of meeting difficulties. When a passage was reached which contained etymological or theological perplexities, he would exclaim, "Gentlemen, here is a difficulty. Let us not be timid; let us look it fairly in the face." Then, after a moment's pause, he would resume: "And now, gentlemen, having faced the difficulty, let us pass on." The good man's Falstaffian valor probably seems less unique to his former pupils now than in their student days. They have often found themselves, when confronted by a problem, sorely tempted to "face" it after the same transient fashion. If they have ever yielded to the temptation, they have probably comforted themselves with the thought that they had many respectable companions in transgression.

For they must have been dull observers of the life of the Church if they have not found out that unwillingness to face problems which the Providence of God and the leadings of his Spirit have forced upon it has been and is one of its serious defects. That this defect is more serious than many good people think, and that it is not an unprofitable task to point out its causes, is our conviction.

It is to be noticed, to begin with, that the temptation to this fault has not mastered exclusively, perhaps not chiefly, the more selfish and worldly. Its peculiar power has lain in its appeal to qualities which give Christian life seriousness and efficiency. Hence the painful contrast between the spirit of the service rendered by many Christians and the tone of their intellectual life. When some piece of work is set before them they are prompt and resolute in attacking it; when they are summoned to form a new conviction, or to modify an old one, they are timid, procrastinating, and self-indulgent. Attacked by a spiritual foe, they will fight heroically; confronted by a hard problem, they will turn and flee.

We need not go beyond our own country, scarcely beyond our own generation, for abundant illustrations of this inconsistency. When called on to face its responsibility for the use of such power as it had to hem in and weaken slavery, at least to prevent its spread, was the Church, as a body, eager to take up the ethical question involved, knowing as it did that it was not an abstract question, that great moral issues were at stake, and that its own character might be damaged by its refusal to get conviction and use it?

Though it should not be forgotten that the power of the abolition movement lay largely in the religious convictions of the few church-mem-

bers who belonged to it from the first, yet candor demands the admission that the strictures passed by their radical associates upon the Church were for a time well founded. Long after the moral effects of slavery were clearly seen — when were they hidden? — and the aggressive temper of the slave-power had become felt, a very large part of the Church, including some of its leaders, wished to suppress the anti-slavery agitation. Many who shared this wish afterwards became leaders in the anti-slavery movement; but they lagged in those earlier years, not because they were time-serving, but because they shrank from facing the question at issue. It involved an important modification of their conception of Christianity, a new departure in ethics and biblical interpretation, and this they were slow to make.

Then the resistance long made to the demand which evangelism fifty years ago put forth for larger liberty in its conception of human freedom as against divine sovereignty; did not this show reluctance to respond to a divine call to reëxamine a leading tenet of theology? Perhaps the conservative leaders had done their thinking before the issue arose, and could only fight and pray against what they deemed a formidable heresy; but they would not have had power so to stir the churches against the new teaching if a large part of the rank and file had not shut their minds to the disturbing ideas and followed on. The problem once met, the essential worthiness of Finney's and Taylor's teaching was recognized, and the flames of strife died down. The charred brands remain to show how long the question was put aside. The reluctance of church teachers to meet the questions concerning the Mosaic cosmogony raised by geology twenty-five years ago is another illustration. "It will be time for us to ask whether our belief accords with the facts," was the plea for delay, "when the geologists have come to an agreement as to what the facts are." So, by the specious pretext that the teachings of science have no decisive value for the Christian mind, delay was gained. When geology had established its position among the sciences, new interpretations of Scripture were invented which modified the discrepancy between its teachings and the Scripture cosmogony. These served their purpose well. The question was long avoided. Biblical science is demonstrating that these artificial interpretations must be given up, — that the sacred writers must be interpreted according to the laws of language, — and that the questions between the Mosaic account of creation and the teachings of geology must be met — but in the face of sturdy opposition from a large part of the Christian public.

This defect in the life of the Church, illustrations to which need not have been confined to the past, is, as has been already said, a "defect of its qualities." To understand it, we must go back of its remaining "old heaven" to some of the noblest features of its life.

First, its hearty love for the old teaching which has made it free makes it unwilling to put itself in an attitude which involves the possible aban-

donment of any of it. The conservative plea that, by keeping the old without jot or tittle of alteration we secure all that it brought to the fathers, while avoiding the perils of change, is by no means an absurd one. Its weight with sober minds, when used in the political sphere, is appreciated by everybody. "The Reflections on the French Revolution" is the splendid proof of its power over one of the great political thinkers of modern times. This plea has still more force in the religious sphere, because there what is old contains more obviously imperishable elements, and the possibilities involved in change are greater and come more swiftly. The English Constitution is not founded on a divine revelation; the theology of Dr. Emmons was: The English government cannot be uprooted by any act of its own; the Church *may* renounce its belief in all revealed truth, and so destroy its life. We can easily understand, then, how a Christian can regard divine truth as wrought out once for all in the system of theology in which he was bred, and resist any attempt to modify that system, with all the energy of his religious conviction. "I have found this Bible to be God's book, and I believe that it all came from Him, even the language. If I regarded it as containing a single error, I could not believe it to be his book, for all his works are perfect. If I did not believe it to be his book I should lose my religious faith, for that faith is built upon the assumption that He gave it to the world to tell it of Himself. Therefore I shall not listen to men who try to prove that it contains errors. Why should I listen to them, if I am to keep on believing in the Bible and living under its influence?" It is a conservatism which not only refuses to accept the results of biblical study, but is inimical to it; which is hostile to textual criticism, even to re-translation of the Scriptures, — we have known it to be avowed by an influential layman, in these its logical inferences. This is not an unaccountable form of belief. We cannot wonder that men should regard the Bible as being what it is through that overshadowing and miraculous action of God in its composition in which they believe, and that they cannot be persuaded to look at the book itself apart from that conception. The association between their spiritual appreciation of its contents and this idea of it as an absolutely perfect because purely divine work, is so intimate that they could not consider the possibility of severing them without pain.

Another cause of indisposition to face religious problems is a certain enthusiasm of faith which glows in some generous minds. They glory in believing. It is chivalrous to trust an unseen Lord. They honor Him by taking what He says without query. The more fully they believe the more they honor Him. It is easy for them to forget that they cannot believe as Christ would have them, until they find out what He would have them believe, and that his ordering of the life of the Church and the world is such that the inquiry has to be constantly renewed, so that a hearty faith must be open-minded and truth-seeking. Many Chris-

tians do forget this, and form the habit of regarding the one act of the soul toward divine things as that of acquiescent trust. They acquire a dislike to the searching and pondering attitude. It seems undevout. They form an impression that there is an antagonism between thinking and trusting. So, instead of keeping their belief sincere and vital, they cultivate devout frames and postures. When difficulties come they shut their eyes and pray instead of facing them. It is the temper which impels men towards Rome.

Many ministers are kept from facing religious problems by a one-sided devotion to their work. They have to impress truth on the minds of their people. They cannot do this unless it comes from them with the ring of absolute conviction. Therefore they will cultivate the habit of believing mightily. They will live in those things that they are sure of. They will let the schools settle the hard questions; they will deal with assured results. So they think little and preach sturdily. And in time, as the power of living thought is taken from the strong convictions, they become feeble, notwithstanding all efforts made to preserve their force, and the sturdy assertions of truth begin to have, even to the preacher, a somewhat mechanical and hollow sound.

Ministers sometimes check the impulse to face problems through conscientious sympathy with the more conservative members of their churches. They cannot succeed in their work unless they have the full coöperation of such parishioners. This they will lose if they try to discuss disturbing questions. They must put away such questions, and live in the religious life of those who will not think. It is the temper which made many timid ministers ignore the slavery question during years when their influence was sorely needed in deepening the moral sentiment of the North. It leads many ministers to ignore the biblical questions which are now pressing upon the mind of the Church, not seeing that the immediate results thus gained are won by making a large subtraction from the effectiveness of those who follow them. In giving these not discreditable reasons for the defect in question, we do not assume that there are none which are less worthy. Those we prefer to pass over, believing that they are not so influential as those named. We may hereafter point out some of the consequences which follow the persistent shirking of religious problems.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ULTRA-CONSERVATIVES.

THERE is in the churches a small body of men who are doing all in their power to retard progress, while they cry out lustily, We are the only safe guides; beware of all others! These are the ultra-conservatives who make loud, not to say impudent, professions of immaculate orthodoxy, and who claim for themselves immunity from criticism on the ground that they are the only surviving defenders of the truth. It is

high time that their hostility to the real interests of the churches and of society were exposed. In our honest judgment, they are doing more harm than any other equal number of men, and their power for evil is increased because they employ all arts to turn suspicion from themselves upon others. There is a true conservatism which is the condition of all real progress. There is an ultra-conservatism which is the sworn enemy of progress. Conservatism avoids by-paths and guides the chariot of the Lord along the solid highways of truth. Ultra-conservatism would chain the wheels and bring the chariot to a stand-still.

It has been the fashion for some time to call to account all those who favor changes in the statement or relative emphasis of religious truths. The churches have been vehemently warned against all such dangerous innovators. It has been declared and reiterated, sometimes in very harsh terms, that trouble is to be looked for only in that quarter. Now, while it is true that, within certain limits, the burden of proof rests on the advocates of change, it is also true that in every generation some change is necessary, and that those who oppose legitimate progress may with still more reason be sharply called to account. We distinctly raise the question, then, whether the ultra-conservatives of to-day shall any longer have the immunity from accountability which they have so long claimed and enjoyed. Shall we tolerate them while they iterate the boast, I am holier than thou, and on the corners of the street thank God that they are not as other men are? The answer to the question is to be gained by recognizing their attitude and designating some of their methods. If we speak plainly, it is because we feel strongly.

The Church of Christ in this country, as elsewhere, has an immense problem before it. It is no exaggeration to say that the conditions of life and thought have never been so perplexing as they are at this present time. Outward changes in rapidity of travel, extension of commerce, growth of cities, influx of foreigners, modes of living, have scarcely kept pace, swiftly as they have come upon us, with the spread of intelligence, discoveries of the reign of law in the universe, the tremendous lurch towards materialism and mercantilism, the contagion of the democratic tendency which intensifies individualism and diminishes regard for authority, the new and pressing social questions which have arisen, the spirit of free inquiry concerning all inherited beliefs and traditions. Doubtless the truth and power of the gospel are adequate to meet these changed conditions, but does any one believe that the truth will be effective if it is presented only in the forms which were appropriate to the centuries which lie behind us? The gospel must be translated and interpreted to modern thought in modern terms. It must be incorporated in character which, instead of being insulated from the world, is in sympathy with it. The living Christ must be brought to the living soul. All honor to those men who, with unwavering faith in the Christ who is the same yesterday and to-day and forever, address themselves to the task of making Him in-

telligible to the thought, real to the need, and inspiring to the life of our own time. That some will go too far and attenuate, even eviscerate, the gospel, is no more than might be expected. Let us not follow after them. But that we should be called off from our sacred task, commanded to drop modern speech and methods, stigmatized as traitors, or at least brought under a cloud of suspicion, is most grievous. The ultra-conservatives are attempting to rob the churches of the spiritual gains which are peculiar to modern religious thought and experience, to hinder (they cannot arrest) the work which is so bravely going on. It becomes intolerable when, complacent in their own fancied security, they try to persuade good men that they are the people and wisdom shall die with them. There are such men among us who are vociferous with warnings, and they do maintain such an attitude towards progress. Let us not follow after them. One extreme is as bad as the other.

Their methods are characteristic of their attitude. One method is that of insisting that a certain phraseology shall be used in the preaching and teaching of doctrines. Phrases which once glowed with meaning, but have lost much of their heat and light, are made tests of doctrinal fidelity. This method may be called the Overworking of Phrases. For instance, concerning the doctrine of atonement, a stand is made on the use of the term *expiation*. Those who can say expiation are safe men. Those who cannot say expiation are dangerous men. It was not so long ago since a stand was made on the term vicarious. To be evangelical one must use the word vicarious freely. But since it is a term with considerable latitude of meaning, and since almost every one who accepts the Divinity of Christ has no objection to it, it is thought necessary to lay hold of some other word which is of unmistakable import. Expiation is a figurative term borrowed from the sacrificial altar to express the necessity of satisfying God, so that he can forgive sin. When used, not in a quantitative, but a spiritual meaning, it expresses an important truth, — indeed, in our judgment, the fundamental truth of atonement. We believe that the reconciliation of God effected by the death of Christ is assumed even by those who deny the necessity of it. The expiation made by Christ has been so effective, and pardon is therefore so freely offered, that some, in their clear recognition of the result, lose sight of the cause, and declare that it never was necessary to reconcile God. But notwithstanding our conviction that the necessity of reconciliation lies primarily in the character of God, we object decidedly to making any one phrase concerning it a shibboleth. It is impossible to express the significance of Christ's atonement by a single word. Expiation is a word that has come down to us from the past, and has its uses, but it is not found in the Bible, and hence has not the advantage which propitiation has, and no one has a right to impose it as a test. Moreover, we request those who hold up this word so prominently to explain precisely what it means to them. Are they not using it themselves in a somewhat vague

sense? Are they not reviving the notion of a quantum of suffering endured, and getting back into mechanical and mercantile conceptions. They must be more explicit, and tell us what their crucial test really is. They are overworking a phrase which, whether in itself or in its associations, is incapable of covering all the facts. When one says he accepts the new creed in its statement concerning the atonement, it is replied, Oh no, you must insert expiatory. So with the phrase *infallible*, as applied to the Bible. It is not enough to say that the "Scriptures constitute the authoritative standard by which religious teaching and human conduct are to be regulated and judged." You must say infallible. But those who would thus lord it over us either do not explain what they mean by infallible, or they limit infallibility to certain spheres of truth, or they assert an infallibility which is only relatively infallible, if any one knows what that means. They do not trust the Bible to assert itself, but would prop it up with a phrase which, unless it means too much, means nothing at all. An eminent judge of the United States courts writes: "While I know that the progressive spirit in theology has come to stay, I can see that there is a strong effort to capture this city in the interests of the sixteenth century." What is this overworking of phrases but an attempt to cast the present doctrinal beliefs of the churches in the rigid mould of a former period, to force the new wine into old bottles? The golden age of Christianity is always in the future. The ultra-conservatives find it in the past. John Foster explained the aversion of men of taste to evangelical religion by showing that truth has been presented in an outgrown or an ambiguous terminology. This aversion will be deepened if we are to be summoned back to the old creeds and phrases, and are to make them ultimate expressions of belief.

We wish the specification of methods could stop here, and that the issue could be squarely joined on the use of mediæval or of modern statements of doctrine. But more must be said. Some of the methods employed are wonderfully suggestive of tactics which are fast coming under condemnation even in politics and business. They are not altogether honorable. It seems as if the ultra-conservatives were deliberately trying to create a panic in the churches. A panic arises not from a calm and candid survey of the facts, but by starting vague and threatening reports. The shout goes up that these progressive men are denying the atonement, teaching a second probation, undermining the authority of the Bible; and timid souls are alarmed. It even goes so far as to the selection of a rallying-cry which will be most *likely* to alarm the churches. It is agreed that a certain cry shall be taken because it will be effective. Then certain statements of fresh views are cut out of their connection and put in another light, which makes them look dangerous. It is like the political method of stalwart Republicans trying to conduct a campaign by waving the bloody shirt. They care nothing about Southern outrages, but they want a party cry.

The ultras seem to take advantage, intentionally, of the patience and magnanimity of those they attack. They resort to insinuations, misrepresentations, vague but alarming surmises, because they suppose no reply will be made. For the sake of peace and to avoid making the impression that progressive theology is animated by a controversial spirit, the obstructionists have been left unmolested. They have supposed the policy of silence would be maintained, and so have said whatever might serve their purposes. Surely we should not condescend to the use of the same weapons, but there comes a time when patience and silence cease to be virtues. It is not well that truth should suffer and spiritual interests be imperilled for the sake of the semblance of peace. When a determined and combined, we had almost said unscrupulous, attempt is made to bring and keep under suspicion those who are trying to preach or teach the truth as Christian men should, when resort is had for this purpose to incorrect and misleading statements, caricatures, false reports, we cannot keep silence. We do not deny that we and our friends are sensitive under the treatment to which we have been subjected; but we are sensitive not because we are sore, but because we are indignant. When candidates soon to come before councils are privately informed that if they hold this or that view they will be rejected, what is this but petty persecution? What would they not say if progressive men should resort to similar measures?

Are these men not to be held accountable for the needless alarm they are causing, and for the wretched mischief they are working? Is it not an excessive love of quietness which refrains from characterizing them as they deserve? They are found in all denominations, and in all generations. They are the lineal descendants of those who drove the Wesleyans out of the Church of England, who drove Jonathan Edwards out of Northampton, who put Albert Barnes on trial for heresy. They have always been the men who would stop the wheels of progress.

It may not be true in religion and theology, but it certainly is true in all other relations, that those who stoutly and incessantly proclaim their own excellence, who declare that they alone are above suspicion, will bear watching. We suspect those who take pains to assure us that they are not to be suspected.

The methods employed betray the consciousness of a waning cause; but one sinner is capable of destroying much good. We believe that the number of ultras who are would-be leaders is insignificantly small, but their activity is out of proportion to their numbers. When determined men can work in comparative safety, a few may hinder the development of a spiritual theology adapted to the needs of the age. The rising tide has its dangerous undertow. We are not indulging in hasty invective. It has been our judgment for many months that the ultra-conservatives are doing much to hinder the progress of truth, and we have at length decided to express our unfavorable opinion. We have no

apologies to offer, for we are stating only what ought to be known. We have no expectation of convincing any one of our opponents of the error of his ways, but we do hope to relieve some of our readers of needless fears, and to point out those who are really the chief offenders. We will claim no exalted virtue by saying that it pains us or grieves us to be obliged to bring such charges against Christian brethren. It pains us that the facts are what they are, but it is a relief and a pleasure to give expression at length to our pent-up feelings of honest indignation.

WOMEN AT OXFORD UNIVERSITY.

THE voting at Oxford on the admission of women to examination for honors has been a genuine surprise. The majority in favor of it is so large that people are rubbing their eyes and asking, not what the vote means to the women, but what it means on the part of the men voting. The largest vote ever cast by the graduates of Oxford was called out on this issue. Obscure rectors came up from all parts of the kingdom and helped to swell the majority. Conservatives in politics voted for, Liberals against, and every one has been asking what it all means.

The facts are soon recited. Some years ago Cambridge University accorded to women the right to be examined on the same terms with men for honors in mathematics, classics, history, and the natural sciences. Other universities of less note had previously granted the same privileges. Oxford had merely given certificates of a certain degree of proficiency in the studies pursued. The demand has been strongly pressed that Oxford should admit women to examination for honors. It was not asked that women might become candidates for degrees, nor that they should have residence in the University, but that they should be examined for honors, and that the names of the successful candidates should appear in alphabetical order precisely as if they were men.

The reasons behind the request were not sentimental, as such demands are in America, but economical. Many of those who apply for examination intend to earn their livelihood by teaching. It has been found that those who succeed in the examinations for honors get the good situations, while the Oxford certificates of proficiency, having no fixed value, are nearly worthless. It was not sentiment that was involved, but bread and butter, — and this explains, in part, the surprising vote.

The resident graduates having voted in favor, an appeal was taken to the non-resident graduates, that is, the Congregation appealed to the Convocation, whose decisions are final. Nearly 800 Masters of Arts came together, — a larger number than appeared at a time of recent theological excitement, a larger number, in fact, than ever assembled, — and by the decisive majority of 143 voted that women should be admitted to the examinations. Who would have predicted that country rectors and curates would hold so advanced views? But a rector has daughters.

It is popularly supposed that he has a good many, and that he is at his wits' end how to support them. One of them had failed to secure a certain position because she had no honor certificates. It is not strange that the bright daughters pack off papa for the Convocation, nor that he is quite ready to go, that by his vote he may improve their chances of earning a living. Not political, nor ecclesiastical, nor sentimental, but domestic reasons had most to do with the remarkable result. It was felt that an unfounded prejudice should not close the doors of employment to intelligent women. Solemn warnings were uttered and dismal forebodings expressed by dignitaries of the church concerning the ruin likely to overwhelm the country by reason of this innovation, one of the Dons predicting that Oxford would become a matrimonial bureau; but nothing availed to alarm the determined voters. The opposition has, at least, the satisfaction of knowing that it is thoroughly beaten, and that it is useless to reopen the question.

Such a vote admitting women to valuable privileges in the most ancient and conservative of English universities does not show that woman suffrage is certain to follow, nor even that a long step has been taken towards the elevation of women. It means that an Englishman loves fair play. It also exhibits the good sense of Englishmen in one important respect. They are willing that the legitimate occupations should be open to woman. There is no silly prejudice standing in the way of a woman who must earn her own livelihood. She does many things in that country, and has for years, which in democratic America custom does not allow her to do. Women here have, indeed, too much of that freedom which only harms them, but they have too little of the freedom which helps them. It is to be desired that some of the conventional restrictions of England might take the place of the excessive freedom permitted here in the mutual relations of men and women, especially of young men and women, but, on the other hand, that our narrowness in excluding women from various respectable occupations might make way for the liberty so generously accorded in the mother country.

THE INDEPENDENT IN POLITICS.

It would be too much to say that the independent commands the present political situation. Nevertheless, politicians will do well not to underestimate his power. Possibly he may not be a determining factor in either of the nominating conventions. Certainly he will be a determining factor in the election if his fair claims are ignored. We can conceive of the two parties as alike satisfying the independents by their nominations and by their assertion of principles, and so virtually eliminating the independent movement from the conflict. But such virtuous action is not to be anticipated. In all probability there will be a choice in respect to Presidential candidates and in respect to the degree in which they are committed to questions of reform.

What is the *real* strength of the present independent movement? Recent events have brought into prominence the fact that the independent seems to hold the balance of power. Is this his strength? Certainly not, in distinction from that of any third party in a contest. The mere holding of the balance between two factions of a party, or between two parties, has no permanent significance. The situation may be purely accidental. According to present indications the independent movement has deeper and more permanent sources of strength.

One source of its present strength evidently lies in its recognition of the place and province of the established parties. It does not seem to be aspiring to make of itself another party. Four years ago there was more discussion about such an attempt than there is to-day. Time has shown the unwisdom of the project. The issues involved are not such as create parties. The corruption of an existing party is not a necessary reason for the organization of a new one.

The Republican party supplanted the Whig party, not because the Whig party was corrupt, but because it was too conservative. It refused the leadership of the moral movement then making itself felt throughout the non-slaveholding States. Party corruption is too often a matter of circumstance, a question of opportunity, as with the Democratic party in its handling of the Irish vote, or with the Republican party in its handling of the negro vote. Or it may come through the local intrenchment of a given party in power, as with the Democratic party in New York city, or with the Republican party in Philadelphia. Historic parties are not to be overturned or swept away through popular impatience or indignation with political managers. There are less costly and more effective ways of punishing insolent and unscrupulous politicians. The independent movement is strong because it is so terribly personal. It names men. Its contention is not simply for general morality of administration. It does not hesitate to say of such and such men that they have not the political character which warrants the trust of citizens.

The emphasis thus placed upon political character, if rigidly insisted upon and supported by resolute efforts toward civil service reform, will surely purify American politics. And nothing else will. If the independents allow themselves to go out into other issues which belong properly to the established parties, they may gain in certain localities some temporary advantage, but they will not effect their main object. The party managers will gladly make concessions upon any question which may be brought before the public as a substitute for the one question of purity of administration. Happily the independent movement shows no sign at present of wavering in the resoluteness or singleness of its purpose.

Another source of its present strength lies in its method of training for political leadership. The acknowledged party method is that of

organization. The political aspirant is "the worker." The ward of the city, or the school district of the country, is the field of his operations. The field must not be too large, else it will not be well "worked." The local politician who gains a reputation for thoroughness puts himself in the way of promotion. He makes himself necessary to the party. A larger field is given him to cultivate, and with the larger power at his command comes the larger claim for services rendered. The only limit to promotion by this method — but the limit is a very rigid one — is that of personal political influence. A man who is simply a political manager is of no account outside his own field, and the largest field open to such a man is the congressional district or the State. There are men in Congress, both in the House and in the Senate, who have nothing to expect from the nation at large. They have no power whatever beyond the power to maintain themselves in their seats. Even Mr. Conkling, with his acknowledged general ability, never made a place for himself in national politics. His political influence was always confined to his own State, where he was the master of its peculiar political methods.

Doubtless the independents, without forming a party, will have to deal more or less with organization. The organizing faculty belongs in politics. But this faculty has shown itself thus far in the independent movement, not in the manipulation of voters, but in the management of public measures. Young men have given themselves to the careful investigation of questions of vital public interest. They have studied into them as they would have studied into like questions in business. And as occasions have offered they have had something to propose. Their plans have been seen to be simple, practical, far-reaching. The press has taken up the men and their measures and given them a hearty support. Their constituency has been limited only by the number of those whom their reforms effect. Hence their influence has been far more than local. They have become influential through the necessity and reach of the interests with which they have identified themselves, and which they have shown themselves competent to handle. "Mr. Roosevelt will never become a political leader," wrote one of the old-time leaders at Albany to a citizen of Central New York. "But he is already a leader," was the reply. "He has been leading all of you throughout the session."

But the chief source of strength in the independent movement is, of course, its independence, — its independence within party, its independence, if need be, of party. Everything depends in the last result upon the assurance of consistency of action. The power of the threat lies in the certainty of its execution. It is, however, to be noticed that this quality of independence is becoming less an irritating force as it asserts itself more in practical measures of reform. The independent, as a type of the reformer, improves under work and with success. He is less a cynic, less a critic, than formerly; he is less frequently spoken of as an impracticable; he has less and less occasion to bolt his party. The more

independence is shown within party, the less is seen to be the need of independence of party. As was natural, from the fact that it was the party in power, the criticisms of the independent have been upon the Republican party. So, too, his work is now largely within the same party. The independents are to be well represented in the Chicago Republican Convention. Their delegates go there with well defined and expressed antagonisms, though there are different degrees of antagonisms toward different possible candidates. These antagonisms are more clearly defined and more clearly expressed than their preferences. The independents do not assume to dictate the nomination. They do affirm, however, their determination to oppose certain possible nominations in a very different way from that in which party opposition usually ends. They enter the convention with the understanding that under very possible contingencies they will not submit to the decision of the majority. This purpose shows an independence within party which it is to be hoped will remove the necessity of the assertion of independence of party.

Meanwhile, whatever may be the result of the approaching conventions, or of the approaching election, the cause of civil service reform advances. It is rapidly passing the stage of experiment. It has received full and hearty recognition at the hands of the present administration, and, thus indorsed, it has gone over from national politics into the politics of the State and of the city. It is not likely to meet with any permanent reverse.

A LETTER FROM BISHOP BRYENNIOS.

THE personal interest in Bishop Bryennios awakened in this country by his candid and scholarly presentation of his important discovery leads the recipient of the following letter to yield to the request of his associate editors for its publication in full:—

CONSTANTINOPLE, April 14, 1884.

REVEREND AND DEAR SIR:—

I duly received your letter of March 24th, as well as the number of the *Andover Review*, of which you are the editor. I beg to offer you my best thanks for what you so kindly write of my *Prolegomena* on the *Διδαχὴ*; I had already received from a Greek student of theology in one of the German universities a translation of your article before receiving the *Review* you did me the favor to send me. If I understand rightly your request, you [would] like to have a fuller account of the discovery of the now celebrated Codex; unfortunately the details are very few and unimportant. The library in which the manuscript was discovered belongs to the Convent of the Holy Sepulchre, where the Patriarch of Jerusalem resides when on a visit to Constantinople. It was during the seventeenth century that Dositheus (*Δοσίθεος*), Patriarch of Jerusalem, and

one of the benefactors of the Holy Land, began to collect these manuscripts, augmented since by his successors. In perusing over the catalogue of manuscripts my attention was particularly attracted to this one because of its contents; in fact, the Synopsis of the Old and New Testaments, by St. John Chrysostom, was the oldest treatise contained in the whole catalogue. But knowing by experience that every manuscript very often contains several treatises written by different authors, and that only the first of the series is marked on the outer sheet, in turning over the leaves I discovered Clement's Epistles, and, last of all, the *Διδαχὴ*. These are the only details of the discovery.

*Ζώης ἐπὶ μήκιστον ὀλβιος ἐν ὀλβίοις, τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν φιλῶν, οὗ ἡ χάρις εἴη μετὰ σοῦ διὰ παντός.*¹

✠ Φιλόθεος Βρνένιος,
μητροπολίτης Νικομηδείας.

WHY BAPTISTS REGARD IMMERSION ONLY AS VALID CHRISTIAN BAPTISM: A COMMUNICATION.

THE article in the last number of this Review entitled "Baptism in the 'Teaching' and in Early Christian Art" is virtually a challenge to those who hold that immersion alone is valid Christian baptism. The article closes with these words: "Is it possible to justify the maintenance of the doctrine that baptism, in order to be baptism, must always and everywhere be administered by submersion without a 'Thus saith the Lord,' which, if ever spoken, would have made impossible the seventh chapter of the 'Teaching' and the further revelation of the church's consciousness of liberty in the early representations of baptism in Christian art?" The history of the Christian church shows that a "Thus saith the Lord" has not prevented among the professed followers of Christ the widest departures from Christian truth. Even in apostolic times Paul had occasion again and again bitterly to mourn over and sharply to rebuke his own converts who had forsaken the truth and accepted error. There is no need, therefore, of answering the question in the form in which it stands. The vital point, I apprehend, is this: Is it possible to justify the position held by those who maintain that immersion alone is valid baptism? It is this question, submitted in "all kindness and love of Christian unity and coöperation," that I purpose to answer. If this position is not capable of justification, the sooner the fact is made to appear, the better it will be for the cause we all desire to serve.

In their view that immersion only is valid baptism, Baptists appeal to the New Testament. They find here, they believe, a "Thus saith the Lord." The words of the great commission, as recorded by Matthew, are as follows: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them," etc. Now, so far as baptism is concerned, what was the act enjoined in this command, and which is also suggested wherever baptism comes before us in the New Testament? We certainly cannot go astray if first of all we seek for the meaning of the word here employed. That word

¹ May you live very long, happy among the happy, loving our Lord Jesus Christ, whose grace be with you alway.

is βαπτίζω, which lexicographers assure us means to *immerse, submerge*. Not a passage has been found, in sacred or profane literature, in which βαπτίζω means to *sprinkle* or to *pour*. I may be told that the "Greek-English Lexicon" of Liddell and Scott, which is used so generally in all of our classical schools and colleges, defines βαπτίζω, to *dip repeatedly, dip under, to bathe, to wet, to pour upon, drench, to dip a vessel, to draw water*. This is true of the first edition both in this country and in England. The correctness of the definition, however, was challenged, and in the second edition the words *to steep, wet, pour upon, drench*, were omitted, as without authority, and have not since reappeared. This second edition, however, retained the words *to dip repeatedly*. These, also, have disappeared, and in their place, as early as the sixth London edition, were introduced the words *to dip in or under water*; while to the definition to *draw*, for example, to *draw wine from bowls in cups*, the editors added in parenthesis, as if to prevent all possible misapprehension, the significant words, "*of course by dipping them*." The history of these changes in the successive editions of this standard Lexicon is, to say the least, a most suggestive one.

We reach the same result if we go to the standard New Testament lexicons. Cremer defines βαπτίζω, to *immerse, submerge*. In Wilke's "Lexicon of New Testament Greek," revised by Grimm, we read under βαπτίζω, "In the New Testament it is used especially of the solemn rite of holy bathing first instituted by John the Baptist; afterward received by Christians as a command of Christ, and accommodated to the genius and nature of his religion—that is, immersion in water." βάπτισμα is defined *immersion, submersion*, and of Christian baptism it is added that, "according to the apostolic conception, this is the rite of holy submersion commanded by Christ." The testimony of the late Professor E. A. Sophocles, of Harvard University, is worthy of notice in this connection. In his "Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods," he says, "There is no evidence that Luke and Paul, and the other writers of the New Testament, put upon this verb meanings not recognized by the Greeks."

With the lexicographers agree the more prominent exegetical scholars of every name, Meyer, DeWette, Tholuck, Olshausen, Lange, Fritsche, Lightfoot, Ellicott, Godet, and many others. Of Mark vii. 4 Meyer says: 'Εάν μὴ βαπτίσωμαι is not to be understood of washing the hands, but of immersion, which the word in classic Greek and in the New Testament everywhere means, *i. e.*, according to the context, *to take a bath*."

The word employed in the injunction cited, therefore, clearly indicates the act required. If now we *translate* the word, instead of *transferring* it, the great commission reads, "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, *immersing* them." What else is this but a "Thus saith the Lord"?

In the administration of baptism, therefore, immersion is essential in order to fulfill the divine command. It is also essential in order to preserve the symbolical significance of the ordinance as presented in the New Testament. In the first place immersion is the most appropriate symbol of that spiritual cleansing which baptism expresses. Jewish ideas on this subject Maimonides states when he says, "Whenever, in the Law, washing of the flesh or of the clothes is mentioned, it means nothing else than the dipping of the whole body in a laver; for if any

man dip himself all over, except the tip of his little finger, he is still in uncleanness."

But baptism is also and especially a symbol of the believer's death to sin, and of his rising to a new life. In his epistle to the Romans (vi. 2, 4), Paul says: "How shall we that are dead to sin live any longer therein? Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized in Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." A like thought is presented in Colossians ii. 12. In baptism, therefore, as the crowning act of repentance and faith, two great facts are symbolically set forth: Buried in the baptismal waters, the old man defiled by sin disappears, but emerging from the emblematic grave he rises to the new life in Christ. In a note to his remarks on Acts xvi. 33, 34, Meyer, referring to the above passage in Romans, says: "Immersion was a thoroughly essential part [*ein ganz wesentliches Stück*] of the symbolism of baptism." Says Lightfoot in his note on Colossians iii. 1: "The sacrament of baptism, as administered in the apostolic age, involved a twofold symbolism, a death or burial and a resurrection. In the rite itself these were represented by two distinct acts, the disappearance beneath the water and the emergence from the water." Weiss, designated in the March number of this Review as "the first New Testament scholar of Germany," gives, in his "Life of Christ," this same symbolical significance to baptism. "Holy ablutions," he says, "were customary among the Jews, and characteristic of the Essenes, but they aimed at levitical purification, and have nothing to do with this symbolical observance, which represents by immersion the complete disappearance of the old nature, and by emersion the beginning of an entirely new life." Let now immersion give place to sprinkling or pouring and this symbolical significance of baptism is destroyed. As Stanley says, "It is a greater change even than that which the Roman Catholic church has made in administering the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper in the bread without the wine. For that was a change which did not affect the thing that was signified; whereas the change from immersion to sprinkling has set aside the larger part of the apostolic language regarding baptism."

It is therefore because nothing can be substituted for immersion without disregarding the act designated in the divine command, and also without destroying the symbolical significance of the act, that Baptists are constrained to hold that immersion, and immersion only, is valid baptism. All possible variations they are ready to allow. It matters not with them whether baptism is administered in a stream or in the sea, in fresh water or in salt, in warm water or in cold. Nor does it matter how the act is performed. Dr. Judson, I have been told, was accustomed to place his hand upon the candidate's head, and the candidate then bowed down beneath the water instead of being laid back into the water, as the rite is now usually administered. Here plainly there is liberty of variation. So far as the act is concerned, the immersion only is the essential thing. It is in this ordinance as in that of the Lord's Supper. A little more than half a century ago Ralph Waldo Emerson was pastor of the Second Unitarian Church in Boston. In a sermon on the Lord's Supper he urged his people to abandon the observance of that ordinance, and "suggested a mode in which a meeting for the same pur-

pose might be held free of objection." I have been told that his suggestion was that the bread and wine should remain on the table at the communion season, and as the German philosopher told his students to "think the wall" the members of Mr. Emerson's church were to think the Lord's Supper. But they were unwilling to conform to Mr. Emerson's suggestion. It seemed to them that the change proposed would be an unwarrantable violation of the plain commandment of the Saviour, "Take, eat — drink;" "This *do* in remembrance of me;" and so, rather than yield cherished convictions of duty, they accepted the pastor's resignation, and Mr. Emerson's ministry suddenly came to an end. Who will say that they were not right? It was not a question of one kind of bread or another, or of one kind of wine or another. Variation here is plainly allowed. But as to the act there was a "Thus saith the Lord" which could not be disregarded without destroying the symbolical significance of the ordinance as instituted by Christ and handed down to his followers.

But we are told in the Review that evidence has been discovered which shows that in the primitive church immersion was not "the only recognized mode," and that "it will not do to repudiate such testimony and fall back simply on the New Testament." In other words, it seems to be claimed that we now possess evidence of the consciousness of a liberty of variation in the administration of baptism in the early church which affords a presumption that immersion could not have been prescribed by our Lord and his apostles as "the only mode."

But let us not make too much of this consciousness of a liberty of variation. The only liberty which the "Teaching" recognizes is in case there is a lack of a sufficient quantity of water for immersion. It is to be remembered, however, that in no other writing of the second century is even this liberty recognized. All the other references to baptism, down to the middle of the third century, require immersion. We then come to a record that is exceedingly suggestive. Magnus, so the record runs, submitted to Cyprian the question whether if one by reason of "sickness and debility" should find it impossible to be washed "in the water" — that is, immersed — he would be accounted a legitimate Christian if he should be "perfused" on his bed "with the saving water." The question was suggested by the well-known case of Novatian. More than a century had passed since the time to which, by the Review, the "Teaching" is assigned. If, now, there was in the church the consciousness of a liberty of variation, how does it happen that such a question could be raised, and why is it that Cyprian, instead of replying hesitatingly and presenting a conception of his own "poor ability," failed to appeal to what was already well established?

But it is said that there are certain representations in art — frescos in the Catacombs — that furnish additional evidence of this consciousness of liberty of variation. This, however, is not *new* evidence. Moreover, it is not to be forgotten that among authorities there is not an agreement with reference to the significance of these pictures, and also with reference to the period to which they are assigned. Indeed, it is a significant fact that in one of the most recent references to these pictorial representations, Schulze's "*Archäologische Studien über altchristliche Monumente*," as was noticed in this Review for May, the position is taken that the pictures must be interpreted in harmony with the litera-

ture. Certainly these pictorial representations, which are assigned by eminent authors to different periods, and concerning whose significance art critics themselves are not in agreement, cannot be regarded as very important witnesses for a liberty of variation concerning which the literature of the period is so remarkably silent.

I cannot, therefore, but think that they ask a great deal who ask Baptists on this kind of evidence to abandon their position that immersion only is valid Christian baptism. Our motto is not, as some affirm, "Water, water," but "Obedience, obedience." We cannot call that baptism which Christ and the apostles did not call baptism.

Henry S. Burrage.

COMMENT.

We give the place reserved for other matter to the foregoing communication, because it proceeds from a clergyman qualified to state the position of that division of the Baptist churches with which he is connected, and because it is written not in a controversial spirit, but to express convictions of Christian obligation. We cannot follow it, within the space at command, into the general field of discussion which it enters, but will offer a few comments which seem to us important in order that the testimony previously adduced may be appreciated.

Our correspondent dismisses the question in the form we have submitted it, as not needing an answer, since the church is always exposed to error, and even Paul's disciples forsook the truth. But this is simply a refusal in advance to consider the evidence we have adduced. It assumes that there is but one possible interpretation of the apostolic rite of baptism, namely, submersion, and that all affusionists, however early they may have appeared, were errorists, whose testimony seals their condemnation. We think that our correspondent will find it difficult to adduce any passages in which Paul sharply rebukes men of the spirit of the writer of the "Teaching," and no less difficult to persuade others, or even himself for any length of time, that evidence from such a treatise is to be treated as proof of contumacy. When we asked, "Is it possible?" we were not oblivious of the liability of Christians to err. We were proposing a historical question. "Is it possible" that an author, using the language of the New Testament, writing for catechumens close upon, perhaps within, the Apostolic Age, enjoining upon them not to forsake the commandments of the Lord, but to observe them "neither adding to them nor taking from them," showing plainly a disposition of unquestioning obedience to divine precepts, could have written as he does of Baptism, if our Lord had explicitly or unmistakably enjoined submersion as indispensable to church membership and fellowship? And further, "is it possible" that there should have been in the church such consciousness of liberty in this matter as Christian art shows, if our Lord's command made submersion a test of obedience to Him, and essential to membership in his visible church?

We submit that these inquiries cannot be dismissed as not needing an answer, on the ground that Paul had erring converts, whom he sharply rebuked.

Our Baptist brethren have been wont to appeal to church history. A distinguished scholar, selected by Dr. Schaff to state their views, uses the following language: "The authorities on . . . the archæology and his-

tory of Christian churches are unanimous in asserting that the baptism of the New Testament and of the early ages of Christianity was a dipping or submersion of the candidate in water." "The archaeologists, Augusti, Garucci (Garrucci), Martigny, De Vogué, etc., tell us that the monumental remains in Asia, Africa, and Europe prove that immersion was the act of baptism."¹ Such appeals to art and history are often made. If "this kind of evidence" has been admissible up to the discovery of the "Teaching," and has been deemed important, we are at a loss to understand why it is of less consequence now.

Although our correspondent dismisses the question proposed by us, and takes up another, he returns to it with the caution that we beware of making "too much of this consciousness of a liberty of variation." The "Teaching," he reminds us, concedes such freedom only in a specified case. But the peculiarity here is that a liberty of variation which allows this much of change subverts the entire Baptist position as defined by our correspondent. He shows a clear consciousness of this when he represents Baptists as ready to recognize liberty of variation in certain particulars, provided always there is submersion. The "Teaching" sets aside just this proviso. A catechumen, according to its instruction, can be regarded, in a particular case, as validly baptized who has not been submersed. A candidate, according to our correspondent, cannot be regarded in any case as validly baptized unless he has been submersed. The two positions are antagonistic in principle. One makes the mode essential, the other does not. It is of no consequence that the exception in the "Teaching" relates to a specified case, so long as the question at issue is whether or not submersion is essential. If the question were, Was submersion the rule? the limited character of the exception would be important. When the question is, Was submersion essential? the limited character of the exception is irrelevant. The mere *fact* of an exception, however limited, is inconsistent with the supposition that the witness regarded the rule as without exception; that is, as always and everywhere binding.

And here we would press upon our correspondent's attention the fact that the author of the "Teaching" recognizes pouring as baptism, and speaks of a candidate for affusion as a candidate for baptism. Some scholars claim that this shows that the words βαπτίζω (baptizo), βάπτισμα (baptisma), had already passed beyond their ordinary sense (immerse, immersion), and had acquired a technical or ritualistic meaning. This seems to be a fair inference. But conceding that the mere words in question still conveyed exclusively the notion of dipping or submersion, and that all we can properly infer from their use in the "Teaching" is that affusion, in a specified contingency, was accepted as a substitute for baptism, having equal validity, how, on this interpretation, does the matter stand? Obviously thus: A Christian teacher, solicitous to impress upon converts to Christianity the commandments of the Lord, perfectly aware that βαπτίζω means immerse, using it in this sense, so far from understanding that any divine injunction had made submersion indispensable, regarded himself as at perfect liberty, in a given case, to enjoin affusion, and this without the slightest apparent suspicion that the validity of the rite was thereby impaired. Nor did he deem it necessary to speak of a

¹ Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*, i. p. 198.

candidate for affusion as anything other than a candidate for baptism, however well aware he was that the mere words, to "pour" and to "baptize," are not synonymous. A more striking testimony to an early consciousness of liberty of variation we cannot imagine. Its perfect simplicity and naturalness, its entire freedom from any trace of that particular sense of ritual obligation which we are told is distinctive of Baptists now, at once arrest attention. And in view of such a testimony, we cannot but repeat our question: How could such a Christian consciousness thus early have been developed if our Lord's command had the force and necessity claimed by our correspondent? To say that this result was reached by sheer, downright disobedience is to us an abandonment of the field of historical inquiry, and worse. It is so improbable that it seems to us to give for an explanation something very like an incredibility.

No more satisfactory is our correspondent's treatment of the evidence from art. The evidence is, he remarks, not new. This much we concede. Dr. Rossi's discoveries have been published long enough to admit of their being carefully tested. Yet, in some sense, the evidence they afford is new. It has but lately been appreciated in its historic validity and in its significance. Only within a few months has it received the literary confirmation to be derived from the "Teaching." Too much, probably, in the interpretation of the early pictures of baptism has been made of the silence of the literature of the second century respecting affusion. But however this may be, that silence is now broken. The "Teaching" speaks unmistakably, and it speaks for liberty, — the same liberty of which we have independent evidence in Christian art.

Our space is nearly exhausted, or we would refer more fully to the testimony of Cyprian. Why he did not choose to refer to other testimonies than those of Scripture it is impossible to say. If there were no facts in the way, our correspondent's inference might stand, at least as a conjecture. But no amount of conjecture can outweigh a grain of positive evidence. Besides, what is the question of Magnus, and what Cyprian's answer, and what the whole subsequent practice of clinic baptism, but a repetition of testimonies that there was a consciousness, more or less defined, of Christian liberty of variation?

Our correspondent appeals to the New Testament. But his citation of lexicons from Liddell and Scott's to Professor Sophocles' reminds us at once that the question he raises, even as a philological one, is broader than the New Testament. It is a historical and a dogmatic question, as well as a lexical one. And more than this, it is one of the nature and spirit of Christianity itself. Conceding all that is claimed as to the meaning of the word "baptizing" (*βαπτίζω*) in our Lord's command, the inference that it prescribes an exact rule as to the mode of symbolizing the spiritual transactions and relations involved is unsustained. There is a noteworthy absence from it of even the ceremonial detail found in the "Teaching." No mention is made of water. "Baptizing into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" is the formula. The thought is borne on at once to the great spiritual conceptions involved. A ritual word is used, and an outward symbol is implied, but the command centres not on the mode of the rite, the immersion into water, but on the immersion into the revelation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. To make such a command a "Thus saith the Lord," absolutely binding on the conscience, in respect to the mode

of using water sacramentally, seems to us to introduce into it an element foreign to its scope and design. It transforms the "great commission" into a "law of commandments contained in ordinances," and incorporates into it not a sacrament, but a ritual.

What appears so plainly in the very form of our Lord's command, namely, its spiritual concentration, is characteristic to our view of the entire treatment of the subject in the New Testament. The spiritual relation of the believer to God, to Christ, to the Holy Ghost, to forgiveness, to regeneration and purification, is what is uppermost and urgent. There is a marked absence of all that is fitted to promote what has been termed a ritualistic conscience. The outward rite is not ignored nor slighted, but there is no appearance of any desire to make its validity depend upon a particular mode of its observance, nor to limit and legalize it by the current meaning of the word which was appropriated to it, and which in its ordinary signification doubtless expressed the usual method of its administration. The central thought was spiritual, — purification, washing away of sins, cleansing in and through a new relationship to the God whom Christ revealed, a cleansing of the whole person of the believer. Submersion signifies this; so does affusion, and so does sprinkling of the head, the principal member and representative of the person. And the tenet of a necessity of submersion for all times, climes, and places, a ritualism of formal command, inflexible, invariable, binding on the conscience of all believers, absolutely necessary to ecclesiastical fellowship, — this seems to us something foreign to the spirit of the New Testament, and to the atmosphere of primitive Christianity. The church from the beginning has had a consciousness of liberty in this matter. It has used the mode of entire immersion, and also abridgments and substitutes for full immersion, meaning, however, the same thing, and has deemed them of equal validity. To our correspondent this savors of disobedience. To us it is an obedience of the most perfect sort, for it springs from the consciousness that the Christian society is intended for all times and nations and climes, and that it is contrary to the very genius of a communion created in the divine purpose to become universal, to make a literal submersion in water always and everywhere essential to admission to its fellowship.

Egbert C. Smyth.

BOOK NOTICES.

THE ALPHABET: An Account of the Origin and Development of Letters. By ISAAC TAYLOR, M. A., LL. D. 2 vols., 8vo. Vol. i., *Semitic Alphabets*, pp. xii., 358. Vol. ii., *Aryan Alphabets*, pp. 398. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1883.

Man's earliest attempts to record his deeds are rude pictures of natural objects. The cave-man has made such a beginning. To these he adds by a graphic trope — the seen for the unseen — symbols for abstract ideas; first of all, perhaps, for numbers.

Out of the many ways in which an object or an action can be de-

pected, out of the many metaphors by which an abstract idea can be more or less definitely conveyed, the most convenient, or the most common, is fixed upon by an implicit convention. Here writing commences. As the picture or the symbol is constantly associated with a name, it comes in time to be for writer and reader the sign of the name rather than of the thing. Ideographic writing passes over into phonographic. Of this stage of the art, and of its unavoidable ambiguity, the familiar puzzle, the *rebus*, is a good illustration. Now some of the word-signs stand for monosyllables, other common words wear down to one syllable. In the composition of the *rebus*, monosyllables have a great advantage. Fewer signs are needed to express what we wish. The next step, therefore, is the syllabary, made up partly of primitive monosyllabic signs, partly by an analogical extension of the principle which has been called acrology or acrophony. So far the process is comparatively simple; and these successive steps, under various modifications, have repeated themselves independently in numerous systems of writing. But to analyze this seemingly ultimate element, the syllable, and to give to the consonant in writing the separate existence which it is unable to maintain in utterance, — this may well be counted one of the greatest and most difficult achievements of the human intellect. It has been independently and consistently accomplished only once in the history of man's manifold graphic experiments.¹ When once invented, the superiority of the alphabet must needs drive out of the field the earlier and more cumbrous ways of writing, though religion long preserved some of them as a sacred script. To trace the history of the origin, development, and propagation of the alphabet is the aim of these volumes.

Until recently, the attempt would have been in vain. In 1841 Sylvestre wrote in the introduction to his great work on "Universal Paleography:" "The manner in which this propagation was effected is one of the most impenetrable secrets of primordial history." If the secret has now been solved, we owe the result not more to the labors of a great number of scholars than to the fortunate discovery of most precious monuments of ancient writing. The fruit of these labors and discoveries Mr. Taylor has brought together for the first time in a comprehensive survey. The brilliant *opus imperfectum* of Lenormant, "*Essai sur la Propagation de l'Alphabet Phénicien*," is the only real predecessor. In the first volume, after a sketch of the principal systems of non-alphabetic writing, he comes at once to the question of questions, the origin of the primitive Semitic alphabet. He adopts De Rouge's derivation from the older type of the Egyptian Hieratic writing. The reasons for this view are given at some length and very clearly. The evidence gains in force by comparison with the attempts which have been made by Levy, Wuttke, Deecke, and others to find the originals of the Semitic letters in some of the various types of the Assyrian or Babylonian inscriptions. One of the things that comes out in this investigation is the extreme antiquity of an alphabetic writing in Egypt. Letters are found in the inscription of King Sent, the oldest written record in existence. But the Egyptians never adopted the consequences of their own discovery. They went on writing in a studious confusion of ideograms, verbal and syllabic phonograms, and alphabetic characters, each earlier stage of the development surviving to embarrass the succeeding ones.

¹ Mr. Taylor gives far too much credit to the untrustworthy tales about the Maya alphabet.

It was in passing from the land of its origin to another race that writing got rid of the incubus of its own traditions. A commercial people could not afford the luxury of graphic expression which was at the command of the sacred scribes. The result was the Phœnician alphabet of twenty-two letters, and alphabetic writing pure and simple. Phœnician merchants and trading posts brought the alphabet to the island Greeks, to Ionia, and to Hellas itself. In passing to an Aryan race, another development took place. The detachment of the consonant was most naturally accomplished by a race in which the consonant is strong, and the vowel relatively feeble and unessential. The Semitic alphabet contains only consonants. An Indo-European language, with its radical vowels written in such a way, would be unintelligible. So the Greeks, by degrees, converted the superfluous signs of the Semitic guttural consonants into vowel-signs. Through colonies of Chalcis the western type of the Greek alphabet passed over to Italy, and so became the parent of all the writing systems of Western Europe.

But the primitive Semitic alphabet had a divergent development of its own. That of Western Syria and Phœnicia has already been spoken of.

The Aramæans are in the front in the second period of Semitic history, and the Aramæan type of writing by degrees superseded the Phœnician, from which it was derived. From it descend the Square Hebrew, the various Syriac scripts, with the alphabets given by the Nestorian missionaries to their Mongol converts, the Arabic and the Iranian alphabets. A third, South Semitic, line of propagation gives us on the one side the Ethiopic and its daughters, and on the other the whole great family of Indian alphabets, connected by the inscriptions of Southern Arabia (Yemen) and Safa.

The descent of the Indian alphabets is still under discussion. A paper by Cust at the Oriental Congress maintaining the view stated above drew out a good deal of dissent. The direct evidence is not perhaps very conclusive, but the alternative, Indian invention, is untenable. There is no trace in India of the gradual evolution of the alphabet out of more primitive systems of writings. Science can give but one interpretation of this fact,—the Indians, like the Greeks, received the alphabet complete from another people. The theory adopted by the author that this people was Sabæan is the most plausible that has been proposed. It thus appears that all existing alphabets are descended from one original.

The way in which the author has accomplished the task of tracing these lines of development and filiation is very admirable. His volumes are a fine example of the application of a thoroughly scientific method to a most interesting chapter of the history of man. He thinks and writes clearly; a good disposition of his material and apt illustration give lucidity and sustained interest to what with less skillful treatment might easily be both dry and bewildering from its very wealth of learning.

The tables of alphabets are sufficiently accurate for the purpose of such a work, though we could wish sometimes that the author had relied less upon the resources of the type-founder. On page 243 of vol. i., *e. g.*, the Samaritan character used in the older MSS. of the Pentateuch resembles that of the Siloam Inscription considerably more closely than appears from the Samaritan type in the second column.

The book is finely printed and well indexed. As a whole, it can hardly be too highly commended.

George F. Moore.

KEILSCHRIFTTEXTE SARGON'S KÖNIGS VON ASSYRIEN. Von Dr. D. G. LYON, Professor an der Harvard Universität, Cambridge, U. S. A. Leipzig : J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1883.

Sargon is the Assyrian king of whom the Bible says so little and the inscriptions of Nineveh so much. When Botta unearthed the palace of Khorsabad he saw one central figure everywhere. Drawing the bow, fording rivers, receiving captives, riding in processions, pouring out libations to the gods, appeared the same towering form, the same commanding features. Who was this hero? It was Sargon, according to the cuneiform writing *Sarru-Kênu*. Here was the speaking portrait of the conqueror of Samaria and the father of Sennacherib.

It is no small service which Professor Lyon has rendered the reading public in editing the chief texts relating to this monarch. The very enumeration of the inscriptions transliterated and translated is a bird's-eye view of Assyrian art and religion. The Cylinder Inscription of seventy-seven lines recalls the hexagonal or octagonal barrels of clay, tiny in bulk and fragile in substance, on which the children of Asshur loved to record their greatest deeds. The Bull Inscription conjures up those colossal creations, half man, half beast, the personification of repose and vigilance, which awe the traveler with their bearded and crowned heads, as once their huge legs, parted by written tablets, dazzled and curbed the native. The fourfold inscription of Bronze, of Silver, of Gold, and of Antimony keeps us from forgetting the stone casket in which these builders of the Tigris were wont to place their fundamental documents and the solemn dedication made in the new moon of the "brick month" by the kings of Asshur to the Gods of heaven and earth.

The work of the author is opportune to the scholar no less than interesting to the reader. Like Dr. Paul Haupt, Professor Lyon is able to call Friedrich Delitzsch his teacher. In the preparation of his volume he has had access to the collections and the learning of this rising Assyriologue. Since Dr. Julius Oppert gave his last revision of a portion of the same inscription in the "Records of the Past," 1878, rapid progress has been made in Assyrian philology and lexicography. The "Assyrische Bibliothek" under Delitzsch and Haupt needed a better text and translation than was extant. The British Museum and the Louvre furnished the originals, and Professor Lyon first copied, then transliterated, and finally interpreted the documents in what we may call a masterly way. For the first time, the Bronze Inscription is given in a modern tongue. All the other inscriptions are rendered so that Theophilus G. Pinches, the successor of George Smith at the British Museum, has ventured the opinion that in Dr. Lyon's "Sargon" we have a better book than Dr. Lotz's *Tiglath-Pileser*. Such praise is doubtless excessive. The author would not communicate nor countenance it. That it has been spoken marks an era, none the less, in American cuneiform scholarship, and opens the way for an examination of the volume itself.

The Introduction has the merit of brevity and comprehensiveness. One section is On the Publication of the Original Text. Here the author tells us he has made the first of the two texts existing at Paris the basis of his work, and enables us to surmise that a fourth at London, now in the hands of a private gentleman, was held rather more tightly from American eyes than might have been expected. Fortunately, Mr. Pinches made good the omission of his compatriot. The section on

Transcription explains the absence of hyphens and determinatives on the ground of the presence of one in the glossary and the other in text. It also treats of the length of the vowels, the doubling of consonants, and the vocal *ê*, which, like Pognon's *é*, is held to have been an original *i* in certain Assyrian as in Syriac and Hebrew forms of the verb. In the plural, the *ê* must be retained throughout, as *nišê*, *malikê*, *kakkê*. Two sections follow on the Translation and on the Commentary and Glossary. Perhaps, however, the most interesting section of the Introduction is the first, which treats of the name and person of Sargon. Discussing the second part of the royal name GI-NA = ideogram for Kênu (written Ki-nu), he deviates from the verbal derivation of Schrader, by which Šarru-ukin would mean "He (*i. e.*, the God) established the king." Professor Lyon prefers the *adjectival*. His reason is Sargon's phrase in the fiftieth line of the Cylinder Inscription. This runs: "Corresponding to the name I bear, with which the great Gods have named me to guard justice and righteousness, to govern the infirm, to do no injury to the weak." For the full value of this name we need to have Sargon = this synonym of "true, faithful, righteous prince." In word, then, Sargon, like the hero of Isaiah's prophecy, is "*the righteous king*."

The German translation, which faces the transliterated and follows the cuneiform text, is clear and strong. Exactness rather than elegance has been sought. Conjectures are used sparingly. Where a word is unknown it does not wear a mask of familiarity. Meanings are justified by abundant references to the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia by Rawlinson and Norris. Sobriety and independence mark the use of authorities. The notes elucidate instead of obscure. In compression they equal, in perspicuity they surpass, many German productions in kindred fields. If they expose blunders trenchantly, they recognize insight generously.

After all, Assyrian lexicography is yet in its childhood. Till the dictionary of the future appears, glossaries and commentaries like those of Professor Lyon must take the place of it. In this aspect we should be grateful for the new material which has been brought together so laboriously for the identification of important terms. Take *narṭabu*, for instance. Oppert reads it "foundation." This omits the first of two signs. Lyon shows that the group IS-PIN means canal of irrigation. Tiglath-Pileser Col. VI. : 101-104, speaks of the increased crops by the increase of *narṭabê*. Also the same ideogram occurs IV. Rawlinson, 58 and 59. In this passage, among the many places where penitents should supplicate pardon of the gods, *narṭabê* meet us. "Lying, sitting, eating, drinking, by the hearth, at the tablet, on horseback, '*ina âhi narṭabi, ina âhi bâri, ina âhi nâri, ina âhi êlippi*,' 'on the bank of the WATER CHANNELS, on the bank of the spring, on the bank of the river, on board of the ship,' — at sunrise and sunset, entering and leaving the city, by the gate, in the house, on the street, in the temple, — everywhere, should one implore pardon." The rivers of Babylon are sacred as Mount Zion.

Were we to blame anything in this excellent work, it would be its somewhat *controversial* tone toward Dr. Julius Oppert. To say that his edition of "Dour-Sarkayan" is critically worthless and swarms with blunders is needlessly severe. At the same time our author's scientific conscience must have been roused by this savant's sins of omission and commission. That Oppert should have rendered "eclipse over Harran,"

in line 6 of the Cylinder Inscription, is exasperating, for he can only do this by intruding a false subject and extruding the true, while giving to a third word a meaning which it never has. For this impossible translation Lyon gives, simply and satisfactorily, "Who stretched out his shadow over the city of Harran." On the other hand, our author expressly recognizes Oppert's services as a pioneer in the realm of cuneiform and the unassailability of his translation in its fundamental particulars, not hesitating here and there to adopt Oppert's rendering in preference to his own.

The lines from 30 to 42 are the Gordian knot of the Inscription. In general it is untied, not severed, by Professor Lyon. Where Oppert translates line 41: "Ašša sāmnī baltī amēlūti mupāšših bu'anē mina māti'a lā akārīma Samāššammē ki nirba ina maḥiri šāmi." "Tunc fuit impositus labor hominum evellentium herbas malas in terra mea non verum pretium reddente, et lolia, una cum deo Serah in opere isto;" our author has the plainer and preciser sentence, "Not to let oil, the life of men, the healer of wounds, become dear in my land, and to fix sesame in price like corn." This is a pleasing glimpse of a ruler great in peace as in war. With no little ingenuity and thoroughness Professor Lyon analyzes the ideogram nirba for ni-ir-ba. Its three parts are AN = Dingir, God; ŠE = grain, and a third compounded of ŠE and IR (read *ēltég*.) + d. = a kind of grain. With the sign for God (Dingir) as a determinative, we have a deity corresponding to Demeter-Ceres, who watches over the springing and the ripening harvest. From the deity to the grain itself is but a step backwards, and we get the designation "corn." II. R. 36: 17 illustrates the former use; V. R. 1: 48 the latter. This text is a medallion. Professor Lyon scours it and the traits of the monarch appear. We see the wise king, the bearer of gracious words, the planter of high cliffs, the irrigator of many a moor where canal had never come, the scatterer of water with full hands, quenching the thirst of every subject, and filling the broad land of Asshur with bread enough and to spare.

We are not sorry that this valuable work appears in the German tongue. In this dress it will reach Continental scholars; it will not escape Americans. Sargon, "the Vicegerent of Bel, the sublime Prince of Asshur, the favorite of Anu and Dagon," will be better known because of the inscriptions in the first palace exhumed at Nineveh, as unlocked by the first Professor of Assyrian at Harvard. The Summer School of Professor Harper, at Worcester, will, it is hoped and expected, be able, through Professor Lyon's learning, patience, and enthusiasm, to lead many a student of the Bible through the eight gates of Khorsabad, untouched by the final curse of the royal Builder, — "Wer meiner Hände Werk ändern, meine Bauten zerstören, die Mauern die ich gemauert, wegschaffen, meine Insignien verschleudern wird — dessen Namen und Samen mögen Asur, Samas, Raman, und die Götter, die all dort wohnen, im Lande weggraben und ihn zu Füßen seines Feindes sitzen lassen gebunden!"

John Phelps Taylor.

NOVUM TESTAMENTUM GRAECE. Ad antiquissimos testes denuo recensuit, apparatus criticum apposuit, CONSTANTINUS TISCHENDORF. Editio octava critica major. Volumen III. Prolegomena scripsit CASPARUS RENATUS GREGORY, additis curis † EZRAE ABBOT. Pars Prior, pp. vi., 440. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1884.

Dr. Scrivener remarks (in his "Plain Introduction," etc., p. 482), "Tischendorf left almost no papers behind him. Hence the task of writing Prolegomena to his eighth edition, gallantly undertaken by two American scholars, Dr. Caspar René Gregory of Leipzig and Dr. Ezra Abbot of Cambridge, U. S., but for their own independent researches, might seem to resemble that of making bricks without straw." The courage of the undertaking has been more than matched by the patience and enterprise, the scholarly research and unflinching toil, with which now for well-nigh eight years it has been prosecuted, — as this first half of the achieved result abundantly evinces.

Professor Tischendorf's preface to his seventh edition was hastily prepared, in consequence (as is supposed) of his preoccupation with plans for a new critical journey. The subjects to which the American scholars have devoted the four hundred and forty pages just published are dispatched there in one hundred and ninety-three; and of these less than fifty seem to have been retained in the present volume. The latter, therefore, may justly claim to be in the main a new and original work.

Of the thirteen Sections into which, as appears from a schedule prefixed, the contents of the entire Prolegomena will be distributed, the volume now published comprises seven, which are occupied principally with the following topics. In Section I. a compendious sketch of Tischendorf's life is followed by a detailed list, covering fifteen pages and evidently prepared with extreme care, of the deceased Professor's publications, in their chronological order. Section II. treats of the four classes of critical helps (namely, Greek manuscripts, ancient versions, patristic quotations, printed editions) as used by Tischendorf in preparing his text. Some impression of his marvelous industry and success as a palæographer is afforded by the facts that the number of uncial manuscripts of the New Testament discovered by him was fifteen, first employed by him twenty-three, edited by him twenty-one, copied by him four, collated by him thirteen. He also discovered and used at least six new manuscripts in cursive characters; edited five manuscripts of that form of the Latin version known as the *Itala*, besides the *Amiatinus* text of the *Vulgate*. The third Section is occupied with a discussion of the principles on which these and the other critical helps are to be used in reproducing the Greek text. Here the practice is briefly vindicated of seeking to recover that text solely from ancient testimonies, and primarily from Greek manuscripts, the evidence from versions and fathers being chiefly corroborative. Then Tischendorf's example is followed in giving an exposition of the five rules, that "peculiarities are to be suspected," "obvious clerical errors eliminated," "in parallel passages the divergent reading to be regarded as the probable one," "that reading in which the others originated to be accepted as the original one," "the linguistic characteristics of the several authors to be heeded." In Section IV. we have an exhibition of orthographical and other details respecting the language, together with the reasons for adhering in these particulars to the general usage of the more ancient manuscripts. Material here to which the

seventh edition gave but seventeen pages has been so augmented as to fill fifty-seven. It is no disparagement to the labors of his predecessors, and particularly to the careful collections of Professor Hort, to say that Dr. Gregory has brought together here a store of information, valuable alike to the student of the Greek language and to one investigating the distinctive characteristics of the several New Testament manuscripts, which for fullness and for lucid arrangement is quite unmatched. Section V. deals with the order of succession of the several groups into which the New Testament books were early distributed, together with the position of individual books in their groups, as well as with ancient and modern divisions of the text into chapters, reading-lessons, and the like. This portion of the work also has grown from ten pages to fifty-two. Moreover, the reader will be especially gratified to meet with a thorough discussion of the origin of our modern division into chapters (which for cogent reasons is ascribed to Cardinal Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died A. D. 1228), together with a special *Excursus* of fifteen pages by Dr. Abbot, exhibiting the disagreement as respects verse-division to be found in fifty-one editions of the Greek text, and nine translations including King James's, — the original division in Robert Stephens's Greek Testament of 1551 being taken as the standard. This laborious Essay displays the characteristic diligence, clearness, accuracy, of its lamented author. The reader, however, should not fail to correct at once a few typographical blemishes, noted on p. v., which slipped in through an unfortunate misunderstanding after the Essay left his hands. Then follows in Section VI. a history of the Greek text, both written and printed. The latter, which has evidently been prepared with extreme care, closes with a collation (covering forty-eight pages) of the texts of Tregelles and Professors Westcott and Hort, the two recent critical editions the readings of which are not noted by Professor Tischendorf in the running commentary beneath his text. The seventh and concluding Section is devoted to a detailed account of the uncial manuscripts, which occupies one hundred and three pages as against sixty-four in the seventh edition. Here, again, the work by its orderly method and its completeness far surpasses anything hitherto published. Incidentally, too, it may be remarked that many readers will be glad to see the calumnious charge sometimes brought against Tischendorf, of bad faith in his mode of securing possession of the Codex Sinaiticus, put forever to rest.

The present limits forbid extended comment on the work of which the public are favored with a specimen in the present volume. But among its conspicuous merits every student will count, first, its tables and other summaries, such, for example, as those on pages, 31, 33, 78, 84, 93 sq., 197 sq., 200 sqq., 338 sq.; second, the lucid order observed in its treatment of topics, — an incalculable amount of time and patience will be saved, for instance, by the methodical and uniform way in which the uncial manuscripts are handled; third, and above all, the copious bibliographical and other references given in the foot-notes. In this last particular there is no work extant which approaches it; nothing, however fugitive or recondite, seems to have escaped the editors in the literature of Germany, France, Italy, England, America. As a thesaurus of references on the topics which it covers, it will have an independent value.

In short, the editors have done credit to themselves, brought honor to their country, and richly rewarded the public patience. Many besides

the present writer will deplore the fact that Dr. Abbot, ὁ μακάριος, did not live to receive his share of the thanks — the only recompense he looked for — which biblical students will feel to be due to the authors, without stint.¹ It will be gratifying to the friends of both to read the eulogium, as true as it is graceful, which Dr. Gregory, little anticipating the tender significance the words would take on before they saw the light, incidentally passes (p. 276 sq.) upon his collaborator. The best wishes of all the friends of sacred literature will attend the survivor in the travels and researches upon which he is about to enter, that so the end may worthily crown the work.

J. H. Thayer.

SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. By HENRY B. SMITH, D. D., LL. D., Edited by WILLIAM S. KARR, D. D., Professor of Theology in Hartford Theological Seminary Pp. xiv, 630. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1884.

The table of contents gives a full outline of the whole; the index is ample; paper, print, and binding are excellent.

A small book, containing Professor Smith's lectures on Apologetics, and another, his Introduction to Christian Theology, were published previously. This moderate volume contains substantially all his instruction on Systematic Theology. It will be heartily welcomed by his numerous pupils, who remember him with reverence and gratitude, and it deservedly claims the attention of all students of the science.

This work has been formed from complete sets of notes of Professor Smith's lectures, taken by his students in different years, and from his own sketches and outlines of them as left in manuscript, supplemented in parts with selections from his unpublished sermons. The latter can be readily distinguished from the rest, but it does not detract from the value or scientific method of this treatise that occasionally a truth appears in it in a more rhetorical form. The editor, himself a pupil and personal friend of Professor Smith, has evidently done his work with thoroughness and fidelity. As a result, we have in this volume an adequate presentation of the author's theology. We may less regret that he did not himself give his work its final form, because formal completeness of system was not one of his prominent aims. He would never match definitions, or force the parts or proportions of any truth as he conceived it, in order to make his system technically consistent. He carries his investigation of some difficult topics as far as he can, till the lines of his thought end, as he says, in mystery; and few men will penetrate that mystery farther on *those* lines. But he generally leaves his subject as though it were to be studied farther, and he leaves it well prepared for farther study. We find in this book, here and there, a discussion unfinished, another only outlined, a problem stated only in its conditions or limitations: but these are not defects; they have much positive value to the student, — more, indeed, than any formal completeness, — for

¹ It may be well promptly to correct an inaccurate statement on p. ii. (due doubtless to the fragmentariness of first accounts) respecting the date and cause of Professor Abbot's death. That event occurred at his home in Cambridge, Mass., on the twenty-first of March, at half past five in the afternoon, and was caused by intestinal disease.

they show us the theologian himself at his work as a student, and help us to understand his methods. It is greatly to the honor of Professor Smith that this publication of his actual teaching, as he left it when he ceased to teach, will not impair his reputation, but will renew and extend his influence.

Theology, as presented in this treatise, is wholly Christian, and it is all considered with paramount reference to its Centre. The author makes three divisions of the subject; the middle one in his plan, and central to all parts of the subject, is Redemption; and in Redemption the Centre is the Redeemer himself. The central fact is the Incarnation. In the author's language, "The central idea to which all the parts of theology are to be referred, and by which the system is to be made a system, or to be constructed, is what we have termed the Christological or Mediatorial idea, namely, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. This idea is central, not in the sense that all the other parts of theology are logically deduced from it, but rather that they centre in it. The idea is that of an Incarnation in order to Redemption." "By this, Christianity is distinguishable from all other religions, and from all forms of philosophy; and by this, and this alone, are we able to construct the whole system of the Christian faith on its proper grounds." "It is so really the centre of unity that when we analyze and grasp and apply it we find that the whole of Christian theology is in it. Thus: the analysis of Incarnation in order to Redemption *presupposes* the doctrine respecting the divine nature, the end of God in his works, the nature of man, and the condition of man as sinful, — the first division of theology, — The Antecedents of Redemption. The same principle, *in its concrete unity*, gives us the doctrines respecting the Person and Work of Christ, our second division of the system. And the same principle, *in its applications*, gives us the third division of the system, embracing regeneration, justification, sanctification, the doctrine respecting the church and the sacraments, and the eschatology," — The Kingdom of Redemption.

Professor Smith is, we believe, the first prominent American theologian to conceive the whole science and to treat all its parts with paramount reference to Christ as its centre. As influenced by many others, this has been the tendency of the best Christian thought, but he has also led it effectively in this direction. More and more is this method coming to be recognized, not merely as the best, but as the only adequate one. And this method may be taken as one chief characteristic of the author's work. By nature and grace he was eminently qualified for theology, and his intellectual powers and habits were also in unusual accord with its true method. Whatever the subject of his thought, he sought its centre, caring relatively little for boundaries, — never for them first, — but seeking them, if at all, from the centre. And such were his intellectual insight and vigor that we generally find him strongest and clearest at the centre of his subject. This book shows that he has done his best work at the centre of the whole system and of each great part of it; but it also shows the great advantages of his method.

Another characteristic of Professor Smith, which is also one of the great excellences of this treatise, is his strong grasp of realities. He keeps them always prominent, and never loses his hold on them, even in the most abstruse discussions. He has a strong sense of the historic facts

of Christianity, and gives them adequate room and force as determining doctrines. Thus he views the Incarnation not primarily as doctrine, but fact, having "about it the majesty of fact." "Nor is it a mere fact of an inspired record; it is not merely a *truth* announced in such a record. So to speak, it lies back of the record, and the record tells us about it." In all his discussions we see and feel the realities which he is considering. Abstractions are distinguished as such; their use is restricted. All technical processes are held rigidly to the service of realities. So we do not distrust our master's art; he will come short rather than err; and if he err, it will be on account of inherent difficulties, and not as misled and misleading with merely verbal forms. He is very conservative in retaining old creed statements, specially those of Westminster, and some which might possibly be dismissed from farther service with advantage to theology and relief to the church. He clings to usage as to terms, scarcely suggesting any change in theological nomenclature. Yet in all his discussions he keeps the realities of his subject always in view, stating and explaining them with remarkable clearness, in simple, common language. He uses the phrase "original sin," and defends its use. But after discussing the real matter which it is used to designate, he says: "Yet we would not dispute about a mere word if the facts of the case are conceded. Native depravity is perhaps a more unobjectionable term than original sin. If people call it native depravity in a moral sense, and say that it comes from Adam, all that is essential is granted."

On the whole, we think this system of theology, or rather this book, is strongest on the divine side of the subject. Of the different parts, the chapters on the Being and Attributes of God, Creation, Providence, and specially the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Person of Christ, are very helpful to clear conceptions of these subjects, and will probably be regarded as the most conclusive. The Atonement is considered as a sacrifice, strictly expiatory and vicarious, made for all mankind. As to theories, which are discussed in four classes, the proposition is, "The different (imperfect) theories of Christ's atoning work give different aspects and relations of that work, and are true in these aspects while false in the implication or assertion that these give the only or ultimate point of view." The author does not attempt to show the ultimate point of view; he does not propose to give a complete theory. He states the ends which the Atonement must subserve, and the essentials included in it, but he explains only in part how it serves its purpose; he relieves its difficulties only in part, and he says, "There is a background of mystery in the Atonement, as well as in the Incarnation, and in the Atonement in connection with the Incarnation, which no man can fully fathom, which has not been, and was not meant to be, fully revealed." Eschatology has but a small place in this treatise, yet relatively as large as in most others. The views taken are those which have been commonly held by Calvinists. On the Parousia, the Resurrection, the Intermediate State, and Final Retribution, there is no adequate discussion or statement of the questions now claiming special attention. On the Nature of Virtue some clear aid is given, we think, to the supporters of what is, at the essential point, a different theory. The subject on which Professor Smith will probably call out most dissent from his ecclesiastical brethren is Sin, which he discusses at length, with great clearness and vigor, and specially in connection with the native moral condition of mankind. He shows us sin in its

root; he makes us feel it, and the helplessness of our moral condition in it. As to that hardest of questions, the Permission of Sin, he says, "We cannot state all the reasons for it; we cannot give a theoretical solution of the problem, while yet the Christian system gives a sufficient practical solution." Some will think the author has reduced human freedom to a minimum and raised human responsibility to a maximum. Certainly, freedom, as he conceives it, is quite consistent with divine purpose. With his conception of freedom and of the nature of sin, he shows that all men are helplessly involved in sin and ruin simply by their race connection with the first transgressor. And whatever our view of freedom, he shows that there is in it no practical relief from the helplessness of our moral condition. The demand which this system makes for Theodicy is very strenuous. Its Theodicy is wholly in Christianity. "As a *matter of fact*, to all the human race there is no hope out of the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. And on the highest question as to God's moral government, the solution must be found *not outside of, but within*, the Christian System." With the moral ruin of mankind in view, as demonstrated in this book, the question of Theodicy, Is Christianity adequate? becomes, to thoughtful minds, even oppressive. We must answer, Yes; but we shall still be pressed with the question, Are our doctrinal representations of Christianity adequate?

We heartily commend this treatise. With its clear, strong outlines of statement and discussion, it will be very helpful to ministers and students as a manual. Without witty remarks, or brilliant illustrations, or much use of analogy, it is deeply interesting. With great positive power, it has not a trace of controversial edge or partisan bitterness. It is intellectually invigorating and spiritually quickening. We commend it to men of all schools and classes; to conservatives, specially as showing that truth can be conserved among men only by renewed study and thorough use; to progressives, as showing in itself some clear steps forward, and as itself making good preparation, and also urgent demand, for more. We specially commend it as being, by its clear exhibition of race relations in sin and redemption, an antidote to the present excessive individualism in theology and in practical religion.

W. E. Merriman.

A CATHOLIC DICTIONARY, containing some account of the Doctrines, Discipline, Rites, Ceremonies, Councils, and Religious Orders of the Catholic Church. By WILLIAM E. ADDIS, Secular Priest, sometime Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland, and THOMAS ARNOLD, M. A., Fellow of the same University.

οὐδὲ νῦν
διὰ τὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπων
ἐκτεν, οὐδὲ μὴν ποτε λάθρα κατακοιμάσθαι·
μέγας ἐν τοῦτοις θεός, οὐδὲ γηράσκει.

SOPH. *Œdip. Rex*, 841.

New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 9 Barclay Street. 1884.

A most important and valuable work, for which we have long been waiting. The name of the second editor, that of the second son and namesake of Dr. Arnold, raises a presumption, which is amply borne out by the performance, that the Dictionary will be up to the height of the latest scholarship, both Catholic and Protestant, as well as of literary and

ethical refinement. Dr. Arnold's second son is a genuine and eminent Christian, though he professes Christianity in what appears to us an obsolescent form. And the articles of the Dictionary throughout are such as well become Christian scholars. The only notable exception is the article on the States of the Church, where the writer loses his head, and fairly raves.

Setting aside the few who can easily consult elaborate authorities, every educated Protestant minister, indeed every educated Protestant in the country, would want to have this book, if Protestants had but a glimmering consciousness of what fools they are almost certain to make of themselves whenever they open their lips about Roman Catholic matters, for want of acquaintance with the mere alphabet of Roman Catholic ideas and usages. We should think that Catholics would be ready to tear their hair in very desperation over some of the blunders which their Protestant neighbors fall into, not out of malice, but out of "ignorance, madam, pure ignorance," as Dr. Johnson admits of one of his definitions. Thus, we remember when a journal of high repute in the religious and another of high repute in the political world both expressed an artless surprise that the Rev. Mr. Farrell should have made a will, instead of quietly letting the Church come in as his heir, in ignorance of the elementary distinction between a secular and a regular. And we remember when a book was circulated by a great and learned church, the writer of which confuses "holy orders,"—the four upper steps of the ministry—with "religious orders" that is, conventual associations. And most Protestants, we believe, have a vague notion that indulgences are a sort of sacrament, implying permission, for a sum of money, to commit certain specified sins,—an opinion, to be sure, for which Master Tetzel is mainly responsible, together with the fact that here, as in so many points, Leibnitz is justified in complaining that Rome in her practice is much worse than she is in her theory. Indeed, to meet all the requirements of Protestant ignorance, there ought to be a special edition of the book.

The Dictionary is thoroughly frank in all its positions, as of course it would be with such editors. They are staunchly and composedly Vaticanist, in the fullest acceptance. The principles of Boniface VIII., in the *Unam Sanctam*, appear to be assumed throughout as the standard of the relations between Church and State. We wonder more than ever, with Mr. Gladstone, what rags and shreds of separate jurisdiction are left to the State. It seems as if at present in Christendom human life was ready to part itself between an intolerant Ultramontaniam and an intolerable Caesarism,—two forms of despotism in both of which Antichrist finds his account.

The Dictionary espouses unshrinkingly the theory that the Church, in herself, has a coercive temporal jurisdiction. It does not, however, concede that she has, either directly or through the secular arm, the right of inflicting death, inasmuch as she cannot give up the hope of reforming offenders. As to mediæval burnings and crusades, the writers say, substantially, "These were the rough ways of the world till now." But the strange argument from the judgments of God inflicted through the apostolic word either proves the whole or nothing. When Rome confines her claims to the infliction of miraculous punishments, we will find no further fault.

Of course this claim of coercive jurisdiction throughout the Church involves the right of suppressing all dissentient Christian worship by immediate ecclesiastical action, should it be found practicable. The right of the Jews to their worship is conceded only because they, as unbaptized, are not within the jurisdiction of the Church. But towards Protestantism, where it has long been in possession, the tone of the Dictionary is without acrimony. The articles on Luther and Calvin are singularly mild. The moral judgments which, as subjects of Rome, the writers are obliged to form of the two great heresiarchs, are thoroughly controlled in their expression by "that most excellent gift of charity." A movement like Jansenism, subsequently arising within the bosom of Catholicism, is a severer strain upon charity, but one which is successfully borne. This article is wholly free from the coarse bitterness which disfigures even Wetzler and Welte, with their sneering taunt of "hypocritical rigorism." It is, indeed, the best conspectus we have seen of this great movement, and is as cordial in its appreciation of its various and illustrious excellences as is compatible with a thorough adhesion to the Papal condemnations of Jansenism as a whole. Towards the Jansenist, or Semi-Jansenist Church of Utrecht, the tone of the corresponding article is respectful, almost affectionate, while acknowledging that there is scarcely ever a conversion from Utrecht to Rome. Those of us who are peculiarly interested in this excellent little church are bound here to make our best acknowledgments. But, indeed, the whole treatment of Jansenism is an encouraging proof how inefficacious the utmost severity of theoretical separation is to check the advance of the large-heartedness of Christ to universal prevalence in his Church. Protestants may perhaps be indulged in the self-complacency of opinion that the Protestant education of various writers in the Dictionary has been of some help this way.

As respects the relation of Protestants to the plan of salvation, the articles on Baptism, Faith, Penance, and others, show that the writers make thorough work in applying the Roman condemnation of the doctrine that "grace is not given out of the Church." We cannot agree with Dr. Schaff in assuming that this must be so limited by the principle *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus* as to leave it still lawful to deny that grace given out of the Church is ever efficacious. Even bitterly controversial catechisms allow that salvation is possible to those who, though not in external communion with Rome, are united "to the soul of the Church," — an expression which we have also noted somewhere in the Dictionary. The Roman Catholic theory may be easily and succinctly stated, following the lines traced by Cardinal Manning in his admirable letter to Dr. Pusey: (1.) Baptism, duly administered in form, and intended as Christian baptism, is valid, by whomsoever administered, and regenerates every recipient not in mortal sin. (2.) Heresy and schism, resulting only from education, and not from heretical pravity, are not mortal sin. (3.) Baptismal grace, maintained and improved, merits increment of grace, and at last the grace of final perseverance. (4.) Baptismal grace, forfeited by mortal sin, may be recovered by an act of perfect contrition, accompanied with the desire of penance. (5.) Where, through wrong education, the desire of penance is not explicitly present, it is reasonable to hold that it is imputed as implicitly present, in the sincere intention of fulfilling all the law of Christ. (6.) Nevertheless, Protestants cannot,

like Catholics, be restored to baptismal grace by attrition merely, since this must be accompanied by actual penance. And lacking, as they do, nearly all the sacraments, they are deprived of the chief defenses and channels of grace. And breathing an atmosphere of false doctrine, unsound morals, and ecclesiastical contumacy, their state must be regarded as mournfully precarious. Nevertheless, where, as Pius IX. says, "their lives give evidence of faith which is made operative by charity," it is lawful for Catholics to breathe such an aspiration as that of the "Catholic Mirror," which concludes an obituary notice of Dr. Fuller, the eminent Baptist minister of Baltimore, thus: "But, above all, Dr. Fuller was emphatically a good man. May the Lord forgive his errors, and receive him among the number of his elect!"

The statement in the Dictionary that there is now practical unanimity in holding the theories that attrition with penance suffices to a state of grace, and that probabilism is preferable to probabiliorism, — that is, that it is lawful, in morals, to follow a probable, against a more probable opinion, — serves to show how the poison of legalism, deepening into servilism, which has been in Catholicism from its first subapostolic development, has become ever more virulent in the veins of the great Italian organism, until it now renders the hope of its future recovery to evangelical health almost chimerical. The many myriads of Christians within it whose spiritual soundness is proof against all malaria cannot well be blamed for clinging loyally to it. But they must allow us to look for Christ's lightning stroke which shall set them free even against their will. With the opinion, mentioned not unapprovingly in the Dictionary, that the Roman bishopric is not of necessity the centre of unity, they may some day find that there is far more bound up than they are now in any way willing to admit.

The Dictionary, against Wetzer and Welte, but supported by Bellarmine, maintains that the Pope, if he uses his authority to oppose previous definitions of the Church, may be deposed, even if he does not *ipso facto* cease to be pope. It appears, then, that Ultramontanism, in giving the weapon of Infallibility into his hands, does not use Trajan's words, *Pro me, si mereor, in me*, but only, *in hostes meos*. So that our pleasant little scheme of some day having Infallibility infallibly condemned by a fallibilist pope is fairly headed off by this timely *caveat* of our friends.

In the articles on matters of common Christian doctrine there is some very profitable reading. See Conscience, Predestination, and Hell. The latter article is an admirable one, and in its mixture of dignity, decision, mildness and mournful sternness, large concessions and firm maintenance of the possibility and, in some cases, the eventual reality of eternal punishment in its strictest sense, it appears to us that it represents both the temper and the doctrinal conclusions to which the Universal Church will ultimately settle.

This admirably prepared Dictionary shows in clear lines how completely at one the two divisions of Western Christendom are in the object of their faith and the goal of their hope, and how profoundly and irreconcilably at variance as to the instrumental means by which that faith is to be expressed and nourished and that hope to be attained.

Charles C. Starbuck.

EPITOME OF ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN HISTORY. By CARL PLOETZ. Translated with extensive additions by WILLIAM H. TILLINGHAST. Pp. 618. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

This is partly a translation, partly an enlargement, of the seventh edition of Carl Ploetz's "*Auszug aus der alten, mittleren, und neueren Geschichte*," Berlin, 1880, a little work which we have used for some years, and found among the most helpful of the now numerous historical handbooks. The intention of the *Auszug* is to afford, not a text-book, but mainly a book of ready reference for dates, these being printed in more or less prominent type according to importance, but comprising also sufficient historical matter to make the whole into a bird's-eye view of universal history. The original Ploetz is, in a word, a chronology and an historical conspectus both in one. Most useful among its historical material are the sketches of important modern treaties and of the main causes and results of great wars. Mr. Tillinghast's purpose seems to be a little more ambitious than Ploetz's, and has resulted in placing before us what, should any teacher wish to employ it so, might answer for a text-book. There is, first, a good translation of Ploetz, nothing being omitted save a very few unimportant details about the wars of 1866 and 1870. But Mr. Tillinghast's own contributions to the book have a considerably larger compass than the translated parts, so that it is at least of three times the original's size. Most of the paragraphs on French history have been enlarged, several of those on English. Entirely new sections appear — a valuable addition — upon Hindoo, Chinese, Japanese, Persian, old Celtic and old Slavic history, upon the early religions of Greece and Rome, and upon the ancient Teutons in England and in the Scandinavian North. There are, besides, several new paragraphs on the history of Great Britain, many more still on American history. Some new and very fine genealogical tables are given. The index is extensive, minute, and about faultless, the finest feature of all. The book is usually accurate; we have noticed, so far, but two errors, — these, doubtless, due to mere oversight: "Edward VII." for "Edward III." at the foot of page 273, and the assignment of the Battle of Bennington to the year 1776 instead of 1777, page 429. The Epitome will prove a valuable new instrument in our every-day historical apparatus, and can be sincerely recommended to all readers and students of history. As an aid in the speedy refreshment of memory, in the quick recall or certification of dates, of prominent events, of the general characteristics of an historical period, and the like, it has no equal in our language. We cannot but feel, however, that a much smaller volume would have fulfilled quite as well as this, if not better, the only service to which this will probably ever be largely put, namely, that of reference. Might not the author, in his additions, have profitably kept more to the purpose of Ploetz? Could not many details have been just as well omitted, and the remainder compressed still more by a freer use of catchwords in numerous places where entire sentences now stand? Still, in the art of successful abridgment, one must confess that imitation of Ploetz is more easily recommended than carried out. Mechanically, as otherwise, the Epitome is a success, although the types used for main dates are not so bold, nor the differences of type so striking, as in the original.

E. Benj. Andrews.

LAUDENT OMNES. Hymns and Tunes for Congregational Singing. By Rev. JOHN E. TODD, D. D., Pastor, and WILLIAM E. CHANDLER, Organist and Chorister, of the Church of the Redeemer, New Haven, Conn. Boston: Russell Brothers. 1884.

This book is a selection of about two hundred hymns arranged for congregational singing, and has a decided advantage over larger collections, since all the hymns can become familiar. Nothing induces a congregation to sing like the frequent repetition of favorite hymns. Nearly all of the tunes have long been in general use. Although wellworn, Hamburg, Rockingham, Duke Street will never be outworn. Such tunes as Eventide, Passion Chorale, and Hursley are the exception. It is a pity the compilers had not added half a hundred tunes which belong to the English revival of church music, for without them worship is likely to become monotonous. Dr. Todd's congregation is led by a large chorus of trained singers, and there was a fine opportunity to educate his people with the use and love of a still higher order of music. As it is, the book contains only such tunes as no collection can omit. Doubtless these are rendered with spirit under so inspiring leadership, but so would the others be. The hymns are those which are sung to the old tunes, and are grouped without regard to subject under the tunes which have been chosen for them. The low price of the book recommends it to small churches and for use in social meetings.

George Harris.

TENNYSON'S IN MEMORIAM. Its Purpose and Its Structure. A Study. By JOHN F. GENUNG. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1884.

Rarely does a single poem gather in itself the aspirations of an age, and give utterance with just range and choice of tone to the mingled hopes and fears that swell

"The still, sad music of humanity."

The "Divina Commedia" spoke thus for mediæval Catholicism, and he who would know the best that has been thought and felt under that phase of faith must traverse the threefold world with Dante. Our age with its new complexities of view and feeling finds voice in the "In Memoriam." More fortunate than Dante, Tennyson has not to wait for posthumous recognition. Two years after its appearance, in 1852, Frederick Robertson hailed this as the most precious work of the century, and counted its teachings "the most satisfactory things that have ever been said on the future state." Interpretation and comment have multiplied with years, and, better yet, the poem has become both a psalm and a prophecy to perplexed and saddened hearts.

The latest interpreter, Mr. Genung, begins with the relation of the poem to the age and to the poet's spiritual and intellectual growth. Tennyson's volume, published in 1842, was separated by nine years of silence from his earlier verses, and showed, in such poems as "Locksley Hall," "Two Voices," and "Love and Duty," the influence of the new Time-Spirit, the higher mood of faith and of doubt. Careful critics even then traced back this change in Tennyson to Arthur Hallam's death, and anticipated larger results. With these fulfilled predictions before us, it is still easier to see in the earlier, shorter poems the promise of the later work.

The purpose of the "In Memoriam" Mr. Genung reaches by successive steps. It is an elegy, but it differs from Milton's "Lycidas" and Shelley's "Adonais" in the intense reality that scorns conventional expression, meets openly the problems of faith and fate, and sets in clear light both seeker and object sought. It is a tribute of friendship, and itself suggests comparison with Shakespeare's Sonnets (lxi. 3); but though both works are deeply introspective, and both singers speak in their real character, the unselfish, idealized love of Tennyson is far above the sensuous level of the Sonnets. The full purpose of the poem, however, is not revealed under either of these aspects. Beyond all else, its chief worth lies in the clear, calm, spiritual vision that loses personal feeling in larger interests, gathers in one the hopes, aspirations, and efforts of the age, and seizes with wise forecast the future of humanity itself.

With this "increasing purpose" the structure of the poem corresponds. At the outset the passionate emotion of the elegy predominates, while further on the tribute flows in more even course, until at last a wider outlook and a deeper peace are gained. After the introductory lyrics, the songs fall into three cycles, each cycle beginning with Christmas-tide. Step by step the essayist follows the progress of the poet's thought, through doubt and question and partial answer and higher teaching, to the triumphant close. He analyzes carefully the successive variations of the single central theme, and illumines by reverent, sympathetic interpretation each change in view and mood. His style is pure and clear, as befits his subject, and his modest volume forms a useful introduction and companion to one of the noblest of English poems.

Theodore C. Pease.

CORNELII TACITI ANNALIUM AB EXCESSU DIVI AUGUSTI LIBRI. THE ANNALS OF TACITUS. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by HENRY FURNEAUX, M. A., formerly Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Vol. I., Books I.-VI., pp. 612. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1884.

Of ancient works illustrative of that most interesting subject of collateral study for the student of church history or the clergyman, the condition of the Roman world in the opening years of Christianity, the "Annals of Tacitus" are of course the most important; the extant portions of them including by far the larger part of the reigns of Tiberius, Claudius, and Nero.

Until quite recently, the only aid in English to the understanding of this masterpiece of the works of the prince of Roman historians was the edition published in London in 1853, as one of Arnold's School Classics, consisting of the text of Karl Nipperdey, with a translation from the German of his Prolegomena and notes; the former containing, among other things, suggestive and instructive remarks upon "the political theory of Tacitus" and the credibility of the "Annals," and an exposition of what is there called "the grandeur and earnestness of his style." The original work of Nipperdey has now, however, reached its seventh edition, and has been thoroughly revised and much improved.

In 1870 there appeared in three small volumes, in the series entitled "Oxford Pocket Classics," a very serviceable edition for the general student, having in addition to the text an introduction, a life of Tacitus, a full chronology of the "Annals," and short notes, chiefly renderings of the more obscure or difficult passages.

Two years later, the commentary of Rev. Percival Frost was published in London, as one of the volumes of the "Bibliotheca Classica." This contains in the Preliminary Remarks an interesting discussion of the trustworthiness of Tacitus as an historian and of his other qualities as a writer, which are summed up in characterizing him as "picturesque in narrative, forcible in expression, and profound in reflection." This edition has also a considerable collection of words and constructions peculiar to this author or his age, or found elsewhere only in the poets, which are grouped together for examination and comparison. The comments on the text, quite limited in extent, are mainly upon the subject-matter, explanatory of allusions to personages, events, customs, etc.

Of very much the same character are the annotations in the "Annals of Tacitus," edited by G. O. Holbrooke, Professor of Latin in Trinity College, Hartford, pp. 523, Macmillan & Co., London, 1882. With slight variations this edition follows the text of Halm (Leipsic, 1877), and the notes are based on a careful consultation throughout of the standard critical works upon Tacitus, from Lipsius down. The numerous references to Madvig's and Roby's Latin Grammars, the maps of the empire and of Rome, Germany, and Campania, and the abridgment of Draeger's "Peculiarities of the Language and Style of Tacitus" add not a little to the value of this commentary.

The work of Furneaux, as it is the most recent, is also by far the ablest, and will be, when finished by the publication of the second volume, the most complete and the most profitable for study of all these treatises expository of Tacitus' "Annals."

Some idea of the character of the Introduction may be given by even a mere enumeration of the topics of the nine "chapters," or separate essays, which compose it. These treat in succession of the life and works of Tacitus, the genuineness of the "Annals," the sources of information open to the author and their probable value, the use made by him of his materials and the influence of his ideas and opinions on his treatment of history, the constitution of the early principate, the general administration and condition of the Roman world at the death of Augustus and during the principate of Tiberius, the estimate in Tacitus of the character and personal government of Tiberius, and the genealogy of the family of Augustus and of the Claudian Cæsars.

It is unnecessary to say that all these are points of exceeding interest and importance to any who are investigating the history of the first Christian century as well as to students of Latin literature.

Nearly all the chapter on "the syntax and style of Tacitus with especial reference to the 'Annals,'" covering thirty-two pages, the editor has derived, as he tells us, from "the exhaustive and no less concise treatise of Dr. Draeger into which are also gathered up the chief results of the labors of Döderlein, Bötticher, Roth, and others on this subject;" and that statement is certainly a sufficient guarantee of its superior value.

Furneaux adopts the text of Halm, preferring it to that of Ritter or even Nipperdey, as nearer to the manuscript, and prefixes to each book a full summary of its contents.

Confidence in the exposition he has given of the text is awakened at the outset by the assurance that "the whole commentary has been mainly drawn up from the abundant material collected by so many predecessors, among the earlier of whom those most used have been Walther and the

valuable edition of Ruperti, in which all the excursus of Lipsius and the chief results of the labor of other commentators down to his date are contained, while among later editors, those most constantly consulted have been Ritter, Orelli, Draeger, and Nipperdey." And this confidence is strengthened by the editor's use of such special works bearing on the criticism and interpretation of the text as Bötticher's "*Lexicon Taciteum*," that part of the complete and exhaustive new "*Lexicon Taciteum*" of Gerber and Greef which has been published, and in illustration of the subject-matter of such authorities as Mommsen's "*Römisches Staatsrecht*," Marquardt's "*Römische Staatsverwaltung*," Friedlaender's "*Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*," and Merivale's "*History of the Romans under the Empire*."

Of all these helps to the comprehension of this most difficult of Latin authors, Furneaux has certainly made a judicious and scholarly use. His commentary is not a collection of extracts from them, nor a mere digest of their opinions or statements; but it gives the results of his own independent study alike of the text itself, of the various views of its different expounders, and of all the best sources of information upon the history and antiquities of the time, in a clear and concise form.

As an evidence of the painstaking thoroughness with which he examines every point requiring consideration, and of his fair and impartial treatment of different judgments upon the same question, may be cited the paragraph preliminary to his discussion of "the estimate in Tacitus of the character and personal government of Tiberius:"—

"Several of the works on this subject are mentioned by Nipperdey, to whose list of various judgments may be added the vigorous defense of Tiberius by Professor Beesly ('*Catiline, Clodius, and Tiberius*,' London, 1878), the more modified praise in M. Duruy's *History*, the more unfavorable view taken by M. Boissier in his work '*L'Opposition sous les Césars*' (especially ch. 6, on the delators), and the unmeasured invective of Comte Champagny ('*Les Césars*').

"Many obligations, not easy to specify in their places, must be here acknowledged to several of these works; but my chief endeavor has been to give an independent judgment on the facts and interpretations of facts contained in Tacitus and other original authorities."

Remarking that Tacitus would undoubtedly wish his readers to take as his most deliberate judgment on Tiberius the summary at the end of the Sixth Book (ch. LI. 5), where his life is marked out into [five] periods, showing a gradual moral deterioration, affecting both his private habits and personal government, Furneaux proceeds to a critical and searching examination of all that is on record of the life of Tiberius, public and private, including the motives imputed to him by ancient historians.

The result at which the critic arrives is that "the stages and periods of change noted by Tacitus can be on the whole made out; though we should consider the explanation put into the mouth of Arruntius, that the character of Tiberius 'had been thrown off its balance by the force of despotism,' to be nearer the truth than the theory adopted by the historian as his own, — that of a true character asserting itself by slow degrees against the disguise of hypocrisy."

Perhaps this is the most satisfactory decision that can be reached as to this difficult historical problem, unless we prefer to remain content with the negative conclusion of Merivale: "While in the ample gallery of

full-length portraits which Roman history has given us between Cæsar and Vespasian Tacitus' painting of Tiberius undoubtedly displays the greatest genius in character delineation, the accuracy of the likeness is a matter of dispute which can never be settled."

E. P. Crowell.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

FROM CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

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Sermons to the Spiritual Man. By William G. T. Shedd, D. D., Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York. 8vo, pp. v., 421. 1884. \$2.50.

The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice. Chiefly told in his own letters. Edited by his son, Frederick Maurice. With portraits. In two volumes, 8vo. Vol. I., pp. xi., 552. Vol. II., pp. xii., 712. 1884. \$5.00.

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Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epistle to the Romans. By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Th. D. Oberconsistorialrath, Hannover. Translated from the fifth edition of the German by Rev. John C. Moore, B. A., and Rev. Edwin Johnson, B. A. The Translation revised and edited by William P. Dickson, D. D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow. With a Preface and Supplementary Notes to the American Edition, by Timothy Dwight, Professor of Sacred Literature in Yale College. Pp. xxiii., 588. 1884. \$3.00.

ERRATA.

Page 124, line 32, for *in* read *is*.

Page 237, line 7, for *foes* read *folks*.

Page 269, line 36, omit *in*.

Page 429, foot-note, for 24 read 20.

Page 429, foot-note, for *ch. iv.*, read *ch. iii.*

Page 442, foot-note, for *σωθήσονται* read *σωθήσονται*; for *αληθείας*, *ἀληθείας*.

Page 533, line 25, and *passim*, for *Garucci* read *Garrucci*.

Page 533, line 27, for *Bulletino* read *Bullettino*.

Page 539, foot-note, for *Bulletino* read *Bullettino*.

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
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
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